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Korea

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**NODONG SINMUN Views 'Foolish Schemes,'
Demands Execution of 'Massacre Ringleader' No
41100071 Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean
25 May 88 p 6**

[Article by Han Ong-ho: "No Tae-u, Prime Mover of the Kwangju Massacre Must Be Executed"]

[Text] On the occasion of the 8th anniversary of the heroic Kwangju people's uprising, angry outcries calling for minutely inquiring into actual facts and for executing the murder ringleader are coming out high from among the people of Kwangju City and various circles and strata of the south Korean people.

On 18 May, in 106 regions of south Korea, a great number of youths and students and various circles and strata of the people launched intensive anti-U.S. and anti-fascist demonstration struggle by means of holding commemorative ceremonies and memorial ceremonies. They cried out that the United States, chief instigator of the Kwangju massacre, must be driven out, and that traitors, No Tae-u and Chon Tu-hwan, must be executed. It is just a matter of course that blood-tainted outcries calling for the execution of homicidal maniac No Tae-u are unceasingly coming out of the south Korean people.

The criminal acts, committed in Kwangju 8 years ago by traitor No Tae-u, of consanguineous massacre atrocity at which both God and man would get angry are still fresh in the memory of the south Korean people who are bearing him a bitter grudge.

The greater leader Comrade Kim Il-song taught as follows:

"There have not yet existed within the recorded history such cannibals as south Korea's military fascist ruling clique who killed at a stroke thousands of people of the same blood with bayonets and rifles and who cruelly executed their political opponents."

As widely known to the world, the savagery of the Kwangju massacre was staged by "the five bandits," including Chon Tu-hwan, who was then "the commander of the security force" of the puppet army, No Tae-u, who was then "the commander of the capital city guard force," Chong Ho-yong, who was then the commanding officer of the airborne unit which was sent to Kwangju, and Pak Chun-byong, who was then the commanding officer of the Third Army Corps. The very ringleaders of these "Kwangju five bandits" were Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u.

Traitor No Tae-u, who was then "the commander of the capital city guard force," is a ringleader and a principal offender who led the van and who was in direct charge of a vast bloody operation designed to massacre insurgents in the Kwangju uprising in conspiracy with traitor Chon

Tu hwan in compliance with orders from Wickham [TN: Phonetic], commanding officer of the U.S. imperialist occupational aggressor forces in south Korea.

In the first place, No Tae-u is a vicious military villain, who marched, at the time of "the 12-12 coup d'etat designed to purge disloyal elements of the army," toward Seoul at the head of the 9th Division in the front area, killed 150 officers and men, arrested and put in detention more than 50 "generals" and high ranking officers, including Chong Sung-hwa, who was then the chief of the general staff of the puppet army and who was "the chief martial law administrator," and thereby seized the military power and played a decisive role in forming a military dictatorial "government." Because of this very "meritorious service," he was promoted on the next day to the post of "the commander of the capital city guard force" through the good offices of Wickham, commanding officer of the U.S. imperialist occupational aggressor forces in south Korea. Thus, to No Tae-u, the Kwangju incident provided a golden chance for efficiently showing his cruel nature to his senior authorities.

As soon as the massive people's struggle came about, Wickham again went to Washington and returned on 18 May a littler earlier than the schedule. Right on that day he held "a rush emergency meeting" of the puppet government and military authorities concerned, discussing measures designed to cope with the Kwangju situation and the operations designed to suppress demonstrations. And, on that very day, No Tae-u, together with traitor Chon Tu-hwan, was appointed by Wickham as head of the Kwangju operations for suppression.

In compliance with decisions of "the rush emergency meeting" which was designed to [map measures to] suppress the Kwangju struggle in its cradle, the following military forces came under the command of military villains Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u on 19 May: the notorious airborne special combat unit and part of the 20th Division of the puppet forces; and military and police forces, including the 31st Reserve Division, under the jurisdiction of "the Cholla Province martial law branch commander."

"If Kwangju falls into the hands of rioters, Seoul will fall and the safety of the United States will be endangered. Destroy the source of the rioters." This was the murder order given by No Tae-u to members of the airborne special combat unit who had been given hallucinogenic drug and turned into homicidal maniacs.

The No Tae-u murder gang of scoundrels indiscriminately massacred the uprising masses by means of employing even toxic chemical weapons, including the nerve gas. And, [even worse than that,] they made no scruple of staging beastly savageries, such as killing citizens by running over by tanks, by tearing stomachs, and by dismembering limbs.

The homicidal devil-like nature of No Tae-u, a leader of the Kwangju massacre, was displayed more and more fully after 21 May, when the Kwangju people's uprising reached a decisive phase.

Simultaneously with a meeting of high ranking U.S. authorities for policy coordination, which was held on 21 May, designed to [map measures] for the suppression of the Kwangju uprising, No Tae-u, who was urgently called in by Wickham, together with Chon Tu-hwan, submitted main points of actions and detailed strategy of "the second stage operations" designed to suppress the Kwangju uprising, taking initiative in requesting that he be [assigned to the task of] being directly in charge of the suppressive operations.

Wickham, who was well aware of No Tae-u's homicidal nature supported by "decisiveness," accepted that request right away and ordered that No be allowed to employ the forces under his jurisdiction as much as needed and as much as wanted.

In an effort to seize real facts of the Kwangju situation and to check on the situation surrounding preparations for operations, traitor No Tae-u went to the spot [Kwangju] on 24 May aboard a helicopter and conducted an aerial inspection over streets of Kwangju. On the next day, he sent one of his aides camouflaged with plain clothes, making him meticulously check on streets of Kwangju and their vicinities.

No Tae-u, who inspected Kwangju City for details and returned to Seoul, reported to Wickham on the situation as soon as he arrived in Seoul. He then held a face to face meeting with those military authority personnel of "the headquarters of special measures for Kwangju suppression" and discussed the scale of forces to be employed and the directions of attack. He then issued orders to launch immediate actions.

In compliance with No Tae-u's operational plans, quickly dispatched to Kwangju were: 3,000 men of airborne special combat units, including the 3d Airborne Unit, 7th Airborne Unit, and 11th Airborne Unit; and more than 10,000 men of the heavily armed 20th Division. They, together with the vast military forces already sent to Kwangju City, encircled the city doubly and trebly, shut off all the traffic of cars and the people, and thoroughly blocked and sealed off the supplies of all foods, water, and electric power.

At that time, No Tae-u, together with Chon Tu-hwan, in an effort to detonate by contact the long-accumulated regional sentiments called "the Cholla colony of the Kyongsang-do empire," weeded out Cholla Province origin [soldiers] from airborne special combat units and "martial law forces" and put only Kyongsang Province origin [soldiers] in them. He then, as he did at the time of the first onslaught, gave them wine and hallucinogenic drug and drove them into murders.

Homicidal ringleader No Tae-u talked big, on the eve of the 27 May Kwangju suppression, by telling to vicious officers: "This is not the time when you are prompted by pity. I will take responsibility for all of what you do. Those soldiers who kill many are going to be patriots."

On 27 May, an all-out attack was launched on Kwangju City in compliance with orders from the No Tae-u and Chon Tu-hwan clique.

Soldiers of "the martial law forces" and the airborne special combat units who closed in upon the city [streets] killed every citizen they met as if they were attacking "a city in the enemy zone."

Due to the heinous and atrocious fratricidal massacre operations of the No Tae-u clique, several hundreds of citizens were brutally massacred only in the last strongholds of revolters, including the provincial office building of south Cholla Province and the Chonil Building; and the Chungnam-no and Chungjang-no streets were stained with blood of revolting masses. Thus Kwangju, a city of a population of 800,000, was turned into "a dead city" and "a place covered with corpses."

Indeed, the savagery of Kwangju massacre staged by the No Tae-u and Chon Tu-hwan clique under the command of U.S. imperialism was the most brutal fratricidal barbarity which cannot be found within the memory of man in terms of brutality, cruelty, and wickedness. It was a consanguineous murder act which can never be forgiven [even] for a thousand years.

Traitor No Tae-u, a ringleader and prime mover of the Kwangju incident, is a permanent traitor and human rubbish who should have been placed on the people's adjudgment and executed a long time ago.

SEKAI, a Japanese magazine, revealed as follows regarding the state of feeling of No Tae-u, who gave a banquet of blood with merry laughs after the Kwangju massacre incident:

"They who massacred so many citizens in the Kwangju incident in 1980 gathered their representatives at the headquarters of an airborne unit in the suburbs of Seoul and even gave a banquet celebrating the suppression of Kwangju [uprising] in an act of madness.

"At that [banquet,] No Tae-u, making a boast of his "meritorious services," was buoyant like a hunter who caught a tiger."

Wickham, commanding officer of the U.S. occupational aggressor forces in south Korea, who received a call from home country and returned home later after that, answering questions from reporters about his feeling, reportedly said: "I think it was fortunate that the Kwangju incident was settled and "the government" was

saved during my term of office. If we did not have No Tae-u's strategy at that time, Kwangju City would have been turned into a Soviet zone." It was no accident that he said so.

No matter what conspiracy or trickery he may resort to, No Tae-u would never be able to wipe the fratricidal blood on his hands; he would never be able to hide his vicious true character as a homicidal ringleader. He would never be able to avoid the onus for the Kwangju incident.

Traitor No Tae-u, principal offender of the Kwangju massacre atrocity, must cast away foolish fraudulent

trickery, such as "the compensation for the Kwangju incident," etc., and must come forward without delay on to the stage of historical adjudgment.

The south Korean people and the people of Kwangju City would positively reject the foolish schemes of traitor No Tae-u who is attempting to strike out true facts of the massacre atrocity, at which both God and man would get angry, committed before the nation, and who is thereby attempting to avoid historical adjudgment. They would eventually execute the massacre ringleader and thereby make him pay the price for the blood of those brave fighters sacrificed.

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**SENTAKU Views North's Unpredictability,
Possible Threat**

*41050085 Tokyo SENTAKU in Japanese
No 7, Jul 88 pp 32-35*

[Text] Will North Korea Run Amuck?

The Seoul Olympics will be held for 15 days starting on 17 September. Two and a half months remain before the first event, the opening ceremonies. Reports and special feature stories in the mass media about the Seoul Olympics have become a bit more lively. Concern is being focused anew within these stories on the longstanding issue of whether the Olympics can be held uneventfully.

South Korea and the International Olympics Committee (IOC), indeed, have not dropped the flexible posture of urging participation up to the very last day before the opening ceremonies. However, opinion is overwhelming that under current circumstances, the participation of north Korea appears to be virtually impossible. As a result, the anxiety always runs across their minds that Pyongyang may go as far as to carry out some kind of obstructive activity. Lately, new and unstable factors, such as the actions of the Japanese Red Army and the deployment of modern weapons by north Korea near the 38th parallel, have begun to be rumored.

The West remains permanently fixed with an image of north Korea as a country "which could be up to anything, Heaven only knows." The Korean Air Lines bombing of last November further strengthened the impression of the brutality of Pyongyang. The truth is that the opaqueness of north Korea's actions causes everyone to worry, including its putative allies, the Soviet Union and China.

To be sure, we cannot yet rule out the possibility that north Korea will run amuck in an effort to smash the Olympics after having decided that daring to go it alone and become isolated would be positive for the country.

We find it hard to believe that the safety of the Olympics is fully ensured because both the Soviet Union and China will attend. This is because north Korea always brings out the fear in us that it might consider committing an "adventurous act" even though that would harm its fraternal socialist relations when it recognizes the decisive damage the Seoul Olympics and its success would have on its regime.

In fact, the participation in the Olympics of both China and the Soviet Union might so deeply wound north Korea's self-respect that it could cause north Korea to stir up more trouble by obstructive acts. Since the beginning of this year, the Soviet Union has expanded its supply of weapons to north Korea and has frequently declared that north Korea could not possibly sabotage the Olympics. Viewed another way, these actions are probably indications of Moscow's uneasiness.

Seoul Within SA-5 Target Range

Of course, in spite of all that, south Korea is busy attending to strengthening its counterterrorism measures, and both Japan and the United States are positively supporting that. As a result, we should be careful about placing too much emphasis on the risk.

At the 20th U.S.-south Korean Security Conference, which was held in Seoul from 7-9 June of last year, both sides were in accord on the point that "from the present moment up to the Olympics is an important period for the security of south Korea," and confirmed that they would strengthen their vigilance and surveillance quickly for the security of the Olympics and would cooperate closely to prevent terrorism.

The two parties incorporated this idea in the text in strong tones by saying, "No provocations to harm the Seoul Olympics can be tolerated." Moreover, this was reaffirmed by the statement, "From the period up to and through the Olympics, the United States military will maintain its security patrols in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula."

At a glance, this would seem to agitate the sense of crisis, but, actually, it does not. Secretary of Defense Carlucci at a press conference at the end of the sessions made known his outlook that he was confident in the security of the Seoul Olympics. His statement was as follows: "South Korea has been refining its plans for security measures with scrupulous care and has been conducting thorough training. I am confident that every method of guaranteeing the safety of the Olympics has been considered. We predict that the Seoul Olympics will proceed safely to a successful conclusion."

One item discussed at this U.S.-south Korean Security Conference was the impact that the SA-5 surface-to-air missiles and the SU-25 jet fighters, which north Korea recently introduced from the Soviet Union, would have on the military situation on the Korean Peninsula.

In particular, the SA-5 missiles, which are deployed near the demilitarized zone at the 38th parallel, have the range to strike Seoul. The United States and south Korean side, naturally, must consider the possibility that north Korea could fire that missile at Seoul's Kimpo Airport with the objective of sabotaging the Olympics. Needless to say, the introduction of new weapons into north Korea has heightened the concern of the United States and south Korea.

However, it is important that, in spite of that, Secretary Carlucci said that his "outlook was overflowing with confidence" with regard to the security precautions for the Seoul Olympics. We can surmise from the fact that, at the very least, a "security guarantee posture" has already been completely prepared and takes into account terrorist acts and other unforeseen occurrences.

Olympics Participation Illogical

Similarly noteworthy in connection with this point was the fact that not one word was mentioned at this security conference about the threat at the Kumkangsan Dam. At the 19th U.S.-south Korean Security Conference, held last year in Washington, the Kumkangsan Dam built by north Korea, raised major concerns regarding the possibility that it would be used to flood Seoul. In other words, Pyongyang would destroy the Kumkangsan Dam and submerge Seoul, thereby ruining the Olympics. The topic did not come up this time, however, because south Korea, having been so deeply worried about this possibility, went so far as to levy a tax on its citizens and build a "peace dam," in order to counter that threat.

However, even a threat of that magnitude failed to keep the attention of the United States and south Korean security authorities over the course of just a year. Why did such a clearcut assessment like that change? It seems to indicate that the "threat" has been estimated by a clear awareness of those on the receiving end and, what is more, was deemed greater than the actuality.

Today, there is even doubt as to whether, in the first place, Kumkangsan Dam is any "threat" to south Korea. Of course, it is true that up to a point in time last year, the United States and south Korea recognized it as a threat. However, the threat appears to have lessened by the passage of a little over a year's time. In the end, it was nothing more than "one man sumo [mere posturing by north Korea]."

Taking the above into full consideration, we find that the United States and south Korea consider north Korean "sabotaging of the Olympics" a great possibility. In fact, it is not surprising that the measures taken by north Korea up to now have forced the United States and south Korea to think that way. What is more, the truth is that they themselves may be conscious of that fact. Putting forth a solid and positive outlook on the security of the Seoul Olympics while pointing out the risk leaves plenty of room for such an interpretation.

Well then, when we consider the possibility of the sabotaging of the Olympics by north Korea, we should first consider the range of options that Pyongyang appears to possess. All sorts of scenarios have been proposed about the actions that north Korea could take, but if we were to categorize these, the following three possibilities emerge: (1) North Korea will participate in the Olympics whether the events are split between the two countries or held solely in south Korea, (2) North Korea will not sabotage the Olympics although it will boycott them, and (3) North Korea will not only boycott the Olympics but will work actively to sabotage them.

In proceeding from (1) to (3), we will shift gradually to the less desirable scenarios, but it is safe to assume that the first possibility has virtually no chance of occurring.

A shared hosting of the Olympics must be considered extremely difficult now even if a compromise were reached between north and south Korea because holding a number of events in Pyongyang is already out of the question in view of time and technical constraints.

Moreover, it is similarly illogical for north Korea to participate as "one nation" in an Olympics held only in south Korea. As described below, the idea of "a joint north and south Korean-hosted Olympics" has lately begun to be advocated in south Korea to an unprecedented extent and is in line with what north Korea is advocating. Pyongyang is not expected to be able to dare participate and ignore such opinions. The demand to hold a jointly hosted Olympics in south Korea would give north Korea an opportune excuse to "not participate in an Olympics held solely in south Korea."

No problems would probably surface if Pyongyang went no farther than scenario (2). This is because the outlook for improvement of north-south relations after the Olympics has never been gloomy. However, the problem is that there is no guarantee that north Korea will do that, and if the past is a guide, we do not have high hopes that such a scenario will occur.

As a consequence, most forecasts up to now have focused on the likelihood of north Korea's selecting the third path. However, recently, what could be called a fourth option has surfaced, and we must pay attention to the possibility that Pyongyang will select this new choice and then act upon it.

Finding Hope in South Korea's Student Movement

In other words, it is important that, in the midst of the rise of the "reunification argument" in south Korea, an inclination has emerged to attribute a certain kind of legitimacy to the demands of north Korea. A view that became especially influential among the college student body was to advocate outspokenly "a north-south Korean joint hosting of the Olympics," and to criticize Seoul's being the "sole host" as a hindrance to unification. Then, these student protesters began to urge the realization of a north-south student conference and, time and again, carried out political activity in support of this idea. Moreover, many students view the United States as a malevolent influence supporting separation and blocking reunification; they are demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. forces stationed in south Korea.

For Pyongyang, these truly reliable reinforcements seemed to gain force suddenly over the past several months. North Korea is undoubtedly emboldened by the fact that the south Korean Government has been unable to keep the student movement thoroughly in check and has taken the position of accepting the demands of the students to a certain extent, such as considering a north-south student exchange. That suggests the possibility that the present student demands could gradually obtain broad support in south Korea.

With the situation changing in this direction, north Korea, as a result, has begun to adopt fully the position of boycotting the Seoul Olympics and serenely watching the course of south Korean politics.

That point was made clear from the following statement by Ho Tam, chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland: "The authority to decide whether the north and south should host the 24th Olympiad jointly resides with the Korean people. As long as the Olympics are going to be held in Korea and not in another country, the Korean people have the authority to reject [sole sponsorship by the south], and to decide by what means [the Olympics] should be implemented. Moreover, in the present situation, when you have the people of the northern half of the republic, not to mention the broad range of people in southern Korea, strongly demanding that the 24th Olympiad be held jointly in the north and south, there are no conditions under which joint sponsorship cannot be realized.... While the young students of southern Korea are fighting to the point of committing suicide by harakari and drowning, how can we proceed to a place where people who devote their lives to the righteous patriotic struggle are being indiscriminately slaughtered, and compete in athletic games and participate in a sports event that is being coerced under the 'protection' of U.S. aircraft carriers? We cannot exchange the reunification of our fatherland, which affects the very existence of our people, for a sports meet. As Chairman Kim Il-song has said, we will not lose anything by not participating in the Seoul Olympics. Rather, we will obtain a revolutionary people."

As cited above, Ho Tam said that "the broad range of people in southern Korea are strongly demanding joint sponsorship of the Olympics." This is the first such definitive statement from a north Korean leader. In the past, Pyongyang has always declared, "Our proposal for joint sponsorship aroused a broad range of support and sympathy around the world," (as said by north Korean Olympic Committee Chairman Kim Yu-sun) and never asserted that it had obtained large support in south Korea. Of course, the proposal for joint sponsorship of the Seoul Olympics had been advocated by south Korean students for several months. Nonetheless, this was no more than a small segment of public opinion and not a basis for north Korea to claim that it had a broad range of support in south Korea.

However, the situation is currently undergoing great change. The demands of the students have surfaced, and voices are growing stronger among opposition politicians and out-of-power forces to seek to have the north and

south participate jointly and explore means for a dialogue and people exchanges. What is more, an explosive incident occurred when a college student committed suicide while demanding the realization of a north-south jointly hosted Olympics.

Avoiding Isolation and Preserving Dignity

North Korea appears to believe that the "legitimacy" of its proposal is slowly being recognized in south Korea. That being the case, it will treat the principle of "we cannot exchange the reunification of our fatherland, which affects the very existence of our people, for a sports meet," as a basic tenet, and boycotting the Seoul Olympics will in no way, then, damage the dignity of north Korea. It is truly possible that north Korea will retort defiantly that it "will not lose anything by not participating."

Furthermore, Pyongyang may reach the conclusion that, judging from the trend of the south Korean students, the need for planning to sabotage the Seoul Olympics has lessened. It was no mistake that the north-south Students Conference set for 15 August has been cancelled. The south Korean students, accepting that fact, will still aim for the realization of the north-south Students Conference and will set 17 September as the next alternate date. That day is the day of the opening ceremonies of the Seoul Olympics.

If that happens, it is more than likely that a storm of student demonstrations will sweep across the nation on 17 September, and Seoul will be enveloped in an atmosphere where Molotov cocktails and tear-gas canisters will fly about, and the opening ceremonies of the Olympics would be unbecoming and thrown into turmoil. The situation might deteriorate so much that the possibility cannot be ruled out that students might commit suicide, one after another, in protest of the "sole Olympics."

Such a situation could clearly damage the image abroad of the Seoul Olympics. On top of that, the students will argue the point that no matter how successful the Seoul Olympics were, "reunification receded" as an ironic result. To that extent, this can be considered precisely what north Korea desires.

In conclusion, the fear of greater isolation is lessened for north Korea since it can succeed without sabotaging the Seoul Olympics. At present, Pyongyang is obtaining supporters as never before within south Korea and may be breathing a sigh of relief. So much support abounds that the possibility seems to have been diminished that north Korea will move to ruin the Olympics.

POLITICAL

Relationship Between Domestic Politics, Anti-U.S. Movements Studied

41070090 Seoul WOLGAN CHOSON in Korean
Jul 88 pp 406-423

[Article by Professor Chang Tal-chung, Sogang University, "Korean Politics and Anti-American Movement

[Text]

From the Movement for Democracy to the Movement for Unification

The main variables in south Korean political change are known to be the 600,000-man military, 1 million college students, and the United States. If the military is understood to be the symbol of forces that preserve the existing system by means of its physical force under the protection of American military power, the college symbolizes the forces of political change through anti-American and anti-military movements. While the status quo forces have stressed order as a means for peace and development, the colleges, as anti-establishment forces, have demanded change.

In Korean political history, colleges as an opposition force have long provided ideology and realistic prescriptions. But the reason why today's colleges have emerged as important players in the Korean political process is that colleges have become the delivery rooms of opposition intellectuals who hold class-oriented ideology.

The opposition movement of the colleges has become specifically a movement for democracy by way of anti-Americanism. That the anti-American movement surfaced in the movement for democracy was an expression of moral criticism of the United States which aided the emergence of military authoritarianism in south Korea. But, with the emergence of the Sixth Republic, the opposition movement of the colleges has been transformed from a democratization movement by way of anti-Americanism. During the period of the Fifth Republic, the anti-American movement and the unification movement became a means for a democratization movement.

But, now the anti-American movement and the unification movement are not separate movements for a democratization movement, but merely different expressions of an anti-imperialistic movement. Such a convergence of the anti-American movement and the unification movement is being realized through a revisionist interpretation of the division of Korea. According to the revisionist interpretation of the division of Korea, the United States is not only responsible for dividing Korea, but also 43,000 men of the U.S. forces in Korea stand in the way of Korean unification. The convergence of the anti-American and unification movements is not necessarily unrelated to the class-oriented leftist movement.

The influence of radical ideology cannot be ignored in the evolution of the anti-American sentiment, which has been growing intensely since the early 1980's, into an anti-American movement.

But there are a few problems in simply characterizing the anti-American movement, which began openly in April 1986, and has now taken the form of a unification movement after having gone through the "Inchon Incident," the "29 June Declaration," and the start of the Sixth Republic, as a form of revolutionary socialist movement. The reason is that the main objective of the anti-American movement, for a unification movement, is above all, the pursuit of anti-foreign national self-determination rights rather than the creation of a socialist system through revolutionary violence.

In other words, the anti-American movement is a form of anti-colonial nationalism, which is common to the Third World, and surfaced in the process of socio-political changes in south Korea. The unification movement through the anti-American movement is not necessarily democratic, but it always bases its movement on democratic mass appeal. This movement shows a strong tendency to overcome the confusion generated by socio-political changes in Korea mainly, at present, by popular efforts rather than by a class. The class structure of Korean society presents some basic problems that have to be solved by nationalism

Against Political Decadence

This means a conscious formation of a supra-class national community independent of dominant foreign influence. Accordingly, despite its class-oriented characteristics, the anti-American movement is evolving into an anti-foreign, nationalist movement rather than a socialist international movement.

Especially, since our people have been under foreign influence so much more than any other people, they firmly believe in the view that the foreign powers are responsible for Korean reality. Furthermore, it is because few countries are more dependent on foreign power in their efforts to overcome their backwardness than our country.

Therefore, in today's perspective, the anti-American movement should be understood as a current of the postwar Korean nationalism developed in the process of overcoming its backwardness and international inequality. Of course, the present anti-American movement might put its roots down in the Korean society as a radical ideological movement.

But it is true that the anti-American movement as a radical ideological movement has failed to receive social and political support as democratization measures have been adopted.

The root of the anti-American movement is of course related to the fate of our country's dependency on foreign powers. Also, such a movement did not begin today. The student movement immediately following the 19 April uprising also followed a similar pattern to that of today's anti-American movement. But, despite our basic nationalist feelings against foreign influence, the special feature of the anti-American movement of the 1980's is that Korea's authoritarian political phenomenon is believed to have been created by American intervention.

Therefore, the anti-American movement of the 1980's is very much moralistic and deterministic. First of all, the reason why it is deterministic is that the anti-American movement appears to be a process in the Korean postwar history rather than an incidental phenomenon.

The reason why it is moralistic is that American policy and the postwar history of Korea are assessed from a moralistic point of view.

The anti-American movement appears in the form of opposition to the immorality of Korean social change and political decadence. The modernization strategy adopted throughout the 1960's and 1970's was a systematic attempt to overcome backwardness and to catch up with the advanced industrial nations by mobilizing resources in reserve, importing up-to-date technologies, and relying on foreign capital.

Such a strategy has aroused hope for progress and reform, and the hope has been believed to be realizable by actively participating in the world market system without challenging its usefulness or justness.

Three Points Of View

Joining the world market system means an acceptance of the legal and institutional restrictions that are provided by the moralistic influence of the West. Accordingly, the authoritarian phenomena of Korean politics and political unrest have not only been interpreted as an inability of our culture, which is not up to the standards of the advanced industrial nations of the West, but also as a product of our political immaturity, and it was assumed that they could be cured by American intervention.

But the after-effects of the Kwangju Incident have begun to nullify the universality and appropriateness of such a developmental strategy. The Kwangju Incident provided momentum for a rapid decline in American charisma or myth, and its moral authority in Korean politics. Herein lay the birth of the anti-American movement as a nationalist radical movement.

As far as the viewpoint of the anti-American movement is concerned, American-style institutions and liberalism are merely strategies devised and imposed upon such

disadvantageously and peripherally located countries as Korea by the United States for the purpose of depriving them of their ability to compete with the United States.

Therefore, the rising tide of anti-Americanism in Korea is a challenge to the concept of Western civilization, and at the same time it is a painful outcry against Korea's chronic political crisis.

The critical views of America which appeared in the postwar history of Korea have been generally presented from three viewpoints. First of all, there is criticism of America for its insufficient role as the protector. The general view of America's postwar Korea policy was that the United States has been understood to be a power to contain the expansion of revolutionary Soviet communism.

The criticism of America's Korea policy comes from such analyses. The focus of such analyses was criticism of the inadequacy of American exercise of influence in the military, political and economic areas in Korea. In other words, it was a criticism of the limited influence of the United States, which was supposed to protect south Korea from being overrun by expansionist Soviet communism. Korean scholars' analyses of the limited nature of the power of the United States has helped dispel the Koreans' illusion about American omnipotence.

But, the critical view of the absence of the American role as the protector has started to develop into anti-American sentiments. It was preceded by a nationalist challenge through debates on human rights in the 1970's. The human rights policy of the Carter administration against the Yushin dictatorship was denounced by the government as American interference in the internal affairs of south Korea, and thus the anti-American feeling was primarily a reflection of the sentiment on the part of the government.

Since such anti-American feelings however failed to enlist popular support, they did not develop into a movement. Inspired by the Carter administration's human rights policy and in contrast with the anti-American position of the government, the opposition leaders urged an American intervention for the purpose of overthrowing the Yushin system.

In the 1970's, the United States was still able to remain a symbol of democracy and progress probably because it was closely related to the Carter administration's foreign policy line which stressed responsiveness to the general historical changes of the Third World. Makers of foreign policy under the Carter administration such as Brzezinski and Vance attempted to improve the relationship with democratic forces of the Third World through human rights diplomacy rather than dealing with the Third World dictators.

Total of 80.9 Percent Unhappy

The foreign policy line advocated by Brzezinski and Vance, which was a historical forces-oriented rather than a personality-oriented one, stirred up strong opposition among conservative Republican intellectuals such as Kirkpatrick. Such a difference in foreign policy lines has surfaced more clearly since the beginning of the Reagan administration.

The Korean people's anti-American mood has spread quite rapidly, and the image of America, which was the symbol of democracy and progress, has been replaced by that of a nation pursuing imperialist national interests. Undeniably the reason for the change was inseparably related to the Reagan administration's foreign policy line.

In a sense, in the statement, "Our View on the Arson Case at the United States Information Agency in Pusan," made by the Korean Christian Social Proselytizing Council, and which could be viewed as the first open anti-American statement in the postwar history, there was criticism of the Reagan administration's Korea policy.

The statement stressed: "Ever since the United States was involved in determining the fate of the Korean Peninsula, it has been regarded as the most valuable ally of the Korean people. But the American approval of the suppression of the Kwangju uprising of May 1980, which turned into an incurable permanent wound, has brought a decisive change in the Korean people's view toward the United States."

"But, we cannot help but feel unpleasant about the continuous insulting remarks about the Korean people made since then by the Reagan administration's officials in dealing with Korean affairs and its economic policy." It went on to point out that the remarks such as that of "field mice" made (8 August 1982) by Wickham, commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea, or the "immature student demonstrators," made by Ambassador Walker (16 February 1982) have helped increase the Korean people's sense of distrust toward the United States. The statement also demanded "the recall of Wickham, the commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea, and Ambassador Walker," and a public apology or clarification of their remarks.

Similar statements were also made subsequently by other Christian organizations and civil rights groups.

Ignoring Rights

The anti-American statements of this sort made in the early 1980's are quite different from the attitude of the Korean people toward the United States, the protector,

until the 1970's. Moreover, such an attitude is qualitatively different from the view expressed by the radical ideological anti-American movement that has been spreading recently and which viewed the United States as an imperialist nation.

That is, these anti-American statements mainly focus on the consequential dimension of the American policy rather than its intentions or motives. Still, they do not go so far as to view the United States as an imperialist country whose basic objective is the exploitation of Korea. Accordingly, as they still view the United States as an ally and symbol of democracy, they earnestly seek to further the right of national self-determination for Korea and bring up the view that the United States is responsible for the Korean political phenomena.

Even though such statements from the early 1980's do not brand the United States as an imperialist state, they do reveal their displeasure in America's ignoring the right of Korea's national survival, and its pursuit of its national interests in the execution of the American imperialist role.

It is viewed that the Reagan administration's priority policy goal—law and order—is reflected in Korea in the form of interventions in the earnest desire for change in Korean society.

The view toward American imperialist policies is clearly reflected in a student survey called the "Perceptions of the System" which was conducted by the General Student Association of Seoul National University in March 1985.

This survey showed that 66.3 percent of the respondents were under the impression that the United States was a powerful and new-colonial power, while only 26.8 percent had the impression that the United States was imperialistic. But concerning Korean-American relations, 80.9 percent of those responding were dissatisfied with only 5 percent satisfied.

The image of America as an imperialist power as reflected in her exercise of functions as a powerful state was clearly demonstrated in surveys in which 95.0 percent, 91.7 percent of those surveyed, believed that American national interests took precedence in Korean-American political and economic relations. Of course, there is a great discrepancy between these surveys and the survey conducted by the CHOSON ILBO in March 1985 which showed that 57.7 percent of those surveyed believed that American national interests came first. Such a discrepancy might be derived from the fact that the student groups generally show progressive inclinations.

Systematized Movement

But another Seoul National University student survey conducted by the Seoul National University newspaper on their views of the United States showed that

68 percent of those responding considered the United States an ally. Such survey figures show that the college community holds a strong image of America as a nation pursuing imperialist policies rather than an image of it as an imperialist state.

Therefore, the anti-American consciousness among college students or the Korean general public is not directed toward the American people or its government but toward those who came to Korea and hurt Korea or those who represent their interests.

In more specialized terms, the anti-American sentiment among college students seems to be focusing on the undesirable consequences of the Korean-American relations rather than the intentions or motives of the U.S. Government itself.

Such anti-American sentiment is based on the understanding that American policy toward Korea is characterized by America's expansionist role in international power politics rather than a policy of intentional imperialist domination.

But, the influence of such a perception of America as an imperialist state has started to have bearings on Korean politics, and has thus given birth to a new political generation which believes that Korea's political and social changes could not have taken place without the external influence of America's expansionist drive.

It has come to be viewed that the reason for the absence of a spontaneous and self-selective discovery of Korea is that Korea depended for its existence on American expansionism which responded to its domestic and foreign environments or structural changes.

This new political generation considers all the Korean political, social, economic, and cultural phenomena to be reflections of the American policy change, and such a relationship is characterized in terms of a structural mechanism of dependency.

They seem to have taken the position that the only possible way to put pressure on the United States under such a framework of relationship is to resort to unusual methods such as a takeover or arson, as seen at the U.S. Information Agency in Kwangju, Pusan, and Seoul.

Such behavior may be viewed as an expression of accumulated anti-American sentiment by the new political generation which holds the Third World viewpoint. The move to reilluminate Korean-U.S. relations from the Third World's point of view was greatly influenced by the dependency theory which had been introduced in the mid-1970's. The second stage of the anti-American movement has emerged with more radical ideological characteristics. They have begun to judge the United States as an imperialist state.

The theoretical focus of the anti-American movement that has been examined so far has been on the power relationship between domination and subservience, which is derived from anarchical international relations rather than from the contradictions of American domestic economic and political systems. Therefore, the tendency to stress the responsibility rather than the motive of American policy is more conspicuous.

But with the movement of April 1986 against the training of new recruits in the training centers on the front, and the Inchon incident of May as the turning point, the anti-American slogans and the expressions of anti-American feelings have undoubtedly evolved into a little more theoretical and more systematized form of anti-imperialism. The reaction against the United States as an imperialist state has not necessarily taken the explosive form of a simply critical cumulative unhappiness.

Imperialistic View Of America

The anti-American movement on the basis of such a viewpoint rules that the Korean political, social, and economic systems are transformed systems of contradictions of the American capitalist system, and as a solution to the problem, it tries to preside over the revolutionary change of the system.

The anti-American movement, grounded on the ruling that the United States is an imperialist state, is basically different in understanding from the movement which stresses the responsibility of the American role in pursuing the imperialist national interest, or from the criticism of the role of the United States as the protector.

The anti-American sentiment or movement which stresses American responsibility focuses its analysis on the American role which grows out of the power relationship in international politics. But those who "view the United States as imperialist" make America's domestic class structure or American ideology their object of analysis. Those who view the United States as imperialist believe that the various contradictions and problems which arose in the postwar history of Korea resulted from the U.S.-Korea policy which tried to find solutions to the contradictions of capitalism.

Accordingly, they maintain that the United States has exported a coercive control mechanism to the Third World in order to impede the process of historical changes in the peripheral societies. But despite such differences in perceptions of the motives or consequences of American policies, the common phenomenon of anti-American feelings or anti-American movements that have developed since 1980 is that they all look at Korean-U.S. relations through critical and negative eyes.

Especially, those who take anti-American attitudes indicate a correlation between the authoritarian political phenomenon and the U.S. policy toward Korea.

The most basic characteristic of the anti-American movement that is spreading in south Korea is the assertion that the American interest and the Korean domestic oppressive forces have formed a conspiratorial collusion. The anti-American movements believe universally that Korean political authoritarianism and oppression are natural outgrowths of the American foreign policy. Therefore, the anti-American movement is a democratization movement in Korea.

The Kwangju Incident is not only known to symbolize political oppression by the United States but also regarded as a historic event marking a setback for Korean nationalism as a result of the collusion of domestic conservative forces with the United States. At any rate, there seems to be no room for argument that the Kwangju Incident has changed the view of America in the eyes of the Korean people in general, especially in the intellectuals, to a critical and negative one.

There seems to be a big difference between the emotionally-oriented anti-American movement, which finds the American role in the Kwangju Incident unique in nature to the Reagan administration, and the radical ideological anti-American movement, which finds the American role in the Kwangju Incident in line with the basic attributes of postwar American foreign policy.

First of all, the emotionally-oriented anti-American movement is a type of nationalist self-realization movement, which is a political phenomenon basically derived from the sense of frustration in the expectations for the United States, and at the same time is a reaction to the one-sidedness of Korean-American relations. Generally, the image of America held by the Korean people (at least until the end of 1970) was an exemplary symbol of modernization and democracy that Korea had tried to emulate.

The United States projected the alternate image of liberation and democracy, which enable the Korean people to free themselves from the yoke of colonial rule and monarchical authoritarianism.

American Responsibility

In the postwar history of Korea the influence of the United States has truly been enormous. It has exerted great influence not only on political values and principles but also on their practices.

The United States has not only provided an ideological principle for the Korean nationalist movement, but also has controlled the Korean people's life in general, ideologically and realistically, through its military rule of Korea from 1945 to 1948, its participation in the Korean war, and the massive scale of its economic aid.

Ideologically, the United States not only provided the ideological sources of liberal democracy, but also laid a foundation for strong anti-communist ideology. The

Korean people sought from the United States a driving force which would destroy the vicious cycle of monarchical authoritarianism such as the Syngman Rhee system or the Yushin system.

Accordingly, the forces of democracy in Korea not only always assumed that the United States would be the supporter of the democracy movement in Korea, but also demanded active involvement of the United States in the process of the democratization of Korea.

But because of the fact that the actual policies of America toward the authoritarian political phenomena of Korea have not been compatible with the image of America as a symbol of democracy, negative views of America have started to grow.

The holders of anti-American views assert that the United States destroyed its own image as a symbol of democracy through the Kwangju Incident by maintaining a honeymoon relationship with the regime which came to power illegitimately.

On the question of American responsibility in the Kwangju Incident, a comprehensive analysis and assessment are expected to be made in the future. But despite the denial of American officials, the people in the anti-American movement firmly maintain that the responsibility lies with the United States on the grounds that the Korean troops mobilized to put down the Kwangju uprising were under the command of the United States military.

At least, the people in the anti-American movement, as an emotionally oriented nationalist movement, implicate the Reagan administration in the Kwangju Incident and the rise of the oppressive regime. Although they give a positive assessment to the role of the United States in protecting Korea from communist aggression, they are concerned with the possibility of impeding the growth of democracy in Korea and its security, in the process of America's pursuit of its selfish national interests.

Unilateral Korean-American Relations

The order of priority in the Reagan administration's Korea policy is first, Korean security; second, economic growth; and third, political development. The Reagan administration's foreign policy toward the Third World, including Korea, which was widely made known throughout the world by former American Ambassador to the United Nations Kirkpatrick, places priority on security and economic development more than democratization and social reform.

Accordingly, the Reagan administration's foreign policy is pursuing American interests by maintaining a honeymoon relationship with the traditional ruling forces of the Third World countries (without regard to whether they are authoritarian or dictatorial) rather than dealing with the forces which seek political and social change.

The formation of Korean-U.S. relations through a honeymoon with an illegitimate government on the basis of such a United States policy is considered to be the principal cause for the outbreak of the anti-American movement in Korea.

From the standpoint of the anti-American movement, Korean-American relations have naturally been a one-way relationship. The Korean Government maintained a low posture to American pressure to the extent that its independence as a sovereign power was in doubt while it was oppressive to its own people.

Perhaps, the most dramatic case of such a dimension of the relationship was the American secret service officials' intrusion, accompanied by German shepherds, into the Korean foreign minister's office, located in the combined government office building, for the purpose of guarding the personal safety of visiting Secretary of the State Shultz.

Despite the history of a century of Korean-American relations, the fact that such an incident took place in the very center of the Korean Government not only helped create a strong impression that American understanding of Korea is still at an elementary level, but also made the people realize that the Korean Government was a subservient government which was manipulated by and under the control of the United States.

"Field Mice" Remark

Taking this incident as a start, many intellectuals and anti-American groups have begun to interpret the "Field Mice" remark made by Wickham, the commander of the U.S. forces in Korea, Ambassador Walker's remark of "immature students," daily appearances of the faces of American officials on television, and ever mounting economic pressures as part of the same phenomenon occurring in the framework of the one-way Korean-American relationship.

But the anti-American feeling for this sort of one-sided Korean-American relations should not be viewed as entirely a new phenomenon. Because, for example, the nationalist attitude surfaced in the development of the movement against the ratification of the Korea-Japan treaty. It was viewed that the economic development plan whose success depended on the United States and Japan could possibly impede Korean unification, and therefore, revision was demanded.

Furthermore, the progressive intellectuals and politicians during the Second Republic made their nationalist position which rejected foreign influences of both the United States and the Soviet Union very clear.

But even such an anti-foreign nationalist position did not brand the United States as an "exploiter, or an imperialist power." Such a phenomenon began to

develop when the general public suspected American support of the government which had been suffering from a chronic legitimacy crisis since the Kwangju Incident.

The anti-American movement is seeking reasons for Korean political oppression from the foreign domination logic rather than from the Korean historic and cultural traditions, or its political and social structures.

Especially, the radical ideology-oriented anti-American movement understands Korean political oppression, and all the social and economic problems, to be the results of America's intentional domination-motivated policy. They also view that America's role in maintaining a balance of power in northeast Asia is reflected in her offering of technology, equipment, and infrastructure for the purpose of maintaining anti-communist conservative regimes.

Particularly, it is asserted that the security-oriented policy of the Reagan administration not only means restrictions of the political activities of civilian groups, but also maintains a causal relationship with the control of civilian sectors by a militarist value system.

Of course, there is no doubt that the Kwangju Incident touched off this line of thinking. But the radical oriented anti-American movement considers the Kwangju Incident an inevitable phenomenon of Korean-American relations rather than an unexpected abrupt incident.

The radical anti-American movement is more ideologically oriented. According to its view, the Korean Peninsula has been integrated into the world capitalist system by the United States in accordance with her world strategic design.

For the purpose of economic exploitation, turning Korea into an anti-Soviet advance post and creating a nuclear base, it has become necessary for the United States to preserve an anti-communist military regime.

In other words, it says, in the process of pursuing its imperialist interests, the United States, in collusion with the Korean military regime, helped promote political oppression, and the Kwangju Incident was an inevitable outcome in the process of pursuing such a policy.

The United States, which was the liberator and the symbol of democracy, has been turned into an exploiter and a villain. This image of villain is understood in a historical context.

Starting from the American agreement with Japan's colonization of the Korean Peninsula early in this century, the responsibility for dividing the Korean Peninsula following its liberation, the policy to perpetuate the

reality of the division, and the honeymoon relationship with the Fifth Republic, Korean-American relations are explained in terms of a radical theoretical design.

The radical ideology views that all the domestic problems, including Korea's oppressive government and division, are the consequences of American policy, a dominant outside force, and these views have evolved through two stages.

America's Negative Role

The first was the stage when the study of dormant ideology was undertaken in the 1970's. The second was the stage when such a theoretical study evolved into a political action movement in the 1980's. The dominant theory that emerged during these two stages was the dependency viewpoint-oriented theory of new colonialism.

The dependency theory that began to be introduced through underground channels from the second half of the 1970's is based on the theory of new-Marxism which views the phenomena of the economic backwardness and the developmental dictatorship in Latin America as a result of America's new-imperialist capitalist expansionism. In accordance with this theoretical scheme, the political oppression of the Yushin system and the dependency-oriented economic development policy of the United States and Japan were explained in the context of a causal relationship. The authoritarian political phenomena in Korea has often been explained by the Confucian political cultural tradition.

But, in order to explain the political authoritarian phenomenon which remains constant despite the changes in the social structure and value consciousness as the economy developed, it has emerged as an alternate theory to the dependency theory. Since this view looks at the phenomenon of the political oppression of the Yushin system in relation to Korea's pursuit of a dependency-oriented economic development strategy, the Pak government was ruled to be a political agent of Japanese monopoly capitalism, which aimed at the exploitation of labor, and the domestic economic groups as overseas branches of Japanese monopoly capitalism or comprador capital.

But, what is called to our attention here is that despite the introduction of such a viewpoint as the dependency theory, the political and social opposition movements under the Yushin system concentrated their efforts to bring about political democracy by overthrowing the Yushin system. However, this movement did not question the morality of the capitalist system.

Also, as the Pak regime under the Yushin system was the object of attack by the Carter administration's human rights policy, the goal of the anti-government and democratization struggles was not anti-American or anti-capitalist, but was strongly anti-Japanese and nationalist.

But, it might be viewed that such a dependency-oriented viewpoint has provided a base for the birth of a "first" generation political class, for the first time in our country since the Korean war, and has begun to treat the political and social phenomena from a class standpoint.

With the Kwangju Incident as a turning point, this political class has turned the political movement for democracy into a movement for the overthrow of the class-oriented system. The political reality after the Kwangju Incident has become a proving ground for the theory and practice of a radical political generation.

Was America Responsible?

The Kwangju Incident has begun to provide a new concept for historical change. Along with the basically negative viewpoint on traditional postwar Korean history, which mainly dealt with the heroic activities of the ruling elite or political events, the Kwangju Incident gave birth to new analytical views which seek historical truths from the life and thought of the masses.

The crystalization of such a move is none other than the anti-American movement. If the political and social movements of the 1970's were rational movements critical of dependency on Japan, those movements since the mid-1980's have been anti-system and anti-imperialist movements focusing on America's negative role.

The anti-imperialist logic appearing here is a Kautsky line of theory rather than a Leninist theory. The main object of debate is the question of the exploitation of the Korean people by a collusive relationship of the United States and Japan rather than the troubled relationship between the United States and Japan.

Therefore, political authoritarianism in Korea is explained as an export of American imperialism. That is, it views the work of the United States in Korea since 1986 as having been to promote and preserve a strong and stable pro-American dictatorship capable of ensuring the realization of American political, military, and economic interests rather than the promotion of democracy in Korea.

The 29 June Declaration and the enactment of a new constitution following a 8-day conference between the ruling and opposition leaders is judged to be a high-handed manipulation to promote, without interruption, the colonial interests of the United States through the formation of a pro-American alliance.

Supposing that American opposition to and intervention in the Korean Government's attempt to issue an emergency mobilization order was an act of interference in the internal affairs in order to preserve dictatorship and suppress democracy, they assert that democracy would be unachievable without first smashing the United States.

Because of such a radical ideological perception, the anti-American movement began from a total rejection of the overall American policy toward Korea rather than dissatisfaction with a simple political authoritarianism or one-sided relationship between the United States and Korea. Therefore, it becomes a new challenge for Korean politics to put its relationship with the United States on firm ground. Depending upon how a movement of this persuasion is dealt with in the future, a good deal of change might occur in the qualitative dimension of Korean politics.

The main problem presented by the anti-American movement might be that it would call for a reappraisal of the basic foundation of Korean foreign policy itself in the future since the main issues of the anti-American movement, such as unification, subordination of the military, the nuclear question, trade friction, and economic dependency, are the most basic questions that Korean politics must address.

The first issue that the anti-American movement raises concerning Korean foreign policy is the responsibility for the division of the country. The anti-American movement starts from the argument that the United States was responsible for the division.

According to their assertion, the most important causes for the division of the Korean Peninsula were linked with America's military strategy against the Soviet Union, the monopoly capital in the country, and the dictatorial power which rides on the American strategy.

Accordingly, if the responsibility for the division supposedly lies with the United States, the most important question here is the removal of the American role. This is believed to be the shortcut to national unification.

For example, according to the equality that "unification equals democratization movement," the ultimate goal is a democratization movement, and the shortcut to a democratization movement would be the overcoming of the U.S. led division. Therefore, the removal of American influence is considered to be a first priority in the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Power of Military Operations

But, although organizations such as the National Unification League (Mintong Yon) which take such a position believe that the division of the Korean Peninsula and Korean political oppression were an outgrowth of the process of promoting the American interest, a Korean foreign policy task for national unification should be, they advocate, a self-reliant national policy on an equal footing with the United States and Japan. In this respect, a thorough-going anti-Americanism does not appear to be their ultimate goal in their arguments for national unification.

But, since the anti-American movement that characterizes the United States as an imperialist power, views that Korean unification or democratization would never be realizable without severing relations with the United States, the policy toward the unification argument of this force is considered to be basic to the fundamentals of the Korean foreign policy.

The second issue that the anti-American movement raises for Korean foreign policy is the anti-nuclear movement and the question of subordination of power of military operations. The most important reason that the anti-American movement and the anti-nuclear movement operate on the same equation is that the nuclear question has a direct bearing on the very question of the annihilation of the people.

In the process of the Soviet response to an American policy of a military build-up throughout the world, north and south Korea not only become a possible site for nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, which could reduce the land to ashes, but also, if indeed a nuclear war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, it would mean the extinction of the Korean people.

Especially, the anti-American movement believes that if the United States uses nuclear weapons to help a certain special interest, or to promote the American interest, this has a direct bearing on the survival of the Korean people.

The most important core of the nuclear question that the anti-American movement is depending on is the view that the possibility of the danger of nuclear war and national extinction increases because of the fact that the Korean Government is not empowered to conduct military operations. It is known that the Korean military, excepting the 2d Army in the rear, the Special Warfare Command, and the Capital Defense command, does not possess the power to conduct military operations.

Since the absence of the power to conduct military operations constitutes the basic framework of subordination to the United States, a solution to this problem, it has been suggested, is that a self-reliant national defense should be imposed which allows the Korean military the power to control the national armed forces and to make independent decisions on military matters on the Korean Peninsula.

If one looks at the situation in this way, the anti-American and anti-nuclear movements may be seen as a nationalist movement of military dimensions for the recovery of independence of the military. But the fact that the issue of military independence has been raised by the people rather than the government is not only interesting, but also raises the possibility that the independent national defense might take the direction of developing nuclear weapons independently. There seems to have been no mention of this point even by the radical anti-nuclear people.

The most immediate issues of the anti-American movement that have been raised as the current problem for Korean foreign policy are trade friction and economic dependency. The anti-American feelings in the area of the economy originate in the belief that the import restrictions and the pressure for market opening are excessively one-sided.

The fact that the United States is pushing simultaneously two mutually contradictory policies of protective import restrictions and market opening on the basis of a free trade principle is nothing other than a pursuit of one-sided self-interests by taking advantage of the asymmetrical Korean-American relationship.

It is viewed that the reason why it is possible for the United States to put such one-sided coercive pressure, such as trade restrictions and market opening, on Korea is related to the fact that Korea maintains a form of government that cannot help but buckle under such pressure.

Since American economic pressure is viewed as an act of pursuing one-sided self-interests against a dependent state by taking advantage of the asymmetrical relationship between Korea and the United States, it is maintained that the only way to rectify such a situation is to establish a democratic government.

Market Opening Pressure

But it appears that anti-American feelings in the area of the economy are evolving on a clearly differentiated level from other areas. The more nationalism-oriented anti-American movement seems to focus its attention on the unhistoricity presented by American economic pressure and the conflict of the cultural value system. Its argument of unhistoricity points out that American economic pressures on Korea should not be pursued on the same level as the United States has done to Japan or Canada.

American policy has tried to tie the Korean economy to the Japanese economic sphere and tried to impose trade restrictions on Korea on the same level with Japan, which it nurtured for 4 decades with generosity and protection in the postwar period. For these reasons it is criticized for its lack of a sense of history.

Since the pressure of trade protectionism that confronts the "American-style democracy" is viewed as basically an inevitable consequence of the relative decline of American superiority and the growth and development of Korea, it is also viewed as a one-sided consequence for the United States, America's one-sided imposition of pressure on Korea will agitate the Korean people's sensitivity and could seriously affect relations between the two countries.

Cultural Frictions

From the standpoint of the conflict of cultural values, the economic frictions between Korea and the United States are basically the conflicts in cultural value systems. For example, the American demand for the opening of the Korean market to American goods which are not compatible with the needs of the Korean market, as has been seen in the case of American pressure for Korea's acceptance of American agricultural products, is viewed as behavior which unilaterally forces its demand for accepting goods in areas where it enjoys superiority without regard to the partner's situations.

Because the United States is trying to sell its surplus goods to Korea without regard to the needs of the Korean market, while Korea produces and exports goods in accordance with the need of the American consumer market, a basic difference in understanding of the value systems of market demands has surfaced.

While the United States charges that because of Korean policy American goods are not imported into the country, Korea believes that the United States is trying to impose the American value-oriented goods on the Korean value system instead of trying to develop the goods that are suitable to Korean consumer markets.

Although such unhistoricity and anti-American feelings arising from different cultural value systems have the potential of being easily transformed into a radical anti-American movement, the situation can also be eased through diplomatic adjustments between the two countries. But ideologically oriented people look at such economic problems from the same theoretical framework as other problems.

For example, the "Democracy Square No 8" issued in the name of the General Student Association of Korea University characterized America's Korea policy as a political fact that derived from the basic nature of American capitalism, and it went on to maintain that American economic pressures were "frantic efforts to drain out the surplus values created by the south Korean people in the direction of the United States by degrading south Korean society into a land to be exploited economically by the United States."

It is a reality that the tone of writing as exemplified by, to begin with, "Democracy Square," "A Million Students" or "Unity Into One" that have led the anti-American movement among the college student community comes from such radical perceptions.

This anti-American movement with a radical perception is expected to go through a stage of its own "nucleus split" since such a movement has failed to enlist the support of the general Korean population, let alone the college community, since 29 June.

Therefore, depending upon how well foreign policy in the area of the economy reflects the emotionally oriented nationalist anti-American arguments, it could make the anti-establishment-oriented ideological perceptions correct themselves.

In conclusion, it is necessary to point out the problem with our perceptions which have so far considered the anti-American movement as the movement of anti-government forces. In fact, it is deemed necessary to point out the fact that the anti-American sentiment is spreading among the so-called right-wing camp. The reason is that a good portion of anti-establishment leaders are leading anti-government movements with the support of various organizations and groups which have links with the United States in one form or another.

Whether they were religious organizations or civil rights groups, the American influence has been enormous. Accordingly, it is not an exaggeration to say that the anti-American mood is at least proliferating structurally throughout the Korean population.

Conservative Anti-Americanism

The phenomena that are most worrisome in the event that such anti-American feelings and movement are not accommodated properly in the political reality can be summed up into three parts.

First of all, there is the worry that the anti-American movement, which is revolutionary and aims at the overthrow of the system, might become further strengthened. Secondly, another fear is that to counter such an outcome, a more oppressive authoritarian government might appear. Thirdly, some fear that indigenous reactions against everything Western, including Christianity and Catholicism, could erupt.

Some members of the intellectual community have already begun to launch serious discussions of the question of balance between the religious organizations which exercise excessive political influence, and other political and social groups. They are showing an in-depth reaction against the value systems of American and Western education and culture.

At any rate, in order to prevent such an extreme phenomenon from developing, it is necessary for Korean politics to clarify externally its position of the nationalist self, and also internally, to turn the political and social system into a system that reconciles social friction.

Korean society is still in the process of democratization. The democratization process itself will bring a major change to the Korean society. However, the price of such a change will be less than the price of overthrowing the system by means of revolutionary reaction.

In this respect, both Korea and the United States have come to a point where they must seek a future course from the lessons of the past, not only because there is an inseparable relationship between the anti-American movement and Korean politics, but also because today's anti-American movement is viewed as a reality originating in the postwar Korean historic current, rather than an incidental phenomenon which can be easily controlled physically.

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'Fundamental Logic' of 'Anti-American Struggle' on College Campuses

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[Article by free lance writer Yu Chong-ha: "The Fundamental Logic Behind Anti-American Struggle Recently Undertaken by University Students Is "The United States Which Has Supported Military Dictatorial Regime and Extreme Anti-Communist Policy is the Fundamental Reason for National Division and Stumbling Block to Reunification."]

[Text] Meaning of Mr. Cho's Death

"The red mountains and rivers are calling me. The place where one exerts daily labor against one's will./Even though rice ripens well, the weeds/Keep coming back with blood and tears on the Korean Peninsula/In the rice paddies, Ah—The red mountains and rivers are calling-/Calling you to cut the chains of bondage/Calling my body and soul, wriggling/Alive/Ah the reviving Korean Peninsula."

This phrase is quoted from a poem "Reviving Korean Peninsula" which was written by Mr. Cho Song-man, who died a heroic death by jumping from the top of Myongdong Cathedral in Seoul after disemboweling himself on 15 May. What could have driven an ordinary young man, who initially entered Seoul National University (SNU) in the chemistry department in 1984 and returned to school after his military service, to such a death?

"I truly cannot understand. I feel that most mass media and even opposition political forces are minimizing the meaning of brother Cho's death by limiting it to the detainee release issue as if that is the sole touchstone of the 'new era' that the No Tae-u regime advocates. Of course, this issue is an important precondition of democratization, therefore it is true that brother Cho declared the 'release of prisoners of conscience' when he jumped from a high place after disemboweling himself. The reality of our country, however, in which we are moaning over the division of our fatherland while being subservient to foreign forces, is what drove him to commit suicide."

This was stated by Mr. L (senior at SNU) whom I met at Kyonghee Palace Civic Park where Mr. Cho's funeral service was held. In effect, all the newspaper and broadcasting media, which reported Mr. Cho's death with headlines such as "Suicide by Jumping from High Place Demanding Release of Prisoners of Conscience," failed to mention the most integral part of Mr. Cho's suicide note.

Mr. Cho claimed four articles in his suicide message: They are, reunification of the Korean Peninsula should not be blocked by any one, the United States should withdraw from the Korean Peninsula, the military government should definitely disappear, and the coming Olympic Games should be co-hosted. In short, it raised the issues of autonomy, democracy, and reunification at the same time, while giving the most weight to the issues of "anti-American struggle" and "national reunification". This can be viewed in the same context as the recent student movements which regard anti-American struggle and the struggle for accelerating national reunification not as two separate entities but as one closely connected task. For convenience's sake, this article will mainly deal with the recent student movement with a focus on the issue of the anti-American struggle.

Aggravating Anti-American struggle

Many people feel that the anti-American struggle this year has been intensifying more than at any time in the past. Of course, it is common knowledge that the legend that "South Korea is virtually the only quiet spot in the worldwide anti-American struggle," was completely shattered since the anti-American struggle became enflamed with the "Kwangju Uprising" in 1980. However, what is causing this flame to grow stronger this year?

The student movement circles, first of all, mention changes in objective political situations such as the inauguration of the No Tae-u regime and south Korea's hosting of the Olympic Games as the reasons. In other words, they think that the United States and the No Tae-u regime view the year 1988 as a period to reorganize the ruling system of the military dictatorship and to firm up the U.S.-south Korean relationship. Through these processes, they claim, the No Tae-u regime can stabilize its power system with U.S. assistance while the United States is constructing a foundation to maximize its political, military, and economic interests in south Korea as the reward for its assistance to the No Tae-u regime. In particular, they claim that such U.S. intentions are well exemplified in its efforts to make the division of north and south Korea permanent through a divided Olympics, to strengthen the close relations between the United States and south Korea, to aggravate south Korea's military dependency by demanding south Korea share the expense of the U.S. Armed Forces there, to put pressure on south Korea to open its domestic markets to imported U.S. industrial- agricultural products and livestock, and to put pressure on

continued foreign exchange appreciation. They further explain that all these U.S. claims require the sacrifice of the Korean people and therefore, the "patriotic democratic forces" cannot but intensify the anti-American struggle.

It seems that internal situations within movement circles such as the student movement also have a great impact on this phenomenon. In other words, it was necessary to have a new change of direction in order to overcome the disintegration and lethargy that have become more serious since the defeat in their struggle in the presidential election. Such slogan as "Let's unify with anti-Americanism" by students in certain movement circles well illustrate this kind of internal situation.

The first sign that the "anti-American movement" was appearing as a central issue of the student movement was indicated in the "New Year Resolution Rally for Struggle" held at the student center of SNU on 11 January of this year. The fact that the rally adopted the "anti-American struggle" as the first task of the student movement in 1988 at a time when denunciation struggles against the rigged election such as the so-called "Probe into Kuro District Office Incident" were still in progress appeared a little unusual in light of the situation at that time. That is, those circles considered the struggle for denunciation of a rigged presidential election and the struggle for the National Assembly elections to be more imminent, as opposed to strengthening the anti-American struggle. In consequence, this rally itself was generally known not to have received much attention.

However, as approximately 5,000 farmers from the National Dairy Farmers Association held the "Resolution Rally for Restricting Beef Imports" in front of the National Assembly building in Yoido on 18 January, thus attracting significant attention to the issue of the U.S. pressure on import market opening, the student movement circles promptly reacted on 21 January to issues concerning the United States by holding the "Debate on the Current Situation Concerning the U.S. Pressure for Opening the Import Market and Rally of Denunciation of U.S. Economic Aggression". Also, as their struggle guideline in the 13th National Assembly election did not accomplish a unified agreement, thus falling into a chaotic condition, the anti-American struggle began to carry relatively more significance and to inspire more direct actions.

Young Student Save-The-Nation Death Squad

"We are sons and daughters of the great Korean people. As we look at our current situation, we cannot simply sit and watch the destiny of our fatherland fall permanently into the hands of U.S. dominance and aggression. Furthermore, we can no longer sit idle and allow the people's lives to suffer under a military dictatorship, therefore we hereby swear that we will be in the vanguard in our struggle to save our nation by devoting our body and soul with our flaming true patriotic hearts.

"On 16 February of the 44th year of the division of our fatherland" ("Affidavit of Young Student Save-The-Nation Death Squad")

On 24 February at 5:00 pm, the day before the inauguration of President No Tae-u which would launch of the 6th Republic, five students from five universities in Seoul, Korea University, Yonsei University, Hanyang University, Kukmin University, and Ewha University took control of the American Cultural Center library located on the second floor, staged a sit-in shouting anti-American slogans and were taken into custody 50 minutes later. These students disclosed that they had formed the "Young Student Save-The-Nation Death Squad" and decided to enter the American Cultural Center in order to punish the extended military dictatorship and the United States which supports it.

Meanwhile, on 26 February at 9:00 am, 2 days after this incident, a homemade time bomb was found on a bookshelf of the library located on the first floor of the American Cultural Center in Kwangju, which also was reportedly installed by a Yonsei University student who was a member of the Young Student Save-The-Nation Death Squad.

This incident caused an enormous shock within and without the country due to the fact that it was timed at a critical moment of the presidential inauguration and that an attempt was made to attack a U.S. agency with a bomb, even though it was a crudely handmade one which was not meant to kill anyone. Also, this incident was a "signal flare" which foretold that the anti-American struggle would come to the surface as a more integral task in the student movement in 1988. In particular, the analysis is made that the affidavits, declarations, and journals of the "Young Student Save-The-Nation Death Squad", which were published as a book titled "Comrade, My Comrade!" (by Seoul Area University Student Leaders Council), have greatly influenced the heightened anti-American struggle because of the wide readership among students. Let's look at one phrase quoted from a declaration from this book.

"...Through the Kwangju Incident and the past election, we came to a clear realization that the United States is the fundamental enemy that hinders the realization of democracy, therefore, democracy cannot flourish in this land without independence from the United States. Nowadays, nobody says that the United States is a guardian of world peace and a motherland of democracy. ...The United States is a true arch-villain for the division of our fatherland and a de facto manipulator of dictatorship.... To the proud Korean people, we offer the true heart of young students."

Such a conception becomes even broader and more specific in the development of subsequent student movements. In other words, the anti-American struggle has further expanded at a rapid pace as the struggle for promoting national reunification has become vigorous

with the north-south Korea student conference, which was suggested in the SNU student senate presidential election campaign, and the struggle to probe into the details of the Kwangju Incident and prosecute those responsible.

On 20 May at 11:30 am, the day after Mr. Cho Song-man's funeral, a group of college students threw a privately manufactured bomb into the U.S. Embassy located in Sejongro, Chongro-ku, Seoul and stirred another shock wave. Seven college students who are members of the "Young Men's Patriotic Death Squad", which belongs to the "Student Association for the Struggle to Secure the People's Right to Live and for the Punishment of the United States, the Chief Criminal of the Kwangju Massacre, and the Dictatorship of Chongwadae", which is affiliated with the "Association of University Student Senates in the Seoul Area", entered the U.S. Embassy while exploding homemade explosives and staged a demonstration, tore the U.S. national flag, waved a large placard on which was written "Expulsion of American Imperialism, the Chief Criminal of the Kwangju Massacre", and were taken into custody after five minutes.

The "Declaration of Struggle of Young Men's Patriotic Death Squad", which was contained in the leaflets distributed by those students, claimed that "The very existence of our people hangs in the balance with nuclear weapons. The right of military operations was misused in massacring the patriotic citizens of Kwangju. Our pure Korean culture is being contaminated by the Yankee culture." It also argued for the prosecutions of Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u and American imperialists, who are the arch-villains of the Kwangju Massacre. In a press conference held at the Chongro Police Precinct, they claimed that "In order to punish American Imperialism which is colonizing the Korean Peninsula, we threw a privately made bomb into the U.S. Embassy which can be viewed as its government-general." They also argued that "We firmly believe that our act will be a signal of struggle to expel the United States from this land."

Attacks on U.S. institutions continued to take place after that incident. On 23 May, three days after the U.S. Embassy bomb throwing incident, a dozen students of Chonnam University (south Cholla University), who are members of the "May Death Squad", threw fire bombs at the American Cultural Center in Kwangju, climbed on to the roof of the building, shouted anti-American slogans, and staged demonstrations. On 26 May, three days after this incident, 30 college students threw fire bombs at the Pangbae-dong branch of the Korea-America Bank and staged demonstrations shouting slogans "Let's Expel American Bums Who Extort the Opening of Import Markets."

At the same time, several other college students committed suicide claiming anti-Americanism and caused great shocks in society.

On 18 May, Mr. Choe Tok-su of Dankuk University (he was a sophomore in the law department who was on a temporary leave of absence) burned himself at its Chonan campus and died on 26 May leaving the statement "The United States, which we have learned to be our permanent friend, sympathized with the Kwangju Massacre, going beyond the level of tacit consent and assistance. On 4 June, Mr. Pak Nae-chon, president of the student senate of the Liberal Arts College of Sungsil University (junior in the Korean literature department) shouted slogans such as "Prosecute Those Responsible for the Kwangju Massacre." and lit fire to his body after pouring paint thinner over it and died on 7 June.

This phenomenon of violent anti-American struggle has expanded in a broad range. The "Committee for Nationwide Joint Struggle to Probe into the Details of the Kwangju Massacre and Punish Those Responsible", which was organized not only by student groups but also a multitude of opposition groups, religious, and youth groups, declared 27 May as the day of "Remembrance of the Spirits of the Kwangju dead and the anti-American struggle" and organized the "National Parade for Punishment of Chief Criminals of Kwangju Massacre and Denunciation of the United States, the Behind-the-Scenes Manipulator of the Massacre". In spite of a police blockade at the source, approximately 4,000 citizens and students staged intermittent demonstrations in and around the Myong-dong and Ulchiro areas until late night shouting slogans such as "Let's Drive Out American Bums Who Maneuvered the Kwangju Massacre Behind the Scenes."

Characteristic "Popularization" and "Totalization"

The anti-American struggle which burst into flame at the beginning of this year generally is characterized by several trends. It can be divided into two large aspects, "popularization" and "totalization", respectively.

First, there is an indication that the anti-American struggle goes beyond the range of certain declaratory student movement sectors and is being expanded on a broad popular basis. When a certain daily newspaper conducted a public opinion poll on 6 June, asking the question "What is your view of the United States?", some very interesting results came out: The first option that the United States has traditionally been our friendly ally and it will continue to be so was chosen by 31.1 percent of the respondents, the second option that the United States has been friendly to south Korea only when its interests coincided with those of our country and it will continue to be so was chosen by 38.6 percent of the respondents, and the third option that the United States has sacrificed our country for its benefit believing us to be a "blood ally" or "permanent friendly nation" and it will continue to do so was chosen by 15.8 percent of respondents. This result indicates that there has been an increase in the number of people who have critical views of the United States compared to the past. Of course, the tendency of anti-American sentiment among

students is much higher, which is reported by various opinion polls. (For example, according to a survey on the attitudes of freshmen conducted by the SNU Life Research Institute, more than 80 percent of freshmen chose the anti-American option.) The opposition and student movement circles claim that this kind of "anti-American turn-around" is a testimony to the fact that the base of the anti-American struggle is widening on a popular basis.

However, some have different views on this argument. Mr. P (age 29, corporate employee) who majored in sociology at SNU has a more prudent view and posed a rhetorical question that "It is true that the people's old concepts of regarding the United States as a "blood ally" or "permanent friendly nation" are certainly changing. But I think it is somewhat premature to say that anti-American sentiment is expanding with the result of this single survey. Particularly, can one describe the second option as really anti-American?"

Second, one can consider the totalization of the anti-American struggle. Mr. Ham Yun-kyong, who masterminded the break-in and sit-in at the American Cultural Center in Seoul in 1986, had the following recollection in a speech that he made last March.

"I was very cowardly three years ago. Not even once, was I able to shout the word 'anti-American'.... 'You are anti-American, are you not?' I just mumbled by saying that 'No, I am not anti-American. I entered the American Cultural Center in order to achieve the establishment of a proper U.S.-south Korea relationship.' ...However, nowadays, the phrase 'Yankee Go Home' has become very natural to us."

As is indicated with these expressions, student movement circles pursue the anti-American struggle with their fundamental concept that the United States is a foreign power that must be completely expelled from this land. The fact that the method of attack became more physical such as by using homemade bombs can also be understood in this context. The fact that opposition interests, religious and youth movement groups, whose intensity of demands tends to be weaker than that of student movements, have also recently begun to stage street meetings well illustrates one aspect of the phenomenon of totalized the anti-American struggle.

Why Anti-American?

A thesis published in a university magazine divided the attitudes of south Korean people toward the United States into three categories. The first is toadyism toward the United States, the second is non-anti-Americanism, and the third is anti-Americanism. First of all, toadyism toward the United States, which is based on a strict cold war view of the world, which "equates the United States with ultimate goodness," is a concept that has, since Korean independence, been firmly impressed in our minds subconsciously through the political process or

education. Not only the "generation of aid" who were brought up eating "flour from bags showing a handshake symbol" but also today's young generation is known to lean strongly toward this concept.

Secondly, the non-anti-American attitude takes the position that "It is true that there are various problems in connection with the United States or U.S.-south Korean relations. However, anti-Americanism is not the answer to these problems." One can say that this attitude has been supported by the anti-American student movement in its early stages or by opposition political forces.

Thirdly, the anti-American independent attitude goes one step further than the afore-mentioned attitude. This attitude substantiates the relentless argument "Go back to your country!" whenever the United States was found to be the major stumbling block in solving various social problems. This kind of attitude is claimed to provide a basis for the anti-American struggle.

In this context of categorized analysis, students in movement circles mention the destruction of toadyism toward the United States as the primary task of the "anti-American movement". They claim that people should completely bury such thoughts as "the United States is always right, therefore, we cannot live away from the United States." This claim is known to be an elementary item which is considerably emphasized in the internal educational program provided by the student movement circle.

Next, they enumerate the overcoming of the non-anti-American attitude, which, they explain, can be achieved naturally once people come to a proper realization of the essence of the United States and the reality of the U.S.-south Korean relationship. For example, they mention the fact that the anti-American struggle, which was hard even to imagine until the 1970's, began to be enflamed after people discovered the true nature of the United States through the "Kwangju Massacre" in 1980.

Let's listen to the story told by Mr. L (junior at SNU expelled from that school), who was arrested in connection with the school demonstration on 27 February and released later.

"A lot of people ask students the question 'Why are you anti-American?'. Then we reply that 'We cannot but be anti-American.' Either looking back at our country's history for the past several decades, or at the several years that I have experienced, I believe that obtaining autonomy by opposing the United States is the starting point for problem-solving. Instead, such arguments as 'In any event, anti-Americanism is troublesome.' is an irresponsible attitude with which people try to avoid reality and which, therefore, does not have any persuasive power."

If so, what is the reason behind the claim of students in movement circles that "We cannot but be anti-American?"

"No longer can we allow the sovereignty of our nation to be at the mercy of another country. In addition, we absolutely refuse any further conspiracy or logic that might otherwise affirm the reality in which our rights to live are being restricted by a foreign power...." (quoted from a "Warning Statement to the United States-Chongwadae Dictatorship", written by the Young Student Save-The-Nation Death Squad).

In recent times, "the United States-Chongwadae dictatorship" has become a generalized expression among students. This expression, which has the same meaning in its use as in the expression "the United States-Marcos dictatorship," which was used in the process of the democratization movement in the Philippines, shows the students' viewpoint of the relationship between the United States and the current administration. It is true that many people still believe that the United States is defending democracy not only in its own country but also around the world and the development of democracy in our country. However, students believe that the United States ultimately does not desire democratization in south Korea because it has been blocking democratization there by its continuous support for military dictatorial regimes. Therefore, the United States and the military regime have formed a single dictatorial system, that is, "the United States-Chongwadae dictatorship."

"There are some occasions when the United States takes the role of a Santa Claus who checks the right wing military and gives south Korea a gift of democracy. However, the true matter of interest for the United States is not human rights or democratization, but a secure guarantee of south Korea's strategic location as a forward base against the Soviet Union. Therefore, is it not true that the United States has reestablished stability by supporting another military dictatorship at such critical times when the old one faced a fierce people's opposition? Even though the United States initially took an ambivalent position at the times of the 16 May and 12 December coup d'etat, the fact that it quickly supported the Pak Chong-hui and Chon Tu-hwan regimes well explains the above-mentioned argument."

This fragmentary explanation is thought to be commonly believed among college students in general. However, the Kwangju Incident is analyzed to have been a decisive influence in providing a firm foundation for such an attitude. Since the collapse of the Yusin regime, decisive assistance to the repression of the Kwangju Incident by the new military forces, which took power with the "12 December coup d'etat," provided a basis for a stronger "U.S.-south Korea close relationship" than at any time in the past, and formulated a new example of "the

United States-Chongwadae dictatorship". The fact that the anti-American struggle in the student movement began to be aggravated after 1980 can be understood in this context.

The same can be said of the so-called Sixth Republic. In other words, from the beginning of the presidential election campaign, it has been claimed that the United States has given public support to a specific leading candidate from the military, political circles, arranged his U.S. visit, and in this way has reaffirmed its support. During that time, there was a sarcastic rumor calling this visit to the United States the "investiture." They also claim that the United States has successfully accomplished the reorganization of the military dictatorial regime by its quick confirmation of the regime's victory in the election, which was a "rigged election." In short, although there was a change in personnel, "the United States-Chongwadae dictatorship" could begin a new start.

"Anti-war, Anti-nuclear, Yankee Go Home"

Among the songs that are sure to appear in recent "anti-American demonstrations" by students, there is a song called the "Anti-war, Anti-nuclear Song." This song has a characteristic slogan at the end in which everyone shouts "Anti-war, Anti-nuclear, Yankee Go Home" with their fists lifted. According to claims of students in movement circles, approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons are currently deployed in south Korea. The United States neither approves nor denies this students' claim on the official level.

However, Gregory Henderson, the director of the Korea Research Institute at the Fairbank Center of Harvard University in the United States, acknowledged the existence of 600 to 700 nuclear weapons in south Korea during a speech in February 1986. Also, a secret document, the so-called "Weinberger Report" (official title: "Department of Defense Plan During the Fiscal Year 1984-88"), whose disclosure shocked the world, illustrates the possibility of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. Taking these examples, students in movement circles are exerting their efforts to show the severity of the nuclear crisis facing the Korean Peninsula and the degree of south Korea's "dependency" on the U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union. In other words, they claim that the withdrawal of nuclear weaponry must be a precondition to true peace on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, some scholars argue that these students' logic is too naive to consider with care the military dynamics in the Far East.

In any event, students in movement circles have the common view that "the United States should withdraw along with nuclear weapons," because as long as the United States possess the right to deploy and control nuclear weaponry, the destiny of the Korean Peninsula cannot help being at the mercy of the United States.

Mr P (junior at SNU), who is a member of the anti-contamination movement group, explains the crisis mentality concerning the nuclear issue as follows.

"In a nutshell, the Korean Peninsula has become a nuclear hostage for the United States. In order to achieve its global strategy, the United States armed the Korean Peninsula, a forward base with important strategic value, with nuclear weaponry. This is completely for the benefit of the United States, not for south Korea. That is why a pro-American, rather than an independent administration, division, rather than reunification, and the threat of war, rather than peace have been guaranteed. Ultimately, our people face the prospect of annihilation from the face of this earth by one decision of several Americans."

The students' anti-American logic is also connected to their efforts to search for the fundamental reason for the division of their country. In connection with this aspect, most students often mention the so-called "dual U.S. policies toward south Korea." In short, they claim that the United States interrupted reunification, which is the long-cherished desire of our people, as a consequence of its strategy of blocking the socialist bloc in the cold war environment after World War II, by making the Korean Peninsula a spearhead and by giving the highest priority to the establishment of a strong anti-communist group in this area which could serve its interests to the maximum. At the same time, students claim that the United States has continuously supported military dictatorial regimes and extreme anti-communist policies, and thus has created tensions rather than reconciliation between north and south Korea. This has contributed to the affirmation of the cease-fire line as the border.

Furthermore, students in movement circles make the criticism that the United States has been continuously enforcing the concept of division. That is, in spite of the fact that the idea of unity (for example, the principle of national unity shown in the 4 July joint statement) is necessary for a people who have been divided for 44 years to proceed on the way to national reunification, the United States has pursued policies such as simultaneous memberships in the United Nations by north and south Korea, and cross recognition by the four superpowers, which would have made the division a fait accompli. They also claim that the U.S. intention is to make the reunification issue not an issue of great national unity but an issue of conflicting systems between the two blocs by allowing the interests of the neighboring superpowers to be intertwined with the reunification issue of our country, based on the divisive cold war ideology.

These attitudes have become an important connecting chain that make the anti-American struggle and the reunification issue inseparable. The fact that the anti-American struggle and the struggle to accelerate national reunification became enflamed simultaneously at the beginning of this year, and the fact that innumerable students who took to the streets on 10 June shouted in

unison such slogans as "Let's Expel American Bums Who Interrupt National Reunification," and "Let's Expel American Bums Who Enforce Separate Hosting of Olympic Games," are also based on this logic. In other words, the issue of anti-Americanism has appeared as the most integral precondition to the struggle to accelerate national reunification. To put it more accurately, it is as follows. "The struggle to accelerate national reunification is carried out as a part of the anti-American independence struggle, which is the most important task at the present time." In other words, they claim that the widespread debate on reunification will lead to the aggravation of the anti-American struggle.

Widespread students' anti-American struggle movements with the reunification issue as a vehicle are expected to take place gradually as described above. Also, as the deadlines for price reduction of foreign goods such as cigarettes, which was decided at the U.S.-south Korea Trade Negotiation last May, come near, the specific impact of that decision will become known. Also as the import of beef is expected to be allowed ultimately, the severe opposition of farmers is anticipated. Furthermore, as the "decision to make south Korea share the \$40 million defense expense," which was made at the annual U.S.-south Korea Security Council, which ended in 9 June, has created a new source of conflict, and the U.S. role during the Kwangju Incident again has begun to come to the surface as a point of dispute in the process of the probe into the details of the incident, the intensity of the anti-American struggle is expected to become even stronger in the future.

U.S. Reaction

If that is the case, what are the attitudes of the United States and the current administration, which are the objects of the anti-American struggle? As citizens and students who attended Mr Cho Song-man's funeral service on 19 May threw rocks at the American Cultural Center and again threw homemade bombs at the U.S. Embassy the next day, the U.S. mass media unanimously reported these incidents and expressed concern over the expansion and violent nature of the anti-American struggle. In particular, the State Department spokesman Charles Redman expressed strong criticism, saying that "There is no excuse for such violence."

As for the United States, in fact, it understood that a series of processes such as the presidential election, the inauguration of the Sixth Republic, and the National Assembly election would be an "epochal development in south Korea's democratization" and it therefore anticipated an improved U.S.-south Korean relationship. Such an attitude is very clearly illustrated in the statement of Rep. Steven Solarz in the hearing of the U.S. House subcommittee for East Asia and Pacific Affairs on 12 May. He predicted that "When south Korea joins the ranks of democratic nations, the number of potential elements of conflict in U.S.-south Korean relationship will decrease...and anti-American sentiment is expected

to decrease," and the reason is that "those who criticize the United States will not retain their fundamental logic that the United States supports a dictatorial regime."

However, as an anti-American struggle more violent than at any time in the past spreads, proving these wishes and anticipations wrong, the U.S. policy makers and mass media became perplexed. As a consequence, the United States is evaluated as affirming its existing position that "The anti-American movement in south Korea stems from a minority of people with misunderstandings and incorrect beliefs." The U.S. Embassy, which has been strengthening its "public relations" activities through the publication COMMENTS ON CONTEMPORARY TOPICS from as early as December 1986, has begun to exert all its efforts to "correct misconceptions," as was exemplified by the direct personal activities of Ambassador Lilley.

Ambassador Lilley has already denied U.S. responsibility for the Kwangju Incident in his reply to the public letters sent by the "Seoul Area University Student Leaders Association" and the "Council Against Military Training" at SNU last February and March respectively.

"...When the south Korean government decides to withdraw its military forces from the operational command of the U.S. commander in chief of the U.S.-south Korea Combined Forces Command, all that is required to do is inform the U.S. commander. The U.S. commander in chief of the U.S.-south Korea Combined Forces Command does not have the authority to block such measures (of the south Korean Government). No U.S. Government or military troops have ever been involved in the Kwangju Incident..." (COMMENTS ON CONTEMPORARY TOPICS, March 1988)

One noteworthy thing is that the United States has completely denied that it agreed to send the military to the scene of the Kwangju Incident. This claim is not only different from the "historical fact" that has been acknowledged so far but also does not coincide with the explanation that the-then U.S. Ambassador Glysteen made during his visit to south Korea, which was that "The United States agreed to send the military troops which were more sophisticated and experienced in coping with civilians, rather than the air-borne special troops." As attacks against U.S. agencies continued, Ambassador Lilley has emphasized this point once again in his interview with the TONG-A ILBO last May.

Reaction of Administration

When students of the Three Democratic Struggle Committee staged a sit-in by occupying the American Cultural Center in Seoul in March 1986, the public safety authority made clear that it would warn the rest of the people by the example of punishing anyone who was engaged in anti-American activities applying the equation that anti-American=leftist pro-communist=anti-national activity, and that measure has generally been used

since then. The public safety authority even went to such extremes as arresting a college student senate staff member on the charge of having drawn a picture of the U.S. flag and letting other students step on it, this on the grounds of violating the national security law. In consequence, that incident once created sarcastic rumors among students that "In American movies, it was all right for an actress to wear the star-spangled flag as her underwear. However, those in this administration who love the United States are maybe more patriotic than the real Americans."

Compared to this, the general feeling among the public is that the No Tae-u administration is showing some changes in attitude. It is true that there were definite changes between 1986 when student members of the Three Democratic Struggle Committee, who claimed that "We are not anti-American, we simply want an establishment of a desirable U.S.-south Korean relationship," were punished with severe sentences on charges of violation of the national security law, and 1988, when student members of the Young Student Save-The-Nation Death Squad, who stipulated the United States as the "fundamental enemy," were arrested on charges of violation of laws concerning violence and its punishment. The administration also shows a lenient attitude toward the opposition struggle by farmers against the opening of import markets. Looking at the situation where even ruling party parliamentary candidates were raising their voices with the opposition to beef imports as their campaign pledges, some are making complaints that "The south Korean Government is aiding in creating anti-American sentiment by shuffling off its responsibility to the United States in order to avoid criticism."

Mr Y (age 31), a member of an opposition interest group, who has been arrested on charges of national security law violation and was released recently from detention, describes the current attitude of the public safety authority.

"...In the course of investigation, the cigarette issue came to the surface as a topic of conversation. A detective said, 'I am Korean, too' and began to join in criticizing 'American bums.' I have met a student member of the Young Student Save-The-Nation Death Squad, who had broken into the American Cultural Center: He said that he was applauded by the prosecutor as being a patriot. Although it appeared that there was some humor involved, even that dedicated public safety prosecutor is said to have revealed his opposition to the trade pressure."

If this is true, can one say that the government also is making some important changes in its attitude? A majority of students seem to have a pessimistic answer to this question. Mr S (senior at SNU), on the staff of the student senate, expressed his opinion as follows.

"Even though the government makes some changes in its method of coping with the situation, I do not think this reflects a change in its way of thinking. The first reason

for that is the fact that the peoples' anti-American sentiment has become considerably generalized and, therefore, the old tricks are not going to work any more. The second reason is that some people within the government seem to take advantage of the students' anti-American struggle or public anti-American sentiment, using it as leverage in negotiations with the United States. However, I find that there is a limit in the extent to which the current administration takes an independent position against the United States.

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Roundtable Discussion of No's 7 July Declaration 41070100 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 7 Jul 88 p 3

[A roundtable discussion, participants Kim Duk, Kim Se Wan, An Pyong Young, reported by reporters Kim Chae Hong and Chang Pyong Su: "Unification—From Moral Duty to the Pursuit of Substance"]

[Text] Kim Duk: Let me start out by saying that the overall meaning of the "7 July Declaration" is that it clarified a new approach to unification by comprehensively expressing the existing unification theories. It brought a fundamental change in the approach to the unification debate adapting domestic democratization and the international detente mood to the north-south relationship. The north-south talks have been limited in many ways by their bilateral nature. The characteristic of the declaration is that it is based upon a unilateral and flexible attitude without any expectations for answers or responses from the other side. We can probably view it as an expression of a new intention for unification.

Kim Se Won: The north-south talks have often looked like competitive face-saving acts rather than a search for substantial results. In this sense, this declaration can be evaluated as a change from such a face saving attitude toward a search for substantial results. A good example is that the declaration urges north Korea to improve its relationship with Western countries without equating it with south Korea's trade with Communist bloc countries. Another remarkable feature of the declaration is that it calls for economic exchanges between north-south not as trade between two countries but as internal exchanges of a nation. I assume that this idea of trade within the nation is based upon the trade between East and West Germany.

An Pyong Young: I would point out the significance of the declaration as a proposal of our approach rather than a practical proposal. The government probably felt a need to show its own blueprint on this issue as a response to the widespread concern of people about the unification issue. This is so since last year, when the issue was initiated by the radical student movement and extra-parliamentary opposition groups of progressive intellectuals. Certainly, the self-confidence gained from the improving relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, and the new detente mood

between the U.S. and the Soviet Union influenced the declaration. We can also assume that the government considered the relationship between East and West Germany as it looked at proposals for industrial and economic exchanges based upon the idea of peaceful coexistence. It has been customary for both Koreas that each side has proposed measures that the other side could not accept because both sides considered each other competitors not interlocutors. The president's declaration has the feature of an approach toward partnership.

Kim Duk: It was a turning point from face-saving dialogue toward a realistic approach. I hope this provides an opportunity to shorten the distance between face-saving talks and realistic conditions for unification.

Kim Se Won: We can also sense the government's intention to provide some preconditions for private initiatives in north-south exchanges. Particularly, the government will lead and encourage the role of the private sector in economic exchange. It seems that we have reached a point when we should discuss private sector initiatives in the north-south economic exchange.

An Pyong Young: The issue of the separate governments of China was settled in international society in the detente mood of the seventies. In our case, this movement toward improvement of the north-south relationship emerged as a result of a combination of the domestic democratization movement and the international atmosphere. It seems inevitable that north Korea must think about an open policy, and in that case the north-south relationship will enter a new phase. Our policy toward the north can contribute to the realization of an ideal and the improvement of the quality of life when it is based upon not only economic exchange but also a unification debate.

Kim Duk: As for the impact of the declaration, we can adapt to the international mood of detente to improve the north-south relationship. Domestically, it can be politically stabilizing in preventing political debates on the unification issue because it can accept both the negative and positive sides of such a debate. It will also ease some of the political tension caused by the generational gap centered around unification issue.

Kim Se Won: Several times the north-south economic talks have failed because of face-saving fights. For example, the north-south economic talks in 1985 were aborted because of disagreements on issues such as national names or debates on "unify first and exchange second." We hope that the economic talks will not be tied to such a face-saving attitude. North Korea has stuck to the viewpoint of "politics first, economics second." They stopped the economic talks of 1985, criticizing the U. S.-Korean joint military exercise. North Korea will probably have to accept the proposal that south Korea will unconditionally help north Korea to improve relationships with Western countries and finally open the door of north Korea, for economic reasons. In addition, south

Korea consolidated the justification for its trade with the Communist bloc by declaring that it will support north Korea's trade with Western countries. By this move, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China will feel freer from north Korea in their trade with south Korea.

An Pyong Young: I hope this declaration will develop into practical and substantial policy instead of remaining a nominal one. The mentality of policymakers does not change overnight. I believe the people's enduring efforts to overcome the division of the country should back it up. Substantial movement in the improvement of the north-south relationship depends upon what we do from now on. Changes in the north-south relationship are just one aspect of more fundamental changes of the system itself, i.e., humanization and democratization. In addition, our economic exchanges with Eastern European countries can expand greatly when the north-south relationship improves and is no longer an issue.

Kim Duk: There have always been hasty expectations after this kind of declaration. And the reality always lags behind expectations.

Even though the word "epoch-making measure" sounds good, we need to accept it as the first step of a long-term improvement rather than have short-term expectations. The qualified improvement of the north-south relationship is possible when the so-called revolutionary impulse disappears from north Korea and real democratic stabilization settles in south Korea.

An Pyong Young: When we examine the relationship between East and West Germany, it is directed rather more toward minimization of the pains of division than toward unification. In particular, they emphasize "internal trade in Germany," in the case of economic exchange. West Germany is the second trade partner, next to the Soviet Union, of East Germany, while East Germany is only West Germany's 10th largest partner in trade. West Germany is trying continuously to strengthen its economic relationship with East Germany, even accepting the disadvantage of buying from East Germany at high prices or selling at low prices.

For the time being, since they think it is still premature to unify as a political whole, which is their ultimate goal, they settled on a relationship as a socio-cultural and economic whole. I think we also need this kind of realistic approach. In other words, the unification debate should unfold with a dialectical synthesis of nationalist zeal and political reality.

Kim Se Won: In the unification debate, north Korea sticks to federalism while south Korea takes a functional approach. Unification and the improvement of relations are two different issues. This declaration seems mainly aimed at the improvement of relations to reach the road to unification. However, I doubt that these proposals will

be realized unless they are accompanied by a political change in north Korea. To give substance to the declaration, the government needs follow-up measures.

Kim Duk: I hope this declaration will provide an opportunity to narrow the differences in the north and south's approaches toward unification. So far, north Korea has neglected the functional process while stressing the political unity. On the other hand, south Korea was occasionally criticized as emphasizing the goal of unification less while stressing a step-by-step gradual approach. Beginning some time ago, our government started taking a dualistic approach toward unification, based upon the East and West German model. The most important thing for unification is how to synthesize the opinions of north and south Korea on this issue. North Korea should get used to a more realistic approach by accepting the Communist Bloc's adaptation of ideological relativism and realism in foreign policy.

An Pyong Young: Under the Fifth Republic, many unification proposals were suggested but hardly anybody remembers the details because all of them were quite unrealistic. Now, these kinds of unrealistic policy proposals should disappear. The six articles of President No's declaration put stress on north-south exchanges, but missed being an epochal proposal for building a structure for peace. A structure should be built to consolidate and develop exchanges leading to the organization of a unified nation.

Kim Duk: So far, there has existed a considerable distance between unification policy and the policy toward north Korea. Our major task is to overcome the factors of the cold-war legacy in our policy toward north Korea. Policy toward the north should be based upon a structure for peace so that the north cannot ignore it.

Kim Se Won: Even though there is the dilemma of north Korea's socialist economic system which will regard trade as government action, the main issue in terms of north-south exchange and an open-door policy will be to what extent the trade complex of north Korea and our private business representatives can play a role.

An Pyong Young: Changes in the north Korean Government are very important factors for the beginning and development of north-south trade. In Eastern European countries there were many changes in the system including their preparation of a currency exchange system to accept Western currency. north Korea has some limits as long as it holds on to its present system. In Germany, there was an attitudinal change in East Germany toward "nation first, system second," as shown in East Germany Prime Minister Honecker's visit to West Germany. This was a result of increased German nationalism at that time and mutual efforts to create national unity.

Kim Duk: Some criticized the East and West German model as being directed toward the status quo of division. We should note that Korea and Germany have

different historical backgrounds. Germany was established while maintaining regional authorities and has a short history as a unified nation, while Korea has a long history as a unified nation. The lesson we can learn from Germany's case is that it is building its unification effort through nonpolitical exchanges.

Kim Se Won: We should note the part in the declaration where south Korea is willing to help in improving north Korea's relations with the United States and Japan. This is a change in the government's policy from the previous insistence on simultaneous recognition of both sides through cross-recognition to a cooperative attitude in supporting north Korea's initial approaches to the United States and Japan.

Kim Duk: As you pointed out, our change of attitude not to oppose approaches between north Korea, the United States, and Japan is a step forward. north Korea should also liberate itself from the idea that government can maintain its legitimacy only by advocating unification through revolution in south Korea.

An Pyong Young: When we look at both East and West Germany, West Germany could always have the upper hand because it was much better off than East Germany in the various fields of politics, economy, and society. It is also noteworthy that West Germany was superior to East Germany in democratization and social welfare standards. When our government system strides toward the nation's welfare and the northern government's experience change, we can say that we are entering the road toward unification.

Kim Duk: I want to call attention to the fact that we should be cautious in our selection of terminology. For example, although we have often used the expression "the elder brother's standpoint," which probably came from the atmosphere of change from confrontation to acceptance, this can be a hindrance to the improvement of the relationship.

An Pyong Young: Unification is a way for both north and south Korea to enjoy a more affluent and righteous life. It is a shortsighted opinion that every problem will disappear when we are united. Moreover, it is a dangerous idea that we will adopt any kind of method to achieve unification. It will become a futile effort if many people will be deprived of their freedom, human rights, and well being as a result of unification.

Kim Se Won: This declaration is significant as a declaration of the Sixth Republic's policy toward the north. We can understand it as a change from illusion toward the practical realization of a difficult reality. We see that West Germany is in a hurry, even when it is supporting East Germany economically.

An Pyong Young: I do not think the declaration itself will provide any epoch-making turning point in north-south relations. I believe that the government and people

should take this declaration as a turning point to overcome the acknowledgement of division, and to consolidate our hard efforts to improve the north-south relations in practical ways.

Kim Se Won: Previous debates on unification had some element of being arbitrary, irresponsible statements. I hope that private organizations will take this declaration as a turning point for proposing a more practical agenda. Each person should accept his or her social responsibilities by establishing his or her own clear views on the issues of reunification and north-south relations.

Kim Duk: I hope that the declaration provides a turning point away from the many frequent declarations on unification. We only expect more detailed practices, and the consequent visible improvement in north-south relations.

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New Ideas, Strategy for Unification in Post-7 July Declaration Era

41070099 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
8, 9, 13 Jul 88

[Three part article by reporter Chong Chin-sok: "After 7 July Declaration"]

[8 Jul 88 p 3]

[Text] The major significance of the "7 July Declaration" by President No Tae-u lies in the fact that it declares to the world that the Sixth Republic seeks changes in existing policies and a new way of thinking toward north Korea.

Such a move was prompted by the recognition of the inevitability of casting new light on existing inter-Korean relations, which have always been confrontational and competitive, in view of the changing conditions of the times, the desires of the people, and, at the same time, from the basic principle that a first order of precedence must be the creation of the right atmosphere if a "united Korea" is to be achieved.

Along with this, in recognition of the urgent need for a new breakthrough in improving north-south relations at a time of rising tensions as the opening of the Olympic games draws near, the declaration is the new government's blueprint for unification diplomacy.

According to the declaration, which consists of six sections starting with the premise of the national community consciousness—the idea that the people in the north and the south are one people—its underlying principle is the basic recognition of the need for nurturing the conditions for unification by restoring the societal homogeneity of a companion relationship through exchanges and cooperations between the two sides.

It means a positive change in the unification strategy for promoting and inducing the opening and development of the interior of north Korea, forcing it onto the international stage as a responsible member and ending the negative policies that have been aimed at isolating north Korea internationally.

The paragraph which is particularly noteworthy is the "nonideological" diplomatic line, which proposes to terminate wasteful competition and confrontation between the north and the south, actively assist north Korea in improving its relations with our friendly nations such as the United States and Japan, and, at the same time, step up diplomatic efforts to improve our relations with socialist nations such as the Soviet Union, China, and East European nations.

If the declaration is examined by paragraph, first of all, the paragraph concerning "the exchange of representatives from various walks of life, and free travel for overseas compatriots" is the one that will be difficult for north Korea to find a good excuse to reject, and if north Korea is willing, this could be specifically implemented. Until now, when our nationals who resided overseas permanently wished to travel to communist bloc countries such as north Korea, they were required to receive permission from the government, and if a violation occurred, the violations were subject to punishment in accordance with the National Security Law. But the reality is that many overseas compatriots are visiting north Korea.

Although this paragraph necessitates an adjustment in the National Security Law, if the concept of expediency in indictments is taken into consideration, it could go into effect immediately, as early as the 7th.

As to the second paragraph which proposes "providing active assistance in exchanging letters and visits between separated family members," although Red Cross meetings are currently not held, the solution to the problem of the separated families can be found through direct and indirect means from a humanitarian standpoint, and the government is willing to take specific measures, including the setting up of offices for meetings between separated family members in a "third" country location such as Tokyo, Hong Kong, or Geneva.

The proposed "open door for north-south trade" means a foundation-building for the realization of a national economic community, and the promotion of direct trade relations on the basis of mutual benefits for the purpose of achieving a balanced development between the two.

It proposes to exempt from export duties, domestic exporters who make north Korean ports the final destination for their exports, and also to grant duty-free status to imports which are either loaded in north Korean ports and brought into the country via a third country or imported directly from north Korea.

Paragraph 4, which proposes that south Korea "will not oppose north Korea's trading of nonmilitary goods with nations friendly to south Korea," can be interpreted to mean that south Korea is interested in ultimately inducing north Korea to open its society, and contributing, even indirectly, to the stability of the livelihood and the promotion of the welfare of the north Korean people. In this case, it is explained that the export of military materiel to north Korea could be restricted by friendly nations through the mechanism of the Coordinating Committee for Export Control (COCOM).

Such a proposal may also be regarded as a momentous measure which could pave the way toward friendly nations' establishing trade offices in north Korea.

The proposal for "ending confrontational diplomacy and effecting free contact between representatives of the north and south" means not just a bold move for abandoning the previous policy of blocking south Korean entry into international organizations, but rather a welcoming of north Korea's participation in international organizations by south Korea. It proposes to end mutual slander from now on, and advocates negotiations in the international arena to promote mutual interests. In this connection, the government is not only lifting the ban against contacting north Korean diplomats which had been in force since the Korean Air Line bombing incident, but also it is taking steps to encourage friendly nations such as the U.S. and Japan to approach north Korea.

Paragraph 6 on the "promotion of improved cross relationships" may be viewed as an intention to promote the conditions for a peaceful atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula through the assurance by the four major powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula that they will promote improved relations between north and south Korea. The 7 July Declaration may be regarded as, in the final analysis, an enlarged and revised version of the "23 June Declaration for Peaceful Unification Diplomacy."

The 23 June Declaration includes such points as mutual noninterference in the internal affairs of north or south Korea, continuation of the north-south dialogues, north and south Korea's simultaneous joining the United Nations, and an open door to all nations on the basis of mutual equality. While this declaration is limited in concept in that it allows a north-south joint system, on the one hand, and withholds its active recognition of north Korea, on the other, the present declaration proposed to pursue a coprosperity of the Korean people on the basis of granting active recognition to the existence and position of north Korea. Herein lies the difference.

This declaration makes clear the change in the view that the new relationship would be a special "temporary arrangement" which would not recognize the existence of two separate independent states, while giving de facto recognition to the two governments of north and south.

In the final analysis, the point that north-south trade would be viewed as internal trade between the Korean people may be interpreted to mean that there is a change in the perception that in reality authorities, who exercise the power to control, exist in north Korea.

As to the timing of the present declaration, it has been learned that the government had to do much thinking about whether the declaration should be issued prior to or after the Olympic games. Some were concerned that in the situation where left-leaning ideology was proliferating, such a unilateral proposal could burden the government in coping with political developments. Others believed that judging from the way north Korea had reacted, in the short run, the divided condition would seem fixed, and the proposal might provide grounds for north Korea to step up its operations in the south.

Therefore, it appears that the present special declaration has given much consideration to paving the way to approaching north Korea from a long and intermediate standpoint rather than expecting short-term effects. Since it is quite possible to adjust through behind-the-scene contacts with north Korea the north Korean proposal for a joint conference as the precondition for a north-south dialogue, the key to the solution to the problems can be found by turning the perception of the national community into reality through the promotion of business projects and mutual exchanges that could be realized. The recognition that on such a foundation the building up of a practical relationship could be stepped up is becoming wider spread.

Along with this, the government also has in mind the expectation that north Korea will respond favorably to the declaration under the pressure of international opinion. The fact that when the recent proposal for an exchange of students was reported, the Soviet Union and China responded positively has played a significant role in coming up with the ideas behind the present measure.

The present declaration has given basic consideration to the understanding of the present situation—that the basic foreign policy line for our government be mutual equality and coexistence in the international social order—in order to make our neighboring countries welcome the emergence of a unified Korea. In the final analysis, the significance of the present declaration lies in the fact that it is an endorsement of the four principles of the future image of a unified Korea—people, independence, freedom, and well-being—which should be fully realized in our society, and that this declaration should not end as a mere declaration; we, ourselves, must firmly adhere to our promises and pledges.

Full Text of the 7 July Special Declaration

My dear 60 million compatriots!

Today I would like to share with you our new republic's policy for realizing a peaceful unification of our fatherland, the desire of all of us.

For nearly a half a century, our people have been suffering from the division of the country into north and south.

The history of division has been the cause of many ordeals and hardships for our people and blocked their normal development.

Exploring the way to achieve a prosperous unified fatherland by tearing down the wall of the north-south division should be the historical mission of all our people who live today.

The north and the south, split by mutually different ideologies and systems, have gone through a fratricidal war, and our people, separated between north and south, have not been able to free themselves from the painful conditions of division—mutual suspicion, slander and enmity.

Although our people did not will our country to be split into north and south, unity of our people must be achieved through our own independent strength and responsibility.

We must joint together to open a bright new era of reconciliation and cooperation between north and south.

Now, the time is upon us to work together to bring about well-being and prosperity for all of our people.

Today, the world is entering a new era of reconciliation and cooperation, transcending ideology and system.

Even between countries with different cultures and histories, a new high is being reached in bold openness and mutual exchanges.

It is my firm conviction that we are at a historical junction where we must bring stable peace and gain a new momentum for unification on the Korean Peninsula, where the risk of war and the tension of confrontation still exist.

The basic reason for our inability to overcome the tragic reality of division lies in the fact that with no regard of the consciousness that the north and the south belong to the same national community, we have intensified hostilities toward each other.

Our people constitute a single community where we are living and creating a brilliant history and cultural tradition through the overcoming of ordeals and challenges, and bringing together our people's energy and wisdom.

Accordingly, the short cut to a unified fatherland would be found in the development of a relationship as a

national community where both north and south achieve prosperity together.

This would be the very road toward national self-respect and national integration.

Now, the north and the south must tear down the wall of separation and carry out mutual exchanges in all areas.

We must take positive steps to restore mutual trust and strengthen our ties as one people.

Further, externally, on the basis of the understanding that we constitute one community, we must end the confrontational relationship.

It is my hope that north Korea will make contributions to the international community as a responsible member, and that such a move will expedite the process of opening and developing north Korean society.

In the international community, north and south must recognize each other's position and cooperate for the interests of all of our people.

My dear 60 million compatriots!

On the basis of the principles of independence, peace, democracy and welfare, today I pledge to you that I will endeavor to open a new era of national self-respect and unified prosperity by creating a social, cultural, economic, and political community in which all the individuals who constitute our people will participate, and I declare to the world that our government will pursue the following policies:

1. Active promotion of the mutual exchange of our people, including politicians, economists, media people, religious leaders, cultural and artistic leaders, scholars, and athletes residing in both the north and the south, and the opening of the doors for overseas compatriots to freely visit the north or the south.
2. Even before the reopening of the north-south Red Cross meeting, for humanitarian reasons, active assistance would be provided to separate families to enable them to obtain information about the life or death of separated family members, confirm their addresses, exchange letters, and visit each other.
3. The door would be opened to inter-Korean trade, which would be regarded as intranational trade.
4. In hopes of achieving a balanced development of the national economy to enable the improvement of the quality of life for all the people both in the north and south, the south Korean Government would not oppose our friendly nations' trading non-military goods with north Korea.

5. Wastefully competitive and confrontational diplomacy between the north and the south will be terminated, and north Korea will be assured of our cooperation in enabling her to make developmental contributions to the international community. Further, it is hoped that representatives from the north and the south can meet freely on the international stage and cooperate for the common interests of our people.

6. In order to nurture conditions conducive to the firm establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula, our government is ready to cooperate with north Korea in her efforts to improve relations with our friendly nations such as the U.S. and Japan. At the same time, on our part, we seek improved relations with socialist nations starting with the Soviet Union and China.

It is my hope that north Korea will also respond positively to our move as cited above.

If north Korea shows an affirmative attitude toward our move, I would like to make it clear that we will take further steps.

I hope that this declaration today will mark a momentous occasion in the opening of a new chapter in developing inter-Korean relations moving toward unification.

If all of our 60 million people pull together with their wisdom and strength, north and south will become a single social, cultural, and economic community before the turn of the century.

It is my firm belief that on such a foundation we will be able to achieve the great task of creating a single unified nation before too long.

Diary of North-South Relations

15 August 1970—President Pak Chong-hui declares a "Peaceful Unification Plan"

12 August 1971—President of the Korean Red Cross Choe Tu-son proposed the opening of the north-south Korean Red Cross meeting for the location of separated family members

14 August 1971—The north Korean Red Cross accepts the proposal for the holding of the north-south Red Cross meeting

4 July 1972—North and south Korea issue a joint communique

20 August 1972-23 August 1973—Seven Plenary Session of the north-south Korean Red Cross are held

10 October 1980—Kim Il-song proposes the creation of the "Koryo Democratic Federated Republic"

12 January 1981—President Chon Tu-hwan proposes mutual visitation by the heads of north and south Korean authorities

15 June 1981—President Chon Tu-hwan proposes a summit meeting of the heads of north and south Korea

22 January 1982—The government announces the "National Unity Democratic Unification Plan"

1 February 1982—Minister of National Unification Son Chai-sik proposed twenty practical model projects

10 February 1982—North Korea proposes a meeting of the "One Hundred Politicians' Joint Conference"

18 January 1983—North Korea proposes a "Joint Conference of political parties and social organizations from north and south Korea"

10 January 1984—North Korea proposes a "tripartite conference" of north Korea, south Korea, and the United States

20 August 1984—President Chon proposes Inter-Korea trade and economic cooperations and exchanges

14 September 1984—The south Korean Red Cross accepts the north Korean proposal to offer relief goods for flood victims.

29 September-4 October 1984—south Korea accepts flood relief goods

12 October 1984—Deputy Prime Minister Sin Pyong-hyon proposes an inter-Korea economic conference

15 November 1984—First Inter-Korea economic conference (Panmunjom)

20 November 1984—Preliminary contact for the Red Cross meeting (Panmunjom)

17 May 1985—Second Inter-Korea economic conference (Panmunjom)

27-30 May 1985—Eighth Red Cross plenary meeting (Seoul)

20 June 1985—Third Inter-Korea economic conference (Panmunjom)

23 July 1985—Preparatory contact for the first Inter-Korea parliamentary meeting

26-29 August 1985—Ninth Red Cross plenary meeting (Pyongyang)

18 September 1985—fourth Inter-Korea economic conference (Panmunjom)

20-25 September 1985—Separated families of the north and the south visit their old homes, and performing arts groups are simultaneously exchanged (Seoul, Pyongyang)

25 September 1985—Preparatory contact for the second Inter-Korea parliamentary meeting (Panmunjom)

8-9 October 1985—First Inter-Korea athletic meeting (Lausanne, Switzerland)

20 November 1985—Fifth Inter-Korea economic conference (Panmunjom)

2-5 December 1985—Tenth Red Cross plenary meeting (Seoul)

8-9 January 1986—The north Korean delegation for the Inter-Korea Conference issues a communique expressing its intention to suspend the Red Cross, economic, and parliamentary conferences

10-11 June 1986—Third athletic meeting (Lausanne)

28 November 1986—Minister of Construction Yi Kyu-hyo proposes a meeting of the Inter-Korea Water Resource Authorities

11 January 1987—North Korea proposes a high-level political and military conference

17 March 1987—The government proposes a meeting between the prime ministers of the north and the south

27 April 1987—A government spokesman urges the unconditional acceptance of a meeting of the Inter-Korea conference

14-15 July 1987—Fourth athletic meeting (Lausanne)

3 June 1988—The government proposes a meeting of high-level authorities of the north and the south

[9 Jul 88 p 3]

[Text] Since the 7 July Declaration of President No Tae-u was issued, the government has been working hard to develop follow-up measures for the various potentially thorny questions, and it has shown special interest in the feasibility of wide-ranging people-to-people exchanges and the scope of the exchanges.

The level of realization of such a plan for the active promotion of people-to-people exchanges will, of course, be dependent upon north Korea's response; however, it is true that the expectation for the feasibility of the exchange is high from the view that the people-to-people exchanges must come first as the basis for the actual realization of the six-points of the declaration.

So far, the government has not allowed south Koreans in Korea or overseas to visit north Korea except in special cases, such as for the promotion of the inter-Korean dialogue. The overseas Koreans' visits of north Korea, which have actually been taking place, have been clearly ruled to be a criminal offense by Article 6 of the National Security Law. Therefore, they do not talk openly about their travels to north Korea.

On this question, the government has clarified its position: overseas Koreans' north Korean visits after the 7 July Declaration will not be questioned at all. The government also stressed, if the concept of expediency in indictments, that this was one item that could produce effects right away.

But, as there are, in fact, conflicting interpretations on the definition of "overseas compatriots," there are all kinds of speculations on the question of who should be allowed to visit north Korea.

If "overseas compatriot" is defined generally to be "one whose base of livelihood is located abroad," then the question is whether or not this definition applies to those who stay overseas for an extended period of time, such as those working abroad or students studying abroad. If these people fall into this category, then those long-term overseas residents with student passports may visit north Korea freely. Therefore, this is an item that requires more careful scrutiny by the government.

Since for humanitarian reasons the government is doing everything possible to find ways for the separated families to meet their estranged family members, the question of the overseas Koreans' visit to north Korea will be clarified by the government's follow-up measures.

Moreover, some point out that the government must fully take note of the fact that limiting the people who would be allowed to travel to north Korea to only overseas Koreans would not be consistent with the circumstantial principle in view of the reality of the separated families within the country.

In this connection, it has been learned that the government is currently studying additional plans with a progressive view on the extent of travel eligibility. Such a plan, it appears, would be gradually expanded independently of the north Korean response.

Therefore, visiting north Korea via a third country by those with a passport could become a thorny issue, depending upon the flexibility on the part of north Korea authorities. With the government easing restrictions on those overseas residents who have been to north Korea and now seek to enter south Korea, the prospect for free travel is bright.

Previously, entry into the country by those who had travelled to north Korea had been strictly controlled by the Immigration Control Bureau of the Ministry of

Justice, and even those with U.S. citizenship were denied the issuance of an entry visas by the overseas diplomatic legations. However, it is learned that such restrictions have been gradually relaxed since last May.

In fact, it is known that a good number of people who have been to north Korea, including Professor J of H University in West Germany and Professors K and Yi of N University in the United States, are currently active in Seoul.

The scope of personal contacts with north Korea other than the one just mentioned, has been greatly expanded by the 7 July Declaration. First of all, north Korean diplomats abroad may be contacted by our diplomats abroad. Thus far, even if they had met at various official or unofficial international meetings, at the most, they just exchanged formal greetings without engaging in any dialogue at all, and even with that since the KAL bombing incident under the "ban on making contacts with north Korean diplomats," any chance of dialogue has been shut off. But, since we are planning to cast votes in favor of north Korea's admission to international organizations, the expansion of our contacts with north Korean diplomats will function as a very inspiring catalyst for the improvement of inter-Korean relations in the future.

Besides, the government is currently studying the specifics of the active exchange of students along with the exchange of journalists between north and south. Reportedly, the government is currently developing various plans starting with the exchange of correspondents on a permanent basis, the permitting of free news coverage and recording and airing for television broadcasting, and the exchange of programs. If such plans are realized, inter-Korean relations will enter into a new phase, and the practical improvement of relations is likely to be accelerated.

Along with these, in addition to some of the plans for a student exchange, debates, and athletic competitions, the government is reportedly studying a plan for exchanging college students on a semester or year-long basis.

Also, as to the sports exchange, if the exchange of athletic competition between Pyongyang and Seoul would be difficult right away, competitions could be held in a third country. The communist countries could play a middlemen's role in the inter-Korean exchange and its improved relations. In light of the thaw in the international milieu, such as the recent promotions of policies to open the Soviet Union and China, this is not impossible.

But no matter how detailed and momentous the exchange plan presented by the government might be, as long as there is no corresponding positive response on the part of north Korea it is quite possible that the impatient expectations will end up a disappointment.

Accordingly, some caution that instead of impatiently coming up with one proposal after another, the government must proceed methodically by watching the north Korean response.

Since the issuance of the "7 July Declaration," there has been in fact no response from north Korea, even after 48 hours had elapsed. Judging from past examples, one can sense that north Korea is taking this matter very sensitively.

[13 Jul 88 p 2]

[Text] The 7 July Declaration of President No requires a major shift of our foreign policy in a positive direction to meet the present challenges of internationalization, when a major overhaul of our existing foreign policy is inevitable.

The fact that it declared termination of wasteful diplomatic competitions between north and south Korea, and that it clarified its plan to seek improved relations with socialist nations suggests a major principle—that at last our foreign policy will be "utility-oriented" and be "non-ideological." It could be taken to mean that room to maneuver has been created by removing the obstacles.

For all these years, the base of our foreign policy has been the "containment of north Korea," which worked as a burdensome factor that narrowed the channels of diplomatic maneuverability and in fact created much friction.

Also, the fact that it has been understood that blocking north Korea's entry into international organizations was the entirety of our diplomatic goal, and this has undeniably put an unnecessary burden to our diplomats working on the diplomatic front.

Therefore, the 7 July Declaration has marked the turning of our energy, which has been spent on the "diplomacy of confrontation" against north Korea, toward a "diplomacy of utility."

Along with this, the fact that an attempt has been made to create a new understanding of the existence of north Korea through the recent declaration cannot be overlooked. That is, the relationship between north and south is interpreted to be a special one—a relationship between two different systems within a single national community until the unification is realized, and not a relationship between two independent nations. It is explained in terms of "one people with two systems" or "one people with two governments." In contrast with the previous perception of north Korea as the enemy, this is a great transformation in understanding.

But it is true that such an understanding has developed beneath the surface without having been openly expressed. Right after the 23 June Declaration in 1973,

then Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil stated in a National Assembly testimony: "We can be described as one people, one state, with two governments."

Also, in 1983, then Foreign Minister Yi Pom-sok, went a step further and remarked in his speech at the National Defense College: "In view of the reality that both north and south Korea are simultaneously members of the 8 specialized agencies of the United Nations and 15 inter-governmental international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Organization, it is an undeniable reality that there exist two states on the Korean Peninsula as members of the international community."

According to the draft of the "Special Guidelines for Work Performance by Government Workers Abroad," which has recently been under review by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the previous guidelines which provided stipulations that had prohibited government workers to act or use words in such a manner that recognized north Korea as a state or a government under international law, or the use of the "formal name of the state" of north Korea, have been amended to permit, if necessary, the use in countries where they have legations or in international meetings, the formal name of north Korea as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the use of words or actions in a manner recognizing north Korea as a state or government that meets the required conditions under the international law.

In such a context, in the final analysis, we can see that our government is adopting the approach of unification that is modelled after the unification policy of East and West Germany, and gives de facto recognition of "one people with two governments."

Along with it, the 7 July Declaration has provided grounds to the four big powers surrounding our country, the U.S., Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, to change their policies toward the Korean Peninsula, and in response, it necessitates a change in the direction of our diplomacy toward the big four.

In this connection, we can, first of all, expect a new position in our diplomacy in the international arena. That is, without stubbornly clinging to the bloc system that has been a dimension of a balance of power, we will be able to concentrate on a realistic diplomacy, such as pursuing a middle-of-the-road diplomatic posture.

Although we do not impatiently expect a reorientation of Korean-American relations, to some degree this may give more power to our voice vis-a-vis the United States and Japan.

The blank area in our diplomatic position that has been secured by the 7 July Declaration that could be the first to turn into a thorny area is our relations with Third World countries.

In this area, since the consequences of the ineffective diplomacy which had been preoccupied with north Korea have surfaced, we can expect to benefit in other areas.

In this connection, the government is planning to push for the "Reordering of the Diplomatic Network" as a long and intermediate plan, including such measures as the closing of those wasteful diplomatic legations abroad.

In the final analysis, to bring such a new plan of diplomacy into reality, the people involved in this area point out that first of all, it is urgent to convert the administrative system into one that allows the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enjoy more "power to conduct diplomacy."

That is, removing invisible discord by reordering the relationship between the National Security and Planning Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and defining the boundaries of the responsibilities are urgent first orders of business in opening a new chapter of democratic diplomacy.

12474/9274

Article Praises Special Committee's Work To Alter, Abolish Draconian Laws

41070112 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
29 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by reporter Pu Chi-yong: "The First Work Designed To Clean Up Draconian Laws, 'Legacy of the Fifth Republic'"]

[Text] The National Assembly Special Committee on Alterations and Abolitions of Laws (chairman: O Yu-pang) on 28 July decided to rescind by mutual agreement between the government party and nongovernment parties the constitutional clause concerning profaning the state and to abrogate the Special Law Governing the Climate of Political Reform. This is significant in that it symbolizes a cleaning up of two items which are "the legacy of the Fifth Republic."

In particular, although both the government party and nongovernment parties failed to exercise their function of "alterations and abolitions of draconian laws" for 3 months after the people decided on, and assigned it as a duty of the 13th National Assembly, they have now set the National Assembly Special Committee on Alterations and Abolitions of Laws in motion, though a little too late, and produced its "first work." This may be evaluated as an effect of the parliamentary activities of the National Assembly that was reformed. Above all, "the special measure law designed to reform the political climate" is a symbolic law, the abrogation of which was decided upon by mutual agreement between the government party and nongovernment parties.

On 3 November 1980, that law was born through a "meaningless" vote of 66 in favor and 8 against at the National Defense Legislative Assembly. The import of the law was that "political activities of those personages who are regarded as persons responsible for the political and social corruption and confusion shall be prohibited from 1968 through 30 June 1988."

Those persons whose political activities were banned by this law were: members of the 10th National Assembly and members of political parties, those who were to be regarded as persons responsible for the political and social corruption and confusion; and more precisely those who were to be regarded as persons conspicuously responsible for the political and social corruption and confusion during the period ranging from 16 August 1968 to 26 October 1980, those whom the Political Reform Committee announced as such publicly after investigating them. However, judging from the ambiguity of its standards and "the arbitrariness" of the leading force of the Fifth Republic, one may say that this law functioned as "a law designed to lock out the three Kims" which debarred politicians of nongovernment party circles, including the old New Democratic Party or Sinmindang, from political circles, and which kept under restraint those personages of the old Republican Party or Konghwadang who were not cooperative with the leading force of the Fifth Republic. The total number of persons whose political activities were banned during that period by that special measure law is 567. Among them, the ban on 250, including Yi Hyo-sang, Chang Ul-pyong, and Yi Mun-ku, was lifted, in the first relaxing, on 25 February 1983; and on 6 March 1985, two years after that, the ban on remaining 14, including three Kims, Kim Tae-chung, Kim Yong-sam, and Kim Chong-pil, and Yi Hu-rak, was removed. Thus the restraining measures were removed entirely.

In fact, the ban on all of those 567 persons whom this law was designed to keep under restraint was lifted and they are all engaged in political activities. And the time limit of that law, 30 June 1988, has also passed. Therefore, one may say that this law is "a dead law" already, even if it is not abrogated. However, members of the government party and nongovernment parties said as follows, as stated by the special committee of the National Assembly in its reasons for submitting a bill for repealing the law: "Although this law is nothing but a law that is not effective any more, this bill is necessary to eliminate thoroughly the possibility of punishment that might be caused by the poisonous clause of this law; and this is a necessary abrogation bill designed to conform with the requirements of the time for democratization and concord of the nation."

Assemblyman O Yu-pang (Democratic Justice Party), chairman of the National Assembly Special Committee on Alterations and Abolitions of Laws, too, was "a suspect" under that law and, at the time of the first

lifting of the ban, it was removed from him. Thus one may point out that the term of "lifting the ban" need not be used in our political circles any more.

"A bill to amend a constitutional clause," by means of which the profanity of the state clause was repealed on that day, simultaneously with the climate of political reform law, does not attract attention at first glance, but it is of significance in that a practical "draconian law" was repealed.

The provision of the clause of "profanity of the state, etc.," laid down in Clause 2, Article 104 of the present constitution is as follows: a native who shows contempt for or slanders the Republic of Korea or a state organization established in compliance with the constitution, or who does harm to the safety, interest, or dignity of the Republic of Korea by means of distorting facts or spreading falsehoods about the Republic, or whose doing such harm is feared, shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding 7 years. This is a clause laid down on 25 March 1975 in view of the fact that public opinion leveled much criticism at the Pak Chong-hui regime at the time of the restoration of 1975; the enactment was designed to "prevent profaning the state by some citizens at home and abroad through their words and actions which were trucking to a stronger power."

In fact, the number of exconvicts accused of violating that clause is so great that even the National Assembly Special Committee on Alterations and Abolitions of Laws, which decided to repeal the law 13 years and 4 months after enactment, is still not able to find a valid list of "the suspect victims" of that clause. The special committee authorities have estimated the number at approximately over 1,000.

As for major political incidents, using this very clause, the Pak regime went to the length of suspending the presidency of Kim Yong-sam of the New Democratic Party or Sinmindang in the case of "the incident of Kim Yong-sam's interview with THE NEW YORK TIMES," one of the causes of the Pusan-Masan Incident of 1979. Han Kwang-ok (Party of Peace and Democracy or Sinmindang), one of the members of the 13th National Assembly, was arrested, tried and convicted using this clause.

The reasons for the proposition made in the bill, designed to amend a constitutional clause, which was submitted to the plenary session of the National Assembly on the basis of agreement between the government party and nongovernment parties are as follows: "The clause, governing profaning of the state, which was laid down in the constitution when it was amended on 25 March 1975, either suppressed the freedom of wholesome criticism that is designed to help develop the nation, or was arbitrarily interpreted and applied. Thus it carried out the function of oppressing antigovernment personages; and it is feared that it may carry out such a

function in the future. Therefore, it must be repealed through amendment in order to effect the development of a democratic society through wholesome criticism by the people."

Indeed, on that day, the National Assembly Special Committee on Alterations and Abolitions of Laws produced some results by thoroughly killing the Special Measure Law Governing Political Reform Climate and striking out "the profaning of the state clause." However, it is still early to expect such a favorable wind in the voyage ahead toward alteration or abolition of laws.

Above all, the plenary session of the special committee held on that day failed to narrow the differences of opinion between the government party and nongovernment parties regarding "the law governing assemblies and demonstrations," and sent it to a subcommittee. This law represents one of the imminent stumbling blocks.

The government party and nongovernment parties separately submitted to the special committee a bill designed to revise the law governing assemblies and demonstrations. And the content of the bill is considerably different from each other in terms of quality. The bill, designed to revise the law governing assemblies and demonstrations, which was submitted jointly by the three nongovernment parties struck out from the existing law the notification right of the chief of police to banning assemblies and demonstrations, and proposed a provision to the effect that an assembly or demonstration may be held at any time only if notice is given 24 hours in advance. Compared to that, the Democratic Justice Party's bill sustained the existing provision which grants the right to prohibition notice to the chief of police; and it proposed that the sponsor shall be able to provide men charged with maintaining order.

The Democratic Justice Party just put forth an alternate proposal that a formal objection may be made against the prohibition notice of the chief of police, and that a decision be made anew on that within 24 hours.

Moreover, the government party and nongovernment parties separately submitted a bill designed to revise the law governing policemen's performance of duties, and a bill designed to revise the minor offenses law. Here, too, they confront each other in terms of some portion of the content. However, regarding the bill designed to revise the law governing policemen's performance of duties, the core content is the same both with the government party and nongovernment parties group, including the proposal that the police shall have the obligation of notifying the suspect of his freedom to refuse the police request to come voluntarily to the police station. Regarding the minor offenses law, too, both the government party and nongovernment parties group proposed the repealing of the clause governing the fabrication of groundless rumors. Thus there is the prospect that agreement will be easily reached at the subcommittee.

At any rate, what is important in the forthcoming work of alterations and abolitions of laws is that National Assemblymen of both the government party and nongovernment parties group must fully take into account the public opinion that emphasis should be put doing away with some laws in their present state rather than on a bigoted dispute over a theory of law, and must thereby display their substantial "productivity."

7989

Analysis of Economic Disparities as Root Cause of Regionalism

41070088 Seoul WOLGAN KYONGHYANG in Korean
Jul 88 pp 264-293

[Essay by Professor Pak Tong-un of Tanguk University:
"The Yongnam-Honam Regional Discord: Inequities in
Personnel Appointments and Economic Concessions"]

[Excerpts]

Emergence of Regional Parties

Regionalism is now showing even the signs of developing into an epidemic of "nation-destroying malaise." The discordant feelings between different regions, long latent—like a ticking time bomb—in the hearts of local people, were ignited into an instantaneous nationwide explosion by the rhetorics of politicians during the presidential election. The seriousness of the regionalism was fully attested to by the regional bloc-voting pattern emerged in both the presidential and National Assembly elections.

In the presidential election, candidates Kim Yong-sam and No Tae-u, both with their roots in the Yongnam region covering Pusan, south Kyongsang Province, Taegu, and north Kyongsang Province, together garnered 90.5 percent of the total votes cast in the Yongnam region, while candidate Kim Tae-chung, with his roots in the Honam region covering Kwangju, and north and south Cholla Provinces, managed to win only 5 percent of the Yongnam regional votes. Conversely, in south Cholla Province, candidate Kim Tae-chung garnered 82.2 percent of the total votes while candidates No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam combined managed to win only 10.8 percent of the total votes. Meanwhile, candidate Kim Chong-pil with his roots in south Chungchong Province emerged as the winner of the highest number of votes in the Chungchong region.

The National Assembly elections, too, produced similar results. Of the four political leaders who had vied for the supreme power, candidate Kim Tae-chung's Party for Peace and Democracy swept all 37 seats in the Honam region; candidate Kim Yong-sam's Reunification Democratic Party won 14 of the 15 seats in Pusan; candidate No Tae-u's Democratic Justice Party garnered 25 out of the 29 seats in Taegu and north Kyongsang Province;

and candidate Kim Chong-pil's New Democratic Republican Party proved its predominance in south Chungchong Province by securing 13 of the 18 seats there.

From the results of these two general elections we can easily sort out those areas that are at the forefront of the confrontational regionalism. Of course in viewing election results alone one should not overlook as a factor such subregionalism that separates Taegu and Pusan or two neighboring provinces of north and south Kyongsang or even divides the residents of one city—e.g., Seoul—based on their places of origin. But this kind of regionalism is nothing very serious in that it is largely a reflection of the voters' empathy with a major political candidate with whom they share the same place of origin. When this is taken into account, one can reach the conclusion that regionalism is most apparent in the Yongnam, Honam, and Chungchong regions and is most acutely confrontational between the Yongnam and the Honam regions. This emotion-driven regional division coincides with the administrative zoning of the country, for the purpose of national land development planning, into the Capital Zone (the region covering Seoul and Kyongin area [Kyonggi Province and Inchon]), the Taeback Zone (the Kangwon region), the Central Zone (the Chungchong region), the Southeast Zone (the Yongnam region), and the Southwest Zone (the Honam region).

In this essay, for the purpose of comparing economic disparities between regions, the writer intends to use primarily the five-region classification system as noted above rather than the municipal and provincial classification systems.

In this small piece of land (and already divided into north and south), why did the problem of regionalism develop in the first place? This is just a very basic, practical question about which every one of the 40 million inhabitants of this land may have something to say—something which, regardless what it is, cannot be brushed aside as being wrong. It is a question which was the subject of study undertaken by the Research Institute of Contemporary Society, the findings of which have already been published; it is also a question which is being pursued relentlessly by the press as well. Furthermore, at a four-party summit meeting held on 27 May at the Blue House, the presidents of the four major political parties agreed to cooperate with each other in order to resolve the problem of regionalism in the days ahead. Given these trends, the prospects are that the regionalism issue is bound to be resolved some day, sooner or later.

But the regionalism issue will not be resolved by words alone. Moreover, the reality of the situation demands that its resolution be hastened right away. Should the impending elections of local legislatures be allowed to proceed before a decisive formula has been worked out that will help bring about a resolution of the regionalism issue, there is a strong possibility that some local legislatures—depending on which region they belong to

—could end up firmly in the yoke of one-party dictatorship. If this should happen, resolution of the problem of regionalism would become even more difficult. This is the very point which politicians of south Korea must especially bear in mind. If in fact it is recognized that south Korea at this very point in time is making a start along the right lines toward sound development, it behooves all of us to make haste with the effort to resolve the problem of regionalism which, if left alone, could develop into a "nation-destroying malaise."

Investment Partial to Certain Regions

The author wishes to make it clear at this point that the main purpose of this essay is to analyze the regional economic disparities, which the author considers to be the cause of the regionalism, and thereby to come up with the ways to resolve the regionalism. This analysis begins with the assumption that during the years of the Third through Fifth Republics, as a result of complete control exercised by a small number of economic bureaucrats over the formulation as well as implementation of economic policies, regional investments tended to be disproportionately partial to certain regions, thereby creating economic disparities between regions.

Broadly speaking, this essay consists of four parts. The first part is devoted to a comparative examination of regional economic disparities by the use of seven economic indicators. The second part is devoted to a theoretical exposition of the economic-policy-making process on the basis of the "Public Options Doctrine," followed by an analysis of the composition of economic bureaucrats by their places of origin. The third part is devoted to a detailed, comparative review of investment programs in different regions. And in the fourth part the author put forth his recommendations on how to resolve regional economic disparities as a step toward resolving the problem of regionalism.

Before taking a comparative look at the economic disparities between regions, let us briefly review the structural characteristics of regional economies as of the time when the south Korean economy was starting on the track of earnest growth.

Table 1 divides the country into five major regions and gives a percentage breakdown by region of the country's population, area, and industrial structure. In the table, for reasons of expediency, the 1985 data were used for population and area, and the degree of industrialization was figured on the basis of each region's share of the total value added by the nation's mining and manufacturing industries as a whole. Also, the table's singling out of the 1963 data on the rate of industrialization was dictated by the need to compare—even if briefly—the structural characteristics of industries as existed in each region as of the early 1960's.

Table 1. Structural Characteristics of Regional Economies (in percentage)

Region	Population (as of 1985)	Area size	Degree of industrialization (as of 1963)
Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0
Seoul-Kyongin	39.0	11.8	40.6
Yongnam	29.8	32.5	29.5
Honam	14.7	20.4	110.0
			[as published; should be 11.0]
Chungchong	10.8	16.4	9.5
Other	5.7	18.9	9.4

(Sources: "Annual Economic Report," 1987, by the Bank of Korea; "Statistical Survey Report on Mining and Manufacturing Industries," 1963, by the Economic Planning Board)

According to Table 1, the Seoul-Kyongin region occupies an area that is only 11.8 percent of the country's land but its population share is 39 percent. Its degree of industrialization being 40.6 percent of the nationwide industrialization is a telling proof that in the early 1960's this region was already playing the central role in the nation's industrial sector. The Yongnam region has slightly less than one-third of the country's population and land, and its degree of industrialization in 1963 was 29.5 percent, 10 percent less than that of the Seoul-Kyongin region. The Honam region, meanwhile, has a population and an area that are about one-half and two-thirds, respectively, of the Yongnam region's; its 1963 degree of industrialization was barely one-third of the Yongnam region's. The Chungchong region, on the other hand, despite its population and area that are much smaller than those of the Honam region, scored industrialization rate of 9.5 percent, only 1.5 percent lower than the Honam's.

From these comparisons we can see that, at the time the First 5-Year Economic Development Plan was getting under way, not only did the Yongnam region have an economic scale—in terms of population and area size—far greater than that of the Honam and Chungchong regions, it was also three times ahead of these other regions in terms of degree of industrialization.

Economic Disparities as the Main Culprit of Regionalism

By the way, the question of regionalism ought to be analyzed from all its attendant aspects—social, cultural, historical, political, and economic. But it is this author's belief that the "root cause" of the regionalism should best be sought in the economic disparities between regions, and the rationale for this belief can be explained rather easily.

Generally speaking, in a personal relationship, if one party feels resentful at the other, that feeling is usually caused by one of many factors such as academic background, social standing, economic strength, and state of health. But in the view of this author, the most overriding of all such feelings of personal resentment may very well be one that is based on disparity in economic strength. For example, if a man with a lofty academic

background but meager economic means has an associate whose academic background is meager but who has enormous economic power, in their relationship the former's resentment of the latter would actually be much greater than the latter's resentment of the former. Why? Because, with the exception of a very few for whom the learning itself is the life goal, in most cases material affluence as a reward for scholarship is one of the most important motivations for academic pursuit. Such a viewpoint, less than laudable though it may be, might even possibly have something in common with the capitalistic sense of value that has been dominating the south Korean society for these years.

By the same token, it seems fair to say that regionalism, too, is fundamentally caused by economic disparities between regions. If a resident of a certain region has the feeling that his region is lagging far behind other regions in terms of high-rise buildings, employment opportunities, living standards, cultural standards, business growth potentials, and the rate of road construction, is it not natural for his resentment arising from such a realization to eventually take the form of regionalism?

It is based on this logic that the author intends to undertake a positive analysis of the economic disparities between regions in an attempt to help find a solution to the problem of regionalism. A great deal of data must be used for a comparative study of regional economic disparities. But on certain indicators corroborative data are either not available or, even if available, are of dubious credibility. In general, regional data concerning the manufacturing industry are not only reliable but are actually being used widely. Moreover, the data on the manufacturing industry have the distinction of being used most effectively in explaining the state of regional modernization or industrialization. Thus, for the purpose of this comparative analysis of regional economic disparities, mostly the data related to the manufacturing industry (in the case of south Korea, mining and manufacturing industries make up nearly all of its manufacturing industry; hence the term "manufacturing industry" is often used in the place of "the mining and manufacturing industries") are used; specifically, a total of seven indicators are used, including some that are not directly related to the manufacturing industry.

Economic Disparities Widened Since 1960

To identify such indicators that show what growth gaps occurred in regional manufacturing sectors during the very period when south Korea's manufacturing-led economy was achieving a high rate of growth would prove to be a direct help to the understanding of the current state of regional economic disparities. In this writing, in order to make it easier for the layman to understand, changes in component ratio are used for comparison purposes. Thus, if a certain region's component ratio increases to a level higher than the nationwide average value, this would mean that not only was that region's growth rate higher than the national growth rate, that region's growth served as the catalyst of the national growth.

First, let us examine the changes that have taken place in the component ratios by region of the values added by the mining and manufacturing industries.

Table 2. Component Ratio of Values Added by Mining and Manufacturing Industries (in percentage)

Region	1963	1970	1979	1986
Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Seoul-Kyongin	39.0	42.0	44.5	43.4
Yongnam	29.8	34.8	38.0	39.3
Honam	14.7	7.2	7.7	7.1
Chungchong	10.8	10.9	6.6	6.8
Other	5.7	5.1	3.2	3.4

(Source: "Statistical Survey Report on Mining and Manufacturing Industries" by the Economic Planning Board)

The Seoul-Kyongin region, like the principal player that it was in the high growth achieved by south Korea's economy, already accounted for 39 percent of the total value added in 1963 by the mining and manufacturing industries nationwide. Although the component ratio increased somewhat in subsequent years, the basic trend remained relatively steady through 1986. The Yongnam region's component ratio in 1963 was 29.8 percent, which was roughly 10 percent less than that of the Seoul-Kyongin region, but it kept on growing at a faster rate than any other region to reach 39.3 percent in 1986, which was then only 4 percent lower than the Seoul-Kyongin region's. In the case of the Honam region, its component ratio suffered a sharp decline during the 1960's—a decline more precipitous than any other region, cutting the ratio from 14.7 percent in 1963 to 7.1 percent, or less than one-half, in 1986. The Chungchong region is showing a declining trend similar to that shown by the Honam region.

From the above comparative examination of the changes in the component ratio by region of the values added by the mining and manufacturing industries, the following conclusions may be drawn: First, the Yongnam region's rate of industrialization has been faster than any other region of the country; on the other hand, the industrialization efforts in the Honam and Chungchong regions,

dwarfed by the growth inertia of the Seoul-Kyongin and Yongnam regions, have suffered relative regression. Second, the level of industrialization in the Honam and Chungchong regions in 1963 [as published; should be 1986] was not even one-fifth of the level in the Yongnam region. From all this it can be said that the economic disparities between regions worsened during south Korea's 25 years of high growth because that growth was centered around the Seoul-Kyongin and Yongnam regions while the local growth in the Honam and Chungchong regions fell behind in relative terms as a result. In making such an assessment, however, one must of course always take into account the industrial structural characteristics of the Honam and Chungchong regions—that they are primarily agricultural areas.

Disproportionate Concentration of Manufacturing Businesses in Yongnam Region

Next, let us examine the changes in the component ratio by region of the mining and manufacturing workers.

Table 3. Component Ratio of Mining and Manufacturing Workers (in percentage)

Region	1963	1979	1986
Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0
Seoul-Kyongin	34.8	45.7	45.6
Yongnam	34.3	40.4	39.4
Honam	12.9	5.8	5.2
Chungchong	9.3	5.9	6.0
Other	8.7	2.2	3.8

(Source: Same as Table 2)

As shown in Table 2 [as published; should be Table 3], the Seoul-Kyongin region's component ratio of the mining and manufacturing workers has registered not only a high level but also a fast rate of growth. It was 34.8 percent in 1963 but jumped to 45.7 percent in 1979; it leveled off at 45.6 percent in 1986. Reflected in the fast rise of the region's component ratio is the role played by four local towns—Kwangmyong, Anyang, Puchon, and Songnam, which were industrialized and elevated to the city status in the second half of the 1970's and made a major contribution to south Korea's high economic growth. The Yongnam region's component ratio of the industrial workers in 1963 was about the same as that of the Seoul-Kyongin region—34.3 percent, but it rose to 39.4 percent in 1986. But unlike in the case of the component ratio of values added as shown in Table 2, it is clear from Table 3 that the Yongnam region's share of the industrial work force grew at a slower rate than the Seoul-Kyongin region; this, however, is believed to have been a logical phenomenon resulting from the expansion in scope of business units in the Yongnam region. In the case of the Honam region, its component ratio of the industrial work force was 12.9 percent in 1963 but declined faster than any other region in subsequent years to reach 5.2 percent in 1986, which was even lower than the share of the Chungchong region.

At this point, let us compare the numbers of industrial workers in the Yongnam and Honam regions and see how they have changed. In 1963 the Yongnam region had 156,197 industrial workers while the Honam region had 56,487; by 1986 these numbers increased 7.2 times to reach 1,124,052 in the case of the Yongnam region and 2.5 times to reach 143,363 in the case of the Honam region. To put it differently, in 1963 the Yongnam region had 2.8 times as many industrial workers as did the Honam region, but by 1986 the gap widened to about 7.8 times in favor of the Yongnam region. As noted earlier, the Yongnam region has a population twice the size of the Honam region's and its level of industrialization is much higher than that of the latter's; that such an enormous differential in the numbers of industrial workers occurred in the course of industrialization is a telling proof that economic disparities between the two regions inevitably worsened during the same period.

From the above comparative review of the component ratio by region of the mining and manufacturing workers, the following conclusions may be drawn: First, taken together with the fact that since 1963 the south Korean manufacturing sector has been increasing its work force at an annual rate of no less than 8.1 percent, the growth in the Seoul-Kyongin and Yongnam regions can be said to have helped developing south Korea's economy into the manufacturing-centered mode and served as the motive force for transforming the country's agriculture-centered employment structure into manufacturing-centered structure within a short period of some 20 years. Second, the disproportionate concentration of economic development, as reflected in the employment picture, in the Seoul-Kyongin and Yongnam regions has severely stunted the relative economic growth in the Honam and Chungchong regions. This can be viewed as a representative proof that industrialization has brought about economic disparities between regions as it has created distribution gaps between classes in the south Korean society.

Disproportionate Concentration of Larger Businesses in Yongnam Region

Next, let us examine the changes that have taken place in the component ratio of the mining and manufacturing businesses.

Table 4. Component Ratio of Mining and Manufacturing Businesses (in percentage)

Region	1963	1979	1986
Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0
Seoul-Kyongin	31.8	43.0	50.7
Yongnam	33.2	31.3	28.3
Honam	17.6	13.9	9.1
Chungchong	13.2	9.3	5.8
Other	4.2	3.5	6.1

(Source: Same as Table 2)

During the period 1963 through 1986, the Seoul-Kyongin region's share of the total number of mining and manufacturing businesses in the country rose sharply. This is believed to have been the result of concentrated development in the Capital Zone of new business entities that were relatively of petty or medium and small in scale during the period of high economic growth. This conjecture can be supported without difficulty if one recalls that during the same period the Seoul-Kyongin region's share of the mining and manufacturing work force increased from 34.8 to 45.6 percent. But in the case of the Yongnam region, its share of the mining and manufacturing businesses rather declined from 33.2 percent in 1963 to 28.3 percent in 1986. This declining trend was exact opposite of the rising trend during the same period of the region's shares of the values added and of the industrial work force. Thus, what the declining share of the manufacturing businesses indicates is that the businesses in the Yongnam region have been made bigger in scale at a faster rate than any other region of the country. Meanwhile, the Honam and Chungchong regions' shares of the manufacturing businesses in 1986 showed a decline of roughly 50 percent as compared with the levels of 1963—a trend similar to what happened to these regions' shares of the values added and of the industrial work force. These trends can be viewed as the result of relative contractions suffered by the economies of these two regions stunted by rapid growth occurring in the Seoul-Kyongin and Yongnam regions.

From the above comparative review of the component ratio by region of the number of manufacturing businesses, the following conclusions may be drawn: First, it can be said that during the period of high economic growth in south Korea the manufacturing businesses in the Yongnam region grew bigger in scale at a faster rate than any other region of the country, and that, as a result, they proved most successful in producing goods with more values added and in absorbing job-seeking population. Second, the Honam and Chungchong regions' shares of the manufacturing businesses shrank as fast as did their shares of the values added and of the work force, suggesting that the widened economic disparities between these two regions and the Yongnam region were inevitable.

Let us now take a comparative look at the changes in the small-business percentage of the mining and manufacturing industries—an indicator that is related to the component ratio of the mining and manufacturing businesses but more specifically reflects the sizes of these businesses. The term "small-business percentage" as used here carries the definition as follows: the number of business entities in the scale of 5-9 employees per entity, expressed as a percentage of the total number of business entities in a given region, not in the country as a whole.

Table 5. Small-Business Percentage

Region	1968	1979	1986
Nationwide	52.0	38.3	31.1
Seoul-Kyongin	45.9	30.6	29.4
Yongnam	47.0	32.9	24.3
Honam	66.5	63.5	54.1
Chungchong	55.5	50.2	38.9

(Source: Same as Table 2)

The nationwide small-business percentage was 52 in 1968 but by 1986, after the period of high economic growth, it dropped to 31.1. Such a drop in the small-business percentage is considered as a natural phenomenon that goes with an economy on the rise. In the case of the Seoul-Kyongin region, the percentage was 45.9 in 1968 but fell to 29.4 in 1986. During the same period, the Yongnam region's small-business percentage dropped from 47 to 24.3, a level far below the nationwide average and the Seoul-Kyongin region. In the Honam region, meanwhile, the percentage decline was slower than any other region: from 66.5 percent in 1968 to 54.1 percent in 1986. In the Chungchong region, the rate of decline was somewhat faster than the Honam region. Both the Honam and Chungchong regions registered small-business percentages markedly higher than the nationwide average.

From the above comparison of the changes in regional small-business percentages, the following conclusions may be drawn: First, as was already noted in discussing the changes in the component ratio of the manufacturing businesses, the Yongnam region has been ridding itself of the pettiness in business scale at a faster rate than any other region. If one accepts the theory that casting off business pettiness is a natural consequence of economic development, it can be said that Yongnam is the region that has been having the fastest economic development in the country. Second, throughout the period of high economic growth in the country, the Honam and Chungchong regions, when compared with the nationwide average, has hardly been able to cast off their business pettiness; this, one may say, has led to the worsening of economic disparities between them and the Yongnam region.

Yongnam's Industrial Parks Three Times Larger Than Seoul's

Next, let us take a comparative look at the component ratios by region of the acreage and production of industrial parks—ratios that can serve as specific indicators helpful for the understanding of regional economic disparities.

Table 6. Component Ratio of Industrial Parks
(as of 1985; in percentage)

Region	Industrial parks	
	Acreage	Production
Nationwide	100.0	100.0
Seoul-Kyongin	19.0	37.6
Yongnam	60.8	45.1

Table 6. Component Ratio of Industrial Parks
(as of 1985; in percentage)

Region	Industrial parks	
	Acreage	Production
Honam	16.0	10.2
Chungchong	2.8	5.8
Other	1.4	1.3

(Source: "Yearbook of Municipal and Provincial Statistics," 1985)

In 1985 the Seoul-Kyongin region accounted for 19 percent of the acreage of and 37.6 percent of the production by all the industrial parks in the country. That the region's production ratio is significantly high in relation to the acreage may be attributed to the more intensive use of land by the industrial parks of this region. The Yongnam region accounts for as much as 60.8 percent of the acreage and 45.1 percent of the production of the nationwide industrial parks. As far as industrial parks are concerned, it can be said that the Yongnam region is indeed playing the role as the center of south Korea's industries. Meanwhile, the Honam region's shares are 16 percent in acreage and 10.2 percent in production, while the Chungchong region accounts for 2.8 percent and 5.8 percent respectively—shares much lower than those of the Honam region.

The following conclusions may be drawn from the above comparison of regional shares of industrial parks: First, in terms of the area and population, the Yongnam region is 2 times and 1.6 times, respectively, bigger than the Honam region, but the Yongnam's shares of the acreage and production of industrial parks are 3.8 times and 4.4 times, respectively, more than the Honam's shares; from this, one can say that the economic disparities between the two regions were only inevitable. Second, when compared on the basis of industrial parks alone, the Yongnam region is far ahead of the Seoul-Kyongin region: that its industrial parks are three times larger in acreage terms than those in Seoul is an indication that the Yongnam region already has all the prerequisites to becoming the industrial center of south Korea as the country's industrialization process keeps up in the days ahead.

Yongnam's Share of Local Taxes Tops Honam's by 3.5 Times

At this point, let us turn to two other indicators that can even more specifically reflect the economic disparities between regions: one is wage differential between regions; the other is the component ratio by region of local taxes.

In examining the regional economic disparities, it would be desirable to use as a basis for comparison the so-called regional per capita income, just like the frequent use of per capita GNP in comparing economic gaps between nations. But reliable reference data for regional per

capita income are not yet available. In its place, therefore, the author has decided to use regional wage standards for the mining and manufacturing workers. Table 7 shows such wage standards by region and by year.

Table 7. Wage Standards of Mining and Manufacturing Workers (in percentage)

Region	1963	1979	1986
Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0
Seoul-Kyongin	117.5	104.9	104.2
Yongnam	90.0	99.6	102.5
Honam	82.5	88.5	96.2
Chungchong	87.5	88.4	90.7

(Source: Same as Table 2)

From 1963 on, the wage level of the mining and manufacturing worker in the Seoul-Kyongin region continued to stay above the nationwide average but the margin grew progressively narrower as it approached 1986. This seems to have been due to the sustained rise in the Yongnam region's wage level which increased faster than in any other region. The Yongnam region's wage level, which was considerably below, or 90 percent of, the nationwide average in 1963, nearly caught up with the nationwide average in 1979 thanks to the fast-growing economy of the region, and finally surpassed the nationwide average in 1986.

Meanwhile, the wage level in the Honam region has risen at a relatively fast pace but remained below the nationwide average: 82.5 percent of the nationwide average in 1963 and 96.2 percent in 1986. The wage level in the Chungchong region rose at a slower pace than in the Honam region; in 1986 it was 90.7 percent of the nationwide average.

The following conclusion may be drawn from the above comparison: That the wage level of the mining and manufacturing worker is higher in the Yongnam region than in the Honam and Chungchong regions makes the economic disparities between them even more clearly understandable. When one takes into account the fact that the Yongnam region has roughly eight times more workers than the Honam region, the magnitude of the economic disparities having to do with the wage differential between these two regions should be readily understandable.

Finally, let us take a comparative look at the component ratio by region of local taxes—an indicator that can most vividly reflect the economic disparities between regions.

Table 8. Component Ratio of Local Taxes (in percentage)

Region	1962	1972	1979	1981	1986
Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Seoul-Kyongin	37.9	56.9	54.3	52.6	56.4
Yongnam	28.0	24.6	26.6	27.6	26.0
Honam	17.7	8.9	9.2	9.3	7.5
Chungchong	12.7	6.6	7.1	7.2	6.9
Other	3.7	3.0	2.8	3.3	2.2

(Sources: "Collection of Statistical Data on Public Finance," 1983, by Choe Kwang; "Regional Finances Yearbook," issued for each fiscal year by the Ministry of Finance)

Local taxes, once the tax headings are decided upon, are universally applied to all regions. Since the 1960's there have been several tax reforms; at present, local taxes are being collected under 12 different headings. The differences in regional shares of local taxes are determined by the structural differences in regional economies inclusive of population, area, and industrial structure; simply put, they are caused by economic disparities between regions.

Table 7 [as published; should be Table 8] shows that the Seoul-Kyongin region's share of local taxes was 37.9 percent in 1962, but as the region's economy continued to develop and expand in scope it rose to 56.4 percent in 1986—significantly higher than any other region. This was due to the Seoul-Kyongin region's superiority over other regions in terms of economic strength and such other factors as population size. The Yongnam region's share of local taxes, on the other hand, was 28 percent in 1962 but showed only slight fluctuations in either direction throughout the 25 years of high growth: in 1986 the region's share was 26 percent, somewhat lower even than what it was in 1963 [as published; should be 1962]. Meanwhile, the Honam and Chungchong regions' shares of local taxes fell sharply from 17.7 percent and 12.7 percent in 1962 to 7.5 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively, in 1986.

From the comparative study of the changes in the component ratio of local taxes, the following conclusion may be drawn: The Yongnam region's share of local taxes was 1.6 times higher than that of the Honam region in 1962, but the economic-growth differential between the two regions that developed over the 25-year period further widened the share gap: in 1986, the Yongnam's share was 3.5 times higher than the Honam's. Even if allowances are made for the differences between these two regions in such factors as population, area, and industrial structure, the widening gap in their shares of local taxes is a telling proof of the worsening economic disparities between them.

Regional Economic Disparities Worsened During High-Growth Period

Regional economic disparities are inevitable consequences of the regional differences in population, area, and industrial structure. Moreover, in a country such as south Korea, where the economy has been achieving one of the highest rates of growth in the world, regional economic disparities are bound to occur after a certain period of time. Be that as it may, having undertaken an analysis using seven different economic indicators, it is the author's considered opinion that the regional economic disparities in south Korea may very well have been widened too much during the course of high economic growth. Especially the economic disparity between the Yongnam and Honam regions seems to have gone beyond what can be accepted as a natural consequence of high economic growth.

The reason for such intensification of regional economic disparities in south Korea may be attributed to the fact that the economic growth in the Yongnam region has been in step with or ahead of the national level while the growth in the Honam and Chungchong regions has been in a state of relative contraction. In other words, it is the very consequence of unbalanced growth between regions.

Proceeding from the author's premise—assuming it is acceptable—that south Korea's regionalism is rooted in regional economic disparities, it can be concluded that the widened economic gaps between regions that emerged during the course of 25 years of high economic growth have undoubtedly exacerbated the problem of regionalism in the Korean society as has already been manifested in the results of the two general elections. Accordingly, it is the author's view that prerequisite to the resolution of the regionalism issue is the introduction of a policy that can reduce the regional economic disparities.

It is in this context that the author will now embark on a detailed discussion of government policies that have governed regional investments in the past. But, first, one needs to understand how economic policies have been formulated in the past and what problems have developed in that process.

The question, then, is, why was it inevitable for regional economic disparities to become worsened during the course of high economic growth? This question, I believe, should be dealt with from two different angles: one has to do with the details of government investments in regions; the other with the details of the private-sector investments in regions.

Given the fact that since the 1960's south Korea's economic policy has been aimed primarily at promoting government-led growth, an analysis of the government policy dealing with regional investments will be of help toward understanding regional economic disparities. More on this anon.

In all cases, a regional investment policy of the government impacts on the direction of the private-sector investment within the region involved and thereby plays a decisive role in creating economic disparities between regions. For instance, should the government decide to help promote a large-scale industrial park in a certain region as a means to achieve a government-set growth target, such an investment-policy decision will serve to invigorate the private-sector investment activities in that region for it will mean a variety of production-related incentives to the local entrepreneurs. Especially if that region had a healthy industrial foundation to begin with, such an influx of government and private-sector investments will, after a period of time, accelerate the region's industrialization, which in turn will inevitably lead to an economic disparity between that region and the others.

In such a situation, the driving force behind the private-sector investment is a competitive desire for the realization of maximum profit; thus, it would not matter even if the private-sector investment were discounted in the analysis of regional economic disparities. What really matters is that if a government policy on regional investment is formulated and implemented not on the basis of the particulars of the economic structure of each region but rather based on political considerations, the ensuing investment is liable to favor a certain region disproportionately. It therefore follows that government investment activities carried out in a manner partial to a certain region will inevitably lead to economic disparities between regions. This, then, is the basic premise underlying the author's analysis as presented herein.

Geographical Spread of Economic Officials by Birthplace

Based on the above premise, the author will now proceed to discuss theoretically and positively the economic policy-making process involved in regional investment policies of the government.

The assumption that since the 1960's regional investment policies of the government have been partial to a certain region may find theoretical support in the Public Options Doctrine. Here, on the basis of the Public Options Doctrine, the economic policy-making process and problems attendant thereto will first be theoretically explained, followed by an examination of the geographical spread of economic bureaucrats by their place of birth.

The Public Options Doctrine is the underpinning of a branch of the economic science striving to analyze political behaviors by means of applying economic theories. This doctrine has been making great strides of late, mainly due to the efforts of Buchanan [Professor James A. Buchanan], a Nobel prize winner in economics, and the likes. This doctrine is contributing particularly to the understanding of the policy-making process within the political system based on parliamentary democracy and the problems attendant upon such a process.

Generally speaking, when a government is about to spend money for the people, the decisionmaking is largely determined by one of three factors: the customary practices, the will of dictator, or democratic vote. Democracy, which is based on democratic vote, may be categorized into two types: the direct democracy, in which the people participate directly in decisionmaking process; and the indirect democracy, in which decisionmaking is done by elected representatives of the people. Because the direct democracy tends to deprive the decisionmaking process of the timeliness and make the process too costly, in real life nearly all nations are practicing the indirect form of democracy.

But the success of such a policy-making process is predicated on some important conditions. To wit, the bureaucrats must be omniscient and omnipotent in their information gathering and distillation of the popular will, and the politicians must be rational, just, and impartial in their representation of the people's interests. When these conditions are met, the people's preferences will be correctly reflected and rational, impartial economic policies can be formulated in the interest of the people.

The question is: Is it really possible for the people's preferences to be correctly reflected in the formulation of economic policies? Many experts have concluded that such a possibility is almost negligible in practical terms. The reason for this is self-evident in the actualities of the bureaucrats and politicians.

Bureaucrats and Politicians Are Big Spenders of Government Money

The Public Options Doctrine defines bureaucrats as a group out to maximize their own gains in terms of promotions and preservation of power and politicians as a group also out to maximize their gains in terms of getting elected or reelected; in essence, these definitions speak of the very actualities of the bureaucrats and politicians. If indeed bureaucrats and politicians are the groups interested solely in the pursuit of their own gains, when they promise to spend the people's money to do wonderful things for the people, their expressed intentions and the actual results are usually two different things. Actually the reason why the people are less than willing to trust the politician's promises boils down to the fact that the people know too well the actualities of the politicians. Thus, the doctrine points out, the act of policy-making by bureaucrats and politicians in a parliamentary democracy is intended for the good not of the people but of themselves—the bureaucrats and politicians.

What are the problems arising from this kind of situation? They are called as "government failures." The term "government failures" is used in reference to ineffectual economic management by the government and economic improprieties caused by the government.

Let us briefly discuss, using the United States as an example, some problems related to government failures. For the simple reason that the more opportunities there are to spend greater sums of government money, the easier it is for bureaucrats and politicians to maximize their own gains, government failures inevitably come to the fore with an expansion of government activities. Today, the core of the economic problem confronting the United States is the cumulative growth of its fiscal deficits resulting from excessive spending of government money by its bureaucrats and politicians in the past.

The United States, too, as with some other countries, has been managing its fiscal deficits by means of considerable monetary expansion; as a result, its domestic prices have risen higher than in other countries, which in turn has progressively worsened its trade deficits in recent years—more imports, less exports. Just the fact that the United States has now become the world's biggest debtor nation is in itself enough to make one fully grasp the extent of U.S. economic problems. A different kind of government failures-related incident happened in the United States in the 1970's: Vice President Agnew was involved in a case of financial impropriety and was forced to resign in the middle of his tenure.

Let us now apply the Public Options Doctrine to the case of south Korea and examine what kind of government failures have manifested themselves there and how the government's regional investment program has been disproportionately partial to a certain region.

Corny though it may sound, a system of parliamentary democracy has been in place in south Korea. But south Korea's parliamentary democracy thus far has been nothing more than a mere form, and it is difficult to draw a parallel between it and the parliamentary democracies of various Western nations. As a matter of fact, because both the Third and Fifth Republics were launched by a one-sided force, it was understandably difficult for the Western-style parliamentary democracy to see the light in south Korea in those days. We call that development a "dictatorization" of politics. That dictatorization of politics prevailed throughout the days of the Third through Fifth Republics is a fact which no one denies.

Facts About Biased Regional Investment Policy

Under the environment of political dictatorization, it was inevitable that the role of members of the National Assembly, the elected spokesmen of the people, was ignored for all practical purposes. Looking back at the National Assembly operations in the past, the truth was that not only were the members, popularly elected by the people, restricted of the opportunities and even the length of time for them to take the floor to speak in behalf of the people, they were denied of the right to investigate government operations that would have enabled them to find out how the government, supported by the people's money, was spending the people's money. Given these facts, it is clear that the management of government operations in those years was nearly monopolized by either one person or a small group of persons.

But the problem does not end there. From the onset of the Third Republic, government's priority policy goal was the promotion of economic growth. That priority was maintained consistently for 25 years through the end of the Fifth Republic. The first through sixth 5-year economic plans, formulated and implemented during that period, are the telling evidence of that fact.

In order to push economic plans forward, individuals with expert knowledge must be mobilized. But, when politics is dictatorized it would be inevitable, as was fully explained earlier, that a handful of politicians and economic bureaucrats with expert knowledge would exercise extraordinary power in the economic policy-making process. If one takes a close look at the economic policy-making process of the past, one cannot deny that most of the economic policies were planned and implemented from behind the curtain almost exclusively by a small number of economic bureaucrats who were closely linked to the machination of political dictatorization. "Elite economic bureaucrats"—these words, spoken as if they were a catchphrase during those 25 years, seem to tell it all. That being the case, the successive regimes in south Korea, which had adopted the democratic system of government under the slogan "government of, by, and for the people," have in effect taken the liberty of neglecting the majority of the people, except for those belonging to a certain clique, for all these years. At this point in time, when political democratization is coming into being in south Korea, all the politicians of the country would do well to remember and bear in mind the fact that the people, who should rightfully have had the honored seats at the center stage, have had to relegate themselves to the back court for so long.

It seems that the biased regional investment policy of the government, which is the crux of this essay, should be viewed in the above context.

When economic policies are established exclusively by a small number of economic bureaucrats, the resulting government failures are bound to be more serious than otherwise. Representative of such failures would be economic "undemocratization."

The meaning of economic undemocratization can be readily understood in conjunction with economic democratization. Although the term "economic democratization" is not really anything very new, it was raised by the wind of political democratization that began blowing last year and has since become a topic of sustained discussion in the Korean society. Simply put, economic democratization means freeing the economy from government controls and interferences so that it can operate autonomously. The reason for so much spotlight focused on this term since last year does not require any lengthy explanation: It is in reaction to the government-centered growth policy pursued by the successive regimes of the past, which had entailed excessive controls of and interferences with the economic management by the government during those years. At present, in the context of economic democratization, most attention seems to be focused on the issue of granting autonomy to the banks and recognizing the independence and neutrality of the Bank of Korea.

The economic undemocratization committed by the Third through Fifth Republics have wrought innumerable side effects on south Korea's economy. For example,

the problem of the concentration of economic power resulting from stepped-up monopoly and oligopoly, the withering of medium and small businesses, the contraction of farm economies, the imbalance in income distribution, between classes, the continuation of low wages, the spread of labor-management disputes, the economic disparities between regions, etc.—the list can go on ad infinitum.

Especially in the case of south Korea, the typical examples of government failures resulting from economic undemocratization may be found in government improprieties. The following cases of improprieties may be labeled as the products of economic undemocratization: the wave of securities scandals during the 1960's; the innumerable incidents of financial improprieties that marked the period of the Fifth Republic from beginning to end, such as the Chang Yong-cha scandal, the Kim Chol-ho scandal, numerous cases of large-scale business scams, the "Saemaul" scandal involving Chon Kyong-hwan [younger brother of former President Chon Tu-hwan], the Yom Po-hyon scandal; the impropriety involving the Ilhae Foundation, and the improprieties involving the Chon clan making the headlines of so many weeklies.

Let us now get back to the matter of government's regional investment policy, which is the core subject of this essay. If we are to assume that in the past the process of economic policy-making was exclusively in the hands of a small number of economic bureaucrats closely linked to the machination of political dictatorization, it is essential that this assumption be verified positively. Toward that end, the author will use two sets of data for analytical purposes. One will be the analysis of the geographical spread by birthplace of those economic bureaucrats who are believed to have been directly involved in the economic policy-making during the period of the Third through Fifth Republics. The other will be the analysis of the details of the government investment program by region.

Before beginning these analyses, a few words seem to be in order about the basic data used for these analyses.

First, the period used for these analyses is from the onset of the Third Republic through the end of the Fifth Republic; when necessary, the period is divided into two subperiods: one covering the Third and Fourth Republics, the other covering the Fifth Republic. In this essay, the Fourth Republic, given its political circumstances, is treated simply as an extension of the Third Republic. Second, counted for the purpose of analysis are only those economic bureaucrats who had held the positions of vice minister and above during the target period with any of the following five economic agencies: the Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Energy and Resources. The predecessor organs of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Ministry of Energy and

Resources are excluded from the survey due to limitations in data processing. In counting the economic bureaucrats above the rank of vice minister, those who were appointed directly as prime minister are excluded on the assumption that they lacked the expertise in economic affairs; however, those who had served as deputy prime minister cum vice minister of the Economic Planning Board and then were promoted to the position of prime minister are in the tally on the belief that they, because of their expertise in the economic affairs, must have exercised even greater influence over the formulation and execution of economic policies.

As far as regional development policies of the central government were concerned, presumably the Ministry of Home Affairs, provincial governors, and mayors of those cities that are under the direct control of the central government had had a great deal of influence over them. Nevertheless, they are excluded from the survey due to the desirability of limiting the criteria of the target group in line with the proposition that it was a small number of economic bureaucrats who had had a monopolistic control over the formulation and promotion of economic policies. It is in fact the author's belief that the relationships between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the bureaucrats of local administrations had had a more decisive impact on regional investment policies of the central government; however, the author feels that this should necessarily be the subject for another time.

Analyzing the special characteristics of the target group of economic bureaucrats on the basis of the geographic spread of their birthplaces may not be entirely reasonable at times. Because if, for instance, some of them were born at one place but grew up at another, the results of the analysis could contain some errors. Be that as it may, given the set of conditions peculiar to south Korea, where a person's territorial ties, personal ties, and school ties interact closely to have a great deal of impact on his advancement in life, and also in view of the practical difficulty of finding out where a person grew up, it seems that conducting the analysis on the basis of places of birth would not be too far out of order.

The sources of the raw materials used for this analysis are the "Comprehensive Listing of Key Officials of the Three Branches of Successive Governments of the Republic of Korea" (May 1985) published by the Naeoe Sinso publishing firm, and the contents of the government appointments columns of daily newspapers such as the KYONGHYANG SINMUN.

A breakdown by birthplace of the economic bureaucrats above the rank of vice minister is given in Table 9 [table not included].

How Birthplaces of Top Leaders Affected the Picture

The economic bureaucrats who, during the period of the Third through Fifth Republics, served in positions of vice minister and above (those who were appointed directly as prime minister are excluded) number 77. Quite a few of them, however, held such a position more

than once, changing from one agency to another. Together, the same 77 officials served in those positions a total of 116 times, the breakdown of which is as follows: served once—47 officials, served twice—22 officials, served three times—7 officials, and served four times—1 official.

[Unnumbered Table] Percentage Breakdown of Senior Economic Bureaucrats by Birthplace

Place of birth	When served	
	During Third-Fourth Republic	During Fifth Republic
Kyongsang Provinces	30.1	43.6
Chungchong Provinces	13.5	13.9
Seoul	10.3	10.4
Cholla Provinces	9.6	13.2
Kyonggi Province	7.7	3.7
Kangwon Province	5.1	5.6
Other	23.7	9.6

Although it is not reflected in Table 9, of the 77 economic bureaucrats, only 2 had been high-ranking military officers prior to their civil-service appointments, indicating that even in those days expertise was considered a necessary qualification for holding responsible positions dealing with economic affairs. Now, setting the head count aside, let us examine the breakdown by birthplace of the 116 times those 77 individuals served in senior economic positions.

As a starter, listed below, in descending order, is a percentage breakdown by birthplace of the number of times the 77 individuals were appointed to senior economic positions during the Third through Fifth Republics (figures in parentheses denote the number of times served).

North Kyongsang Province	24.1 percent (28 times)
Seoul	21.8 percent (25 times) [as published]
North Korea	15.5 percent (18 times)
South Kyongsong Province	7.8 percent (9 times)
South Chungchong Province	7.8 percent (9 times)
Kangwon Province	6.9 percent (8 times)
Kyonggi Province	5.2 percent (6 times)
North Cholla Province	4.3 percent (5 times)
South Cholla Province	2.6 percent (3 times)
Cheju Island	2.6 percent (3 times)
North Chungchong Province	1.7 percent (2 times)

Individuals born in north Kyongsang Province accounted for 28 of the 116 appointments to senior economic positions, or 24.1 percent—the highest share, made during the period from the Third through Fifth Republics. Presumably this had something to do with the fact that the two presidents who served in that period both had personal ties with north Kyongsang Province. Seoul's share of 21.8 percent [as published; should be 21.5 percent] was slightly lower than north Kyongsang's, while those who were born in north Korea accounted for 15.5 percent, the third highest share. Such a high percentage accounted for by those who were originally from north Korea perhaps should best be appreciated in

conjunction with the fact that ever since the founding of the Republic of Korea a large number of north Korea-born elite civil servants have traditionally been deeply involved in governmental affairs. One notable feature revealed by this analysis is that south Kyongsang Province, which is part of the Yongnam region, accounted for only 7.8 percent of the senior appointments during the period, the same as south Chungchong Province's share. On the other hand, south Chungchong's relatively high percentage—next only to north Kyongsang, Seoul, and north Korea—seems to have been a phenomenon related to the personal territorial connection of Mr K [Kim Chong-pil] who, from the start of the Third Republic, held key government positions for a long period of time.

Meanwhile, Kangwon, Kyonggi, south Cholla, north Cholla, Cheju, and north Chungchong each had between 2 and 8 out of the senior appointments totaling 116—between 2 and 7 in percentage terms.

The same percentage breakdown by birthplace of the 116 senior economic appointments is regrouped below on the basis of the five major regions:

Seoul-Kyongin	27.0 percent
	[as published; should be 26.7]
Yongnam	31.9 percent
Honam	6.9 percent
Chungchong	9.5 percent
Other (Cheju, Kangwon, and north Korea)	25.0 percent

One notable feature is Yongnam's 31.9-percent share which is not only higher than Seoul-Kyongin's but the highest among all regions. This closely parallels with our earlier findings on the Yongnam region's various economic strengths, which in certain cases exceeded the Seoul-Kyongin region and in all cases far exceeded all other regions except for Seoul-Kyongin. Another notable feature is that, unlike its relative standing among all regions in terms of economic disparities, the Honam region ranks lowest in terms of the number of its native sons having received senior economic appointments.

Next, let us examine a similar percentage breakdown for the period covering the Third and Fourth Republics only; the listing below is in descending order with number of appointments given in parentheses:

Seoul	22.5 percent (16 times)
North Korea	16.9 percent (12 times)
North Kyongsang	14.3 percent (10 times)
	[as published; should be 14.1 percent]
South Chungchong	11.3 percent (8 times)
South Kyongsang	9.9 percent (7 times)
Kangwon	9.9 percent (7 times)
Kyonggi	4.2 percent (3 times)
[North Cholla	4.2 percent (3 times)]
North Chungchong	2.8 percent (2 times)
Cheju	2.8 percent (2 times)
South Cholla	1.4 percent (1 time)

During the years of the Third and Fourth Republics, the number of appointments made to senior economic positions above the rank of vice minister totaled 71 times. Of this total, Seoul natives accounted for 22.5 percent; those born in north Korea, 16.9 percent; those from north Kyongsang, 14.3 percent; those from south Chungchong, 11.3 percent; native sons of south Kyongsang and Kangwon, 9.9 percent each; and only once, or 1.4 percent of the total, was an individual from south Cholla involved in the appointment. Seoul's highest share for the period presumably was due to Seoul's having a concentration of elite economic bureaucrats, after all. On the other hand, north Kyongsang's 14.3 percent and south Chungchong's 11.3 percent could be viewed as having had something to do with north Kyongsang being the birthplace of the president [Pak Chong-hui] of the Third Republic and south Chungchong being the birthplace of Mr K [Kim Chong-pil] who had enormous political influence during that period.

The same percentage breakdown becomes as follows when rearranged for the five major regions:

Seoul-Kyongin	26.7 percent
Yongnam	24.2 percent
	[as published; should be 24.0]
Honam	5.6 percent
Chungchong	14.1 percent
Other	29.1 percent
	[as published; should be 29.6]

Excluding the "other" region, which covers Cheju, Kangwon, and north Korea, the regional breakdown puts Seoul-Kyongin at the top with 26.7 percent, followed by Yongnam with 24.2 percent [as published; should be 24.0 percent]. Chungchong's 14.1 percent far exceeds Honam's mere 5.6 percent. Two things stand out about the component ratio by birthplace of senior economic bureaucrats during the period of the Third and Fourth Republics: One is the markedly low share of Honam's as compared with other regions; the other is Yongnam's share's being almost on a par with Seoul-Kyongin's.

Finally, let us examine the percentage breakdown by birthplace of senior economic appointments made during the Fifth Republic. During this period, senior economic bureaucrats above the position of vice minister were appointed 45 times. The percentage breakdown of these appointments by birthplace of the appointee is listed below in descending order:

North Kyongsang	40.0 percent (18 times)
Seoul	20.0 percent (9 times)
North Korea	13.3 percent (6 times)
Kyonggi	6.7 percent (3 times)
South Kyongsang	4.4 percent (2 times)
South Cholla	4.4 percent (2 times)
North Cholla	4.4 percent (2 times)
Kangwon	2.2 percent (1 time)
South Chungchong	2.2 percent (1 time)
Cheju	2.2 percent (1 time)
North Chungchong	0 percent (0 time)

Most remarkable features of the above comparison are first, that north Kyongsang's 40-percent share is no less than twice the size of Seoul's share; and second, that south Chungchong, whose native sons had accounted for 11.3 percent of such appointments during the period of the Third and Fourth Republics, managed to secure only a 2.2-percent share during this period. Meanwhile, south Kyongsang, south Cholla, and north Cholla each accounted for 2 appointments, or 4.4 percent, of the 45 total.

Rearranging it for the five major regions, the breakdown becomes as follows:

Seoul-Kyongin	26.7 percent
Yongnam	44.4 percent
Honam	8.8 percent
Chungchong	2.2 percent
Other	17.9 percent

During the period of the Fifth Republic, the Yongnam region's native sons accounted for no less than 44.4 percent of all senior-level economic appointments. The Seoul-Kyongin region's share was 26.7 percent, identical to its share during the Third and Fourth Republics. But Chungchong's share fell to a mere 2.2 percent in this period, the lowest among all regions, while Honam registered 8.8 percent.

The question is: What conclusion can one draw from the above comparison of regional shares of senior-level economic appointments made during the Fifth Republic? The obvious conclusion, in a nutshell, is that the native sons of the Yongnam region in general but more specifically of north Kyongsang Province accounted for more than 40 percent, an excessively high share, of the total appointments, and that the Yongnam's share rose sharply during this period as compared with what it had been during the Third Republic.

This conclusion generally coincides with the results of a study undertaken by the Research Institute of Contemporary Society and published in a paper entitled "A Study of Regional Schism in the South Korean Society: The Yongnam-Honam Discord as the Core Issue." The study covered, as the target group for its analysis, senior-level [unspecified] officials of the successive governments, beginning with the First Republic and ending at early 1985, the midway point of the Fifth Republic. Thus, it is different from the study of mine with respect to both the target criteria and the period of coverage. Be that as it may, if I may borrow from the institute's study results only those portions applicable to two specific periods—one covering the Third and Fourth Republics, the other covering the Fifth Republic, they are as follows:

During the Third and Fourth Republics, according to that study, a total of 432 persons served in senior government positions throughout the three branches; 30.1 percent of them were native sons of the Yongnam region. During the Fifth Republic, again according to the

same study, the Yongnam's share in this regard rose sharply—43.6 percent of 156 senior officials. Naturally I find it quite interesting, indeed, to note that the Yongnam's percentage share during the Fifth Republic, as quoted above from the institute's study, is nearly identical with Yongnam's 44.4-percent share of senior economic officials during the same period as my own analysis has revealed. Meanwhile, Seoul's shares of all senior officials governmentwide during these two periods were held to 10.3 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively—levels much lower than the Yongnam's in both instances. On the other hand, interestingly, Chungchong's shares for the same two periods were 13.5 percent and 13.9 percent, respectively—the second highest among all regions, while Honam's shares were 9.6 percent and 13.2 percent, respectively, which are much higher than its shares of senior economic officials alone.

Now, the question is: What does such geographical bias apparent in the appointments of senior economic officials or all senior officials governmentwide have to do with the problem of regional schism? Undoubtedly many will find this question relatively easy to answer: They will say that when appointments of senior government officials are disproportionately biased in favor of the native sons of a certain region, this will make individuals from other regions feel alienated, which in turn will trigger bad feelings between regions. It seems, however, that such an answer may not necessarily be on the mark. One day, after the two major elections had been over and when the problem of regional schism was surfacing as a social issue, a certain professor appeared on a televised debate, during which he made a point of rationalizing the geographical bias in the appointments of senior government officials. According to his argument, the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 resulted in demographic changes, which not only brought a heavy concentration of talented people to the Yongnam region but also made that region, already strong in its economic foundation, even stronger in economic terms than any other region including the Seoul region as it was then. As a result, he said, those who were born in the Yongnam region during the 1950's had more opportunities than did those born elsewhere to receive higher education either within the country or abroad. Although the legitimacy of such an argument is subject to further research, this writer tends to accept the correctness of his argument. Further, it makes this writer feel that, except for the past excesses in appointing the native sons of a certain region to senior government positions, in general there may very well be room for reflection on the wisdom of regions harboring bad feelings against each other strictly on the basis of apparent geographical imbalance in the selection of senior officials.

Gap in National Subsidies

Based on the premise that regional schism was caused by economic disparities between regions, the author has thus far devoted his analysis to the actual state of regional economic disparities and to the geographical

distribution by birthplace of senior economic officials. Now, the author will get on with an analysis of the contents of the regional investments by government as a means toward a more detailed examination of how such economic disparities between regions have been brought about.

As was touched upon already, it would be a fair statement to say that regional economic disparities have been brought about due to the regional imbalances in terms of private-sector investments and regional investments by the government. But it is the author's view that, given the economic structure existing in south Korea, the question of private-sector investments is not the issue at all. On the other hand, regional investments by the government, which are made based on the government's investment policy, are bound to have direct causal effects on the creation of regional economic disparities.

Especially in the case of south Korea, where the economy has for so long been controlled by the government-led growth policy, it is all the more a fair assumption that the government's investment policy has had a decisive impact on the economic growth and industrialization of any given region. Under such circumstances, the national government, by making large investments through a local government in the expansion of the area's social overhead capital or economic infrastructure which in turn will promote the area's economic growth, can encourage local private investors to help production activities of the area. Some domestic and foreign scholars cite the government's success in expanding economic infrastructure as one of the reasons behind south Korea's achievement of high economic growth in the past. The term "economic infrastructure" as used here involves such things as roads, irrigations, telephones, electricity, and ever-increasing industrial parks.

A review of the contents of investment programs by local governments since the onset of the First 5-Year Economic Plan reveals that some 20-80 percent of their total investment outlays have been directed to such economic programs that are related to economic infrastructure. Thus, an analysis of the contents of local investment

outlays will greatly facilitate the analysis of economic disparities between regions. In this connection, we need first to discuss the sources of revenue for local investment outlays.

It is a reality that all local autonomous entities of south Korea are weak in financial capacity. This is well reflected in the state of so-called fiscal self-sufficiency ratio. The local fiscal self-sufficiency ratio is measured by the ratio of the sum of local-tax revenue plus self-generated revenue from non-tax receipt to the total annual revenue of a given local government. The overall local fiscal self-sufficiency ratio in south Korea has been averaging at a meager 56 percent during the past 10 years, with the exception of 1986 when it registered 60.7 percent, the record high. When due to low self-sufficiency ratio local governments cannot meet their expenditures with their self-generated revenues, treasury subsidies and revenue sharing will make up for the shortfalls on the basis of the local finance adjustment system. At this point, a brief explanation may be in order regarding the nature of treasury subsidy and revenue sharing.

The treasury subsidy may be characterized as a designated subsidy. It is provided by the central government in order to support a national program entrusted to local governments or such other activities of local governments that are essential to the implementation of national policies; it is a designated subsidy in that the funds must be used only for the purposes specifically designated. The revenue sharing, on the other hand, is a form of subsidy provided to local governments as an open, general revenue, the aim of which is to redress the regional imbalances in local finances; it takes the character of general subsidies designed to augment autonomous revenues of local governments.

It is worth noting, therefore, that, as the local self-government system comes into play in earnest in the days ahead, the two forms of subsidies cited above will be the representative means which the central government can utilize for the purposes not only of ensuring financial equilibrium between local governments but also of redressing economic disparities between regions.

Now, let us examine, as we promised earlier, the contents of local investment programs and the revenue sources for local investment outlays. For the purpose of this study, the figures on investment outlays are taken from the annual settlement of accounts for 1986, inclusive of general and special accounts.

Table 10 [-a]. Percentage Breakdown by Revenue Source and by Program Category of FY86 Investment Outlays (General Account and Special Account)

Program category	Total	Revenue sources for investment outlays				Bond flotation	Other
		Treasury subsidy	Revenue sharing	Self-generated receipts			
Total	100.0 (100.0)	12.7 (100.0)	5.0 (100.0)	60.7 (100.0)		14.6 (100.0)	7.0 (100.0)
1. Social welfare	5.4	(14.8)	(0.3)	(5.5)		(0.7)	(2.7)
2. Industrial	14.1	(57.1)	(1.5)	(9.7)		(98.4)	(11.1)
3. Construction, irrigation	60.8	(20.4)	(52.6)	(59.3)		(0.7)	(74.3)
4. Other	19.7	(7.7)	(45.7)	(25.5)		(0.2)	(11.9)

(Source: "Local Finances Yearbook," 1987, by Local Administration Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs)

[Table 10-b]. Percentage Breakdown of Investment Outlays by Revenue Source and by Region

Year	Region	Revenue sources for investment outlays				Other	Total
		Treasury subsidy	Revenue sharing	Bond flotation	Self-generated receipts		
1972	Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	Seoul-Kyongin	12.5	8.6	32.3	57.6	19.4	
	Yongnam	28.3	39.2	28.7	23.4	27.6	
	Honam	27.6	21.3	18.3	8.4	24.5	
	Chungchong	19.1	17.5	5.4	6.8	18.4	
	Share of total	(17.9)	(19.2)	(6.1)	(50.2)	(6.5)	(100.0)
1977	Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	Seoul-Kyongin	20.3	10.0	37.1	49.1	36.9	
	Yongnam	27.1	21.8	49.5	26.7	22.6	
	Honam	24.1	38.0	4.8	7.6	20.9	
	Chungchong	17.3	10.9	4.8	12.3	9.7	
	Share of total	(16.5)	(7.7)	(2.0)	(62.7)	(11.2)	(100.0)
1982	Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	Seoul-Kyongin	26.7	3.8	66.4	55.0	42.0	
	Yongnam	27.0	38.7	25.2	21.7	22.8	
	Honam	20.0	17.1	6.5	12.4	22.5	
	Chungchong	14.9	23.3	0.9	5.9	6.5	
	Share of total	(10.1)	(2.8)	(14.3)	(58.2)	(14.6)	(100.0)
1986	Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	Seoul-Kyongin	9.7	7.2	41.8	61.4	69.5	
	Yongnam	44.9	13.4	41.2	25.1	28.2	
	Honam	28.1	10.5	5.6	5.9	1.0	
	Chungchong	11.4	53.9	8.5	4.2	0.2	
	Share of total	(9.5)	(2.9)	(14.2)	(70.9)	(2.5)	(100.0)

(Sources: "Local Finances Yearbook," annual editions, by Local Administration Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs)

As shown in Table 10, the percentage breakdown of the total 1986 investment outlays by all local governments is as follows: national government subsidies totaling 17.7 percent, of which 12.7 percent was in the form of treasury subsidies and 5 percent in the form of revenue sharing; self-generated receipts, 60.7 percent; bond flotation, 14.6 percent; and 7 percent from "other" sources that are made up of highway funds and transfer funds. In 1986, the local finances self-sufficiency ratio was at its highest level; consequently, the relative share of the national subsidies was kept at its lowest level. By contrast, in 1974, for example, treasury subsidies and revenue sharing combined accounted for 38.8 percent of the total local investment outlays. At any rate, the level of national subsidies as a percentage of the local investment outlays, although lower than that of self-generated receipts, has been consistently high in every year, testifying to the fact that every year the national government has been spending a huge sum of money in support of local investment programs.

In the same year, of the treasury subsidies, which accounted for 12.7 percent of the total investment outlays by local governments, no less than 77.5 percent was devoted to economic programs in the industrial and

construction sectors; likewise, of the funds provided under the revenue sharing, the use of which was at the discretion of local governments, 54.1 percent was spent for economic programs. This is the pattern which can be seen in all other years as well.

Similarly, of the investment outlays using self-generated receipts, which accounted for 60.7 percent of the total investment outlays, 69 percent was devoted to economic programs. Especially noteworthy is the trend of recent years in which an increasingly higher percentage of the investment outlays has been met by funds raised through flotation of loans, both domestically and abroad; in 1986, of the funds so raised, which accounted for 14.6 percent of the total investment outlays, some 99 percent was devoted to economic programs. Likewise, in the case of the revenues from "other" sources, made up of provincial subsidies and transfer funds, our study reveals that as much as 85.4 percent of it has been spent on economic programs.

Now, as a more direct approach to the understanding of the causes for regional economic disparities, let us compare the relative levels of investment outlays in different regions. Table 11 illustrates such levels by region and by year.

Table 11. Regional Investment Outlays in Percent of National Total

Region	1972	1977	1982	1986
Nationwide	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Seoul-Kyongin	36.1	39.8	50.5	52.3
Yongnam	28.5	26.4	23.8	29.0
Honam	16.0	14.1	13.9	8.0
Chungchong	11.7	12.6	6.7	6.8
Other	7.7	7.2	5.1	3.9

(Source: Same as Table 10; appropriate yearly editions)

Table 11 shows that the relative level of the Seoul-Kyongin region's investment outlays rose from 36.1 percent of the national total in 1972 to 52.3 percent in 1986, indicating a rapid increase subsequent to the 1970's. Such a rapid increase was made possible by a correspondingly rapid expansion during the same period of the revenue source essential to the economic growth of the region. In the case of Yongnam, the relative level was 28.5 percent in 1972, declined slightly thereafter through the early 1980's, but went back up to 29 percent in 1986, somewhat higher than the 1972 level. By contrast, Honam's relative level, which was 16 percent in 1972, suffered a sustained decline, reaching a mere 8 percent in 1986. From all this, it is self-evident that the relative scope of Yongnam's investment outlays, which was 1.7 times that of Honam's in 1972, expanded to the level 3.6 times bigger than Honam's in 1986, testifying to the fact that the gap between these two regions progressively widened during that period. The Chungchong region, too, suffered a decline at a rate similar to Honam's; in terms of relative level of investment outlays, Chungchong was far below Honam.

This comparative analysis leads to the conclusion that the relative levels of local investment outlays, which inevitably play a decisive role in the growth of local economies, have shown progressively widening gaps in recent years between the regions of Yongnam, Honam, and Chungchong. Of course one explanation for this may be that the expansion of the scale of investment outlays in and around the Seoul-Kyongin region resulted in a relative contraction in other regions. But given the recent increase Yongnam's level of investment outlays, it seems that the contractions in Honam and Chungchong cannot be attributed solely to the expansion in Seoul-Kyongin.

Details regarding the revenue sources for local investment outlays can be of great value in explaining economic disparities between regions. For the purpose of this study, the revenue sources are classified into five categories as follows: treasury subsidies and revenue sharing, which together constitute national subsidies; self-generated revenues from local taxes and non-tax receipts; flotation of bonds, mainly in the form of public credit; and "other" revenues consisting of provincial-account subsidies and transfer funds.

Treasury Subsidy: In 1972, treasury subsidies accounted for 17.9 percent of the total investment outlays by all local governments; after that, however, the percentage

gradually declined to reach 9.5 percent in 1986. Looking at the regional allocation pattern of treasury subsidies, the Yongnam region's share exceeded not only that of Seoul-Kyongin's but those of all other regions in all 4 years [see Table 10-b]. Especially in 1986, Yongnam's share was no less than 44.9 percent of the total. Given the nature of treasury subsidies—i.e., they are given to the local government for the purpose of promoting specifically designated programs, the fact that the Yongnam region consistently received the most treasury subsidies is a direct indication of the extent of help provided by the national government to this region's economic growth. Meanwhile, in those same 4 years, the Honam region's share of the treasury subsidies ranged between 20 percent and 28.3 percent [as published; should read 28.1 percent], which is lower than Yongnam's but still relatively high in comparison with the shares of the other regions. The Chungchong region's share was consistently much smaller than Honam's.

Revenue Sharing: Although revenue sharing accounted for 19.2 percent of the total investment outlays in 1972, the percentage dropped sharply thereafter to reach a mere 2.9 percent in 1986. The record of actual distribution of revenue shares shows that Yongnam, Honam, and Chungchong all were recipients of the biggest share in one year or another, indicating no evidence of regional bias in the allocation of investment funds raised by local allocation tax. Such absence of regional bias is rather not surprising if one recalls that the use of revenue shares is left to the discretion of local governments.

Bond Flotation: Funds raised by bond flotation, mostly involving public credit, accounted for 6.1 percent of the total investment outlays in 1972 but more than 14 percent of the total outlays in both 1982 and 1986. The regional breakdown shows that in all 4 years Seoul-Kyongin and Yongnam had the highest shares of the funds of this category—shares ranging between 32 percent and 66 percent. By contrast, in the case of Honam and Chungchong, their shares stayed far below the 10-percent level except for 1972. Bond flotation is done on the basis of the investment policy set by the national government; thus, it can be viewed as the revenue source that can most clearly reflect the degree of regional bias in local investment outlays.

Self-Generated Receipts: In all 4 years, self-generated receipts of local governments accounted for the largest shares of the total investment outlays, ranging between 50 percent and 70 percent. The regional breakdown shows that Seoul-Kyongin and Yongnam maintained

annual percentages ranging between 20 percent and 60 percent in each of the 4 years. Such relatively high percentages on the part of these two regions reflect their stronger economies as compared with other regions. Honam and Chungchong, on the other hand, accounted for much less than 10 percent of the total in most instances. Because self-generated receipts are the biggest single source of funds for the total investment outlays, the regional gaps in the relative shares of this category of funds will have greater causal impact on economic disparities between regions than any other revenue source would.

Other Revenues: Detailed discussion on this category is omitted.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above comparison of regional investment outlays: First, as if to demonstrate their economic strength, Seoul-Kyongin and Yongnam have been able to meet more of their investment outlays with the self-generated receipts of their own in comparison with other regions; it is fair to say, therefore, that in so doing these two regions have further exacerbated the economic disparities between them and the other regions. Second, that Yongnam has been the recipient of the biggest share of treasury subsidies among all regions and that especially Yongnam has had far greater shares of the investment funds raised through flotation of bonds, involving mostly public credit, than the shares of all other regions except for Seoul-Kyongin can be viewed as constituting the evidence that the regional investment programs have been promoted in the manner disproportionately favoring the Yongnam region.

"Nation-Destroying Malaise" and Regional Disparities Confirmed

As already explained earlier, what prompted this author to undertake this writing was his assumption that economic disparities between regions must have been the root cause of the regional schism which, he suspects, could possibly evolve into a "nation-destroying malaise." The purpose of this essay, which was also explained earlier, was to conduct a positive analysis of that assumption from which to draw and present possible approaches to the resolution of the problem of regional schism. Further, in conducting this analysis, the basic assumption was that during the years of the Third through Fifth Republics—the period of dictatorial government, the formulation and execution of economic policies in most instances were the exclusive domain of a small number of economic bureaucrats inseparably linked to the politics of the time, and that, as a result, regional investments by the government disproportionately favored a certain region, thus creating economic disparities between regions.

The results of the analysis are supportive of that basic assumption to a satisfactory degree. A comparative study of regional economic strengths measured against

seven different economic indicators has vividly revealed the presence of economic disparities between Yongnam and Honam for one and between Yongnam and Chungchong for another; moreover, the study has also revealed that these disparities have been exacerbated to an excessive degree as a result of the 25 years of high economic growth. It was for the purpose of positively verifying the causes of these anomalies that the author used the Public Options Doctrine as the basis for his comparative analysis of the geographical composition by birthplace of the economic bureaucrats who served during the years of the Third through Fifth Republics and the contents of regional investment activities undertaken by the government during the same period. The results of this analysis have shown that the Yongnam region was disproportionately favored both in terms of the number of native sons selected for senior economic positions and in terms of the allocation of the government's regional investments.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there are some problems to accepting the validity of the results of the author's analysis. First, there is a possibility that the geographical bias favoring Yongnam in the composition of senior economic bureaucrats was something logical. For one thing, the analysis has made no distinction for those individuals who were born in Yongnam but—like the old saying "Everyone born ends up in Seoul"—actually grew up in Seoul to become "elite economic bureaucrats." For another, if the geographic tilt toward Yongnam apparent in the composition of senior economic bureaucrats was the result of the convergence during the Korean war of talented segments of the population to that region, then it cannot and ought not be viewed as an issue at all.

Second, there is also a possibility that the disproportionate concentration of regional investments in the Yongnam region was only natural because of the region's geographic conditions favorable for industrial growth. It is too heavy a task for this author to even discuss this question when he knows little about the national land development plan or the regional development plans. Nevertheless, given the fact that the Yongnam region's industrial foundation has always been strong and also its conditions for the private-sector investment and for industrial development have excelled those in the Honam and Chungchong regions, it is the author's belief that regional economic disparities brought about as a result of high economic growth cannot and ought not be viewed as an issue at all.

Having said all that, there are two problems which, it seems, cannot be ignored. Even this author, who is so opposed to regionalism that he views it as a nation-destroying malaise, finds it difficult to shrug off these two particular problems lightly. One of them is that the selection of senior economic bureaucrats and the apportioning of regional investments have favored the Yongnam region "excessively." The other is that most of the economic policies in the past have been formulated and executed exclusively by a small number of economic

bureaucrats inseparably linked to the dictatorial political machine. Under these circumstances, it is easy to imagine how such excessive bias toward a certain region would lead to regional schism among the general public.

Fear of Government Expansion

If it is deemed valid to assume that regional economic disparities begot regional schism, it logically follows that the ways to eliminate the regional economic disparities must be found first before the problem of regional schism can be resolved. In this context, the author wishes to make three suggestions: first, to decide upon a comprehensive plan for national land development; second, to prevent government expansion; and third, to expand the revenues of local governments.

To begin with, the author believes that deciding upon a comprehensive plan for national land development will make the greatest contribution toward the elimination of regional economic disparities. Of course it is common knowledge that such a plan was drawn up some time ago and has been in place all along. But the author has a different idea about how to "decide upon" such a plan. If the existing plan is flawless, it may be decided upon as is; if, on the other hand, it is flawed, it should be corrected and then decided upon. In any event, leaving the substance of such a plan to a proper expert to judge, what the author is suggesting is that in the future a new plan should be decided upon with the consent of the people of the areas to be affected by the plan.

Anyway, such a new development plan must reflect the unique characteristics of the regions concerned and have the consent of the local people; what is then necessary is to have the plan decided upon institutionally so that it cannot be changed at all by the next government—whatever kind it may be. If the central government, acting within the framework of such a national development plan and in close conjunction with regional development plans of the local governments, administers its regional investment program year after year within the allowable limit of the budget, the plans of the central and local governments will gain the confidence of the people and in the long run the regional economic disparities will be eliminated. The development of the Southwest Zone, which is currently under way in preparation for the prospective trade with China, is expected to contribute significantly to the elimination of the existing economic disparities between Yongnam and Honam as well as between Yongnam and Chungchong. This prospect alone should be enough to make the viability of the author's suggestion readily acceptable. In this connection, an important addendum to the author's suggestion is that such a new comprehensive plan for national land development should be decided upon not by economic bureaucrats but by the National Assembly.

Next, the author believes that the policy planners—be they bureaucrats or politicians—should give their serious thought to the problem of government expansion when they ponder the ways to eliminate regional economic disparities.

Of late, riding on the waves of democratization and acting as if their time had finally arrived, the politicians more than others have been trying to outdo each other in spouting various policy measures. "There shall be built a high-speed electric railway leading directly to Mt. Solak," "I will see to it that farmers' debts are remitted entirely," etc.—campaign promises such as these, made during the last presidential election by those vying for the supreme power, are good cases in point. All these policy proposals, if weighed carefully, do reveal one common characteristic—they reflect the aspiration of these politicians wanting to do something good for the people. Also, in a practical sense, the need for such policy measures is readily appreciated. Nevertheless, the point which must not be overlooked is this: Without exception these policy measures will require "more money, more regulations, and more government meddling."

It is being said that government expansion is one of the most serious problems confronting modern democracies. The evils of government expansion can be summed up as follows: It curbs the freedom of individual choices; it fans inflation because, as has happened in the United States, excessive government spending is managed by increasing the supply of currency. Milton Friedman, the winner of the 1976 Nobel prize in economic science, wrote about government expansion in the United States as follows:

"...We cannot continue to follow the course of the past. In 1928, government spending in the United States at all levels—federal, state, and local—was less than 10 percent of the national income.... But, today, this ratio has reached the 40-percent level. In just 50 years, government spending has increased from 10 percent of the national income to 50 percent of the same...."

Friedman's point is directly applicable to south Korea as well. For the government spending in south Korea, including the public-sector expenditures, has already reached 35 percent of the national income, a level similar to that in the United States.

As to why the question of government expansion is so serious at this particular time in our country, the reason may be explained in two ways. One is that should the imminent formation of local legislative assemblies be followed by fierce political competitions among local governments, all trying to eliminate regional economic disparities, this will inevitably lead to an acceleration of government expansion. The other is that if the revenues of local governments are to expand and the system of local self-government to work effectively, it is essential, above all else, to have the economic power of the national government, the symbol of centralism, dispersed to local governments. It stands to reason, therefore, that there be certain steps taken to prevent further expansion of the government sector. More on this anon.

A footnote is in order: In order to prevent government expansion, the government-centered economic policy must be replaced by a private-sector-centered economic policy; in other words, economic democratization must take place first.

Tax Reform Needed

Lastly, expanding the revenues of local governments will have to be the most important step toward the elimination of regional economic disparities. It needs to be emphasized that strengthening the fiscal base of local governments is a requisite condition for the effective institution of a local self-government system following the imminent formation of local legislative assemblies. Toward that end, two things will have to be done: One is to reform the taxation system to make it local-tax-centered so that the self-generated revenues of local governments may be increased; the other is to revise the existing economic and financial adjustment system so that regional allocation of treasury subsidies and revenue shares can be readjusted in such a way to facilitate the elimination of economic disparities between regions.

At present, the fiscal operations of local governments in south Korea are, as is the case with the national government, divided into general account and special account. In addition, there is a separate account called Local Education Special Account which takes care of the education budget. The scope of local finance measured in percentage of the total national finance was about 27 percent in the early 1970's but increased to 34 percent by the middle of the 1980's; measured in percentage of the GNP, it was about 8 percent in the early 1970's but has now reached the 11 percent level.

The revenues of a local government are consisted of local taxes, non-tax receipts, revenue share, and treasury subsidy. Local taxes are currently made up of 12 tax items; non-tax receipts are being collected in accordance with the provisions of 187 different ordinances. It is because their revenues are insufficient to meet expenditures that local governments are receiving help from the national government in the form of revenue shares and treasury subsidies. The percentage of the total expenditure which is met by tax revenue plus non-tax receipts is referred to as financial self-sufficiency ratio. What is striking about south Korea's local finance is that local governments, with the exception of a few, have financial self-sufficiency ratios that are too low.

As a matter of fact, the state of local finance, as reflected in the low self-sufficiency ratio, is so serious that today there are many local autonomous entities that cannot even meet their payrolls with their self-generated revenues alone. Take cities for example: In 1985, 13 cities out of the 57 in all, or 23 percent of all cities, were unable to meet their payrolls with their self-generated revenues; with the revenues from local taxes alone, some 78 percent of all cities would have failed to meet even their payrolls. Likewise, in the case of "kun" [district], 109 out

of the total of 139 districts had self-generated revenues insufficient even to meet payrolls; only 7 districts had local tax revenues large enough to meet their payrolls.

Granted that the reason why so many local governments are struggling with their fiscal problems lies in the fact that their revenue bases are weak in the first place, but part of the reason has had to do with the system itself—the system which in the past barred full-fledged local autonomy and, as a corollary, maintained a taxation system with a primary emphasis on national taxes. It stands to reason, therefore, that the tax system ought to be reformed expeditiously to make it local-tax-centered if we are to have a full-fledged local autonomy system become a reality.

Furthermore, there ought to be a rational revision of the local finance adjustment system, which is designed to redress fiscal imbalances on the part of local governments and involves such national subsidies as revenue shares, the use of which is left to the discretion of local governments, and treasury subsidies that are intended for the promotion of specifically designated projects.

Unless these problems are resolved before the formation of local legislative assemblies, it is unlikely that regional economic disparities can be eliminated any time soon. Conversely, if all such problems are resolved and balanced local investments—the kind that will vivify the intrinsic characters of a given region—are sustained over a long period of time, not only will there be less of such regional economic disparities, there will also be, hopefully, none of the schism between regions.

The author believes that two prerequisites must be met before we can proceed in search of the ways to eliminate regional economic disparities. One is economic democratization; the other, the awakening of the politicians.

The recently formed National Assembly, in which the oppositions hold more seats than does the ruling party, carries the expectations that it will play a decisive role in facilitating the realization of economic democratization in south Korea—a long-standing craving of the people. Yet it remains to be seen whether the politicians of south Korea today will in fact depart from the past practice of speaking in loud but hollow voices and demonstrate a sincere posture of willingness to serve their master, the people. The surging trends toward political and economic democratization notwithstanding, unless the politicians make earnest efforts to resolve the problem of regional discord, that problem is bound to turn from bad to worse. The author's parting reminder to the politicians of south Korea is this: Politicians ignited the regionalism; politicians ought to extinguish the fire.

FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRADE

Daily Advocates Balance in Trade Ties to PRC, USSR

SK0909013188 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
9 Sep 88 p 8

[Editorial: "Direct Seoul-Moscow Exchanges"]

[Text] The way is expected to be paved for the opening of direct non-political exchanges between Korea and the Soviet Union after the Seoul Olympic Games.

While sports and cultural exchanges between the two countries, which have no diplomatic ties yet, seem to have already begun, a notable development was seen early this week when the temporary Soviet consular delegation to the Seoul Olympiad visited the Korea Trade Promotion Corp (KOTRA), a semi-government organization in charge of trade promotion, and reportedly discussed the opening of trade offices in Korea and the Soviet Union on a reciprocal basis.

The move is significant, indicating the Soviet Union is planning to establish a formal trade channel between the two nations, though their annual trade volume is limited to the \$150 million level.

The Soviet delegation's visit to KOTRA is apparently a substantial step in Seoul and Moscow's mutual attempts to explore economic cooperation by opening trade offices in the near future following the Seoul Olympics.

To recall, initial informal contacts were made between the two countries in Budapest, Hungary to discuss the matter. In addition, some analysts view that the establishment of the Hungarian and Yugoslavian trade offices in Seoul following the conclusion of binational trade pacts with Korea in August last year and in March this year has served as a prelude to Moscow's moves to "officialize" trade with Seoul.

In follow-up action, the Soviet Union is expected to send an observation team to the Seoul International Trade Fair, slated to open toward the end of this coming October, the first trade mission the Communist giant will have dispatched to Seoul.

As a matter of fact, our country's indirect trade with the Communist bloc is lopsidedly dependent on China. According to government statistics, last year 79 percent or \$814 million worth of the nation's total exports to Communist states were shipped to China, while its exports to the Soviet Union accounted for only 6 percent or \$67 million worth.

Out of the total Korean imports last year from the Communist countries, 83 percent or \$673 million worth came from China, compared with only 12 percent or \$97 million worth from the Soviet Union.

However, now that the two Communist giants' respective attempts to promote trade and economic exchanges have really accelerated on the occasion of the Seoul Olympics, there is a high likelihood that Korea's economic cooperation with Moscow will become more facilitated than that with Beijing after the Olympiad due to open on Sept. 17.

This is because Chinese leaders appear to be more nervous about Pyongyang than the Soviets in exploring economic ties with Seoul. Yet, in our pursuit of a "northern diplomatic policy" toward the Communist countries, we should not underestimate the Communist powers' traditionally heavy burden represented by their relations with Pyongyang, a "responsibility" which makes them take a prudent attitude to increasing exchanges with Seoul. Accordingly, it is improper and unwise to excessively publicize positive contacts with those Communist states on one hand, and to be either hastily excited or disappointed at the result of contacts with them on the other.

We also should bear in mind that the Soviet Union like China and other East European Communist countries maintains its alliance with north Korea, and continues to stick to the principle of separating economy from politics in foreign relations with Seoul.

The recent Moscow approach toward Seoul is in line with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomatic offensive in the Pacific-Asian region and attempts to develop the vast area of Far Eastern Siberia at an enormous investment of 200 billion rubles over a period of 15 years. The Soviet Union, which is reportedly suffering from shortages in capital, technology and manpower, badly needs economic cooperation from Japan, Korea and China with its ambitious Siberian project.

For our part, as there are limits to our economic dependence on Japan and the United States, the need to seek links with northern Communist powers is also on the gradual increase. Moreover, a balanced approach toward the two Communist giant countries is vital to deter north Korean provocation harming the security of this Republic.

Now required are prudent, systematic and far-sighted approaches toward the Communist states so as to pursue both diplomatic ideals and practical interests, as seen in the recent decisions to launch a governmental task team charged with working out northern economic policies and a private-level overseas exchange association as the actual channel for contact with Communist nations.

MILITARY

General Warns South Against U.S., 'Military Provocations'

41100074 Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean
24 Jun 88 p 3

[Speech by Col Gen Chon Mun-uk: "If U.S. Imperialism and the south Korean Puppet Clique Provoke a New War, They Would Never Be Able to Avoid Punishment Thousandfold"]

[Text] Under the circumstances in which unceasing innovations are being effected on all fronts of socialist construction while the flame of the 200-day battle designed to significantly observe the 40th anniversary of the founding of the republic, and in which youths and students and the people in south Korea are showing more enthusiastically than ever before their spirits of anti-U.S. struggle and ardent desire for the unification of fatherland, we are going to observe "the June 25 Anti-U.S. Struggle Day."

On the occasion of this day, our people and officers and men of our people's armed forces are burning with seething hatred against the U.S. imperialist aggressors, who set a fire of war of aggression in Korea and who brought unmeasurable disasters and miseries to our people, and are fully determined to crash the schemes of U.S. imperialism for provoking a new war and to accomplish at any cost the independent unification of fatherland.

U.S. imperialism is the Korean people's bitter enemy who started invading our country even one hundred and several tens of years ago. It is a shameless war provoker and a warmonger who brought about a vicious and criminal aggressive war in our country.

The stirring up of the Korean war by U.S. imperialism 38 years ago today was a direct product of the aggressive war [brought about by] those who became lunatic about the ambition of conquering the world.

The U.S. imperialists who illegally occupied south Korea after World War II turned the entire land of the south into a war powder keg in order to use Korea as a bridgehead for invasion of Asia and a military base set up against the national liberation movement and socialist countries; and they built up a stupendous force for aggression. On the basis of such deliberate war preparations, U.S. imperialism and the Syngman Rhee puppet clique launched military provocations almost daily in the vicinity of the 38th parallel; and, finally on 25 June 1950, they started an adventurous armed invasion against the northern half of our republic. In order to eliminate, in its infancy, our republic, which was still young and only two years old after its foundation, the U.S. imperialist aggressors attempted to occupy the whole Korea at a stroke: they ordered several million man giant forces, including their own aggressive forces

armed with modern technology, 15 divisions of mercenaries of their satellites, and the south Korean puppet forces, and a great quantity of combat technological equipment, including aircraft, tanks and ships, into the Korean war front in great quantities. They mobilized the most barbaric means and methods of war which were ever employed in the history of war, reducing our cities and rural villages into ashes and massacring peaceful citizens indiscriminately. Thus our country literally turned into a sea of fire every day during the war. Many countries in the world had to worry about the destiny of our people. However, that war in our country did not end with the victory on the part of the U.S. imperialist aggressors who started the war, but with the proud victory on the part of our people and our republic.

Under the leadership of the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il-song, who is an ever-victorious iron-willed commander, a legendary hero, and an excellent military strategist, our people and officers and men of the people's armed forces vigorously launched into the sacred war, fully displaying their high revolutionary [spirit] and mass-oriented heroism. Thus they destroyed the U.S. imperialist aggressors and scored a great victory. This was a historical event that forcefully showed the fact that those people and armed forces who are united, in fighting, like a steel tub around the party and the leader are capable of defeating and expelling any strong and powerful enemies, even if they are haughtily making a lunge with modern armaments and stupendous armed might. From that time on, our people and people's armed forces came to display more forcefully their dignity as a heroic people and a heroic armed force; and the myth about "the mightiness" of the U.S. imperialist aggressors came to be shattered to pieces.

Imperialists cannot live even one day without clinging to the schemes of aggression and war. The vicious aggressive character of U.S. imperialism, ringleader of world aggression and an implacable enemy of our people, has not been changed. The U.S. imperialists, instead of finding due lessons from the shameful defeat in the Korean War and of withdrawing from south Korea, are clinging to the schemes of bringing about "two Koreas" and running wild to effect a new war.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and a secretary of the party Central Committee, pointed out as follows:

"Due to the frantic war provocation schemes of U.S. imperialism and the south Korean military fascist clique, a tense situation in which a war may break out at any moment is being brought about in our country."

Today the danger of war is not coming from the north but from the south. U.S. imperialism and the south Korean puppet clique are desperately standing against the peace-loving policy and the proposals for unification of the fatherland of our party and the government of

the republic. Our party and the government of the republic, consistently asserting that the unification of the country should be accomplished independently with the power of the Korean people themselves without any foreign force's intervention, have put forth in detail realistic and rational plans for materializing it, and have made all integral efforts to realize it. During recent years alone, we offered many peaceful proposals, unilaterally reduced armed forces by 100,000 men, and took an epoch-making measure of turning 150,000 men of armed forces to the grand socialist construction. In our country today, soldiers of the people's armed forces are rendering meritorious services in labor in the socialist construction in all construction sites, including the sites of express highway construction between Pyongyang and Kaesong and the construction site of the Rehabilitation Avenue and the construction site of the Sunchon Vinalon Complex.

However, in south Korea, stupendous personnel and material resources are being turned to war preparations; and U.S. imperialism is leading the situation to the brink of war. Earlier, they already reorganized the operational command system of the puppet forces into a war setup and the armed forces of the puppet forces were reorganized into an offensive type. Eighty to ninety percent of the U.S. imperialist aggressive forces and of the puppet forces was moved to the front near the military demarcation line. It was a long time ago already that more than 1,000 nuclear weapons and "nuclear knapsacks" were carried into the land of south Korea, which is not large. And it is no secret that the armed forces of special commando units of as many as 180,000 men are constantly ready to move to a target region of the northern half of the republic.

U.S. imperialism and the No Tae-u clique deployed a great number of nuclear offensive weapons in south Korea. They got fully prepared for an offensive operation against the north at any moment. But, they are still not satisfied with that; they did not withdraw their aggressive forces, including the aircraft carrier fleet which took part in the joint military exercises "Team Spirit 88" on the pretext of "the security for the Olympic Games," and deployed them in south Korea and its vicinity. Furthermore, even their air force and other aggressive armed forces stationed in Japan and the Philippines are constantly standing poised for "an emergency action posture."

All these facts show that U.S. imperialism is the very ringleader of aggression and war, that it is our people's implacable enemy who is obstructing the unification of Korea, and that it is a vicious behind-the-scene manipulator who is driving the south Korean puppets out to division and war.

Without shattering the aggressive schemes of U.S. imperialism and as long as the U.S. imperialist aggressors are allowed to stay in south Korea, the unification of fatherland cannot be resolved independently and one cannot

think of the safety and peace of our country, Asia, and the world. It is by no means fortuitous that the people of various circles and classes, including the youths and students, in south Korea are recently raising voices for unification talks and the participation in the unification dialogue, and that they are launching surprise attacks on the U.S. cultural offices everywhere while crying out slogans such as "Yankee go home."

U.S. imperialism has no reason whatsoever for continuing to stay in south Korea. U.S. imperialism must look squarely at the flow of time and act with discretion. It must put an end to schemes of war provocation right away and withdraw from south Korea immediately.

Enemies must not mistake the peace loving policies of our party and the government of our republic for fragility of power. We are a powerful and dignified people. We are fully prepared for destroying them at a stroke if the U.S. imperialist aggressors make a lunge at us.

Our people and armed forces are the most proud and dignified people and armed forces who, upholding in the vanguard of our revolution the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il-song, a rare military genius and ever victorious iron-willed commander who defeated two imperialisms in one generation and ushered in a period of new upsurge of anti-imperialist and anti-U.S. struggle, are marching forward along with the honorable guidance of the party.

By marching forward along with the refined leadership of the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il who are leading the great work of chucheizing the whole armed forces to victory, the power of our people's armed forces has been strengthened beyond comparison and their political and ideological superiority is being displayed at its loftiest height.

Today the loyalty toward the party and the leader has become the most fundamental ideological posture and the prime life of the entire rank and file of the people's armed forces. All the officers and men of the People's Armed Forces are united more solidly than ever before around the party central committee headed by the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il-song. They are materializing the party's ideology of founding the armed forces at the risk of walking through sea and fire. Invincible is the power of such a revolutionary armed forces who are firmly determined ideologically to leave their whole fate to the leader of revolution, and who would willingly give up their youth and lives for the party, the leader, fatherland, and the people. Such armed forces would be able to score victory no matter how strong an enemy they may fight with.

Today we have not only an invincible revolutionary armed might that is staunchly equipped with political, ideological, military, and technological [resources] but also a strong socialist state which is giving out the light of independence, self-reliance, and self-defense. Amid the

majestic struggle of the battle of grand socialist construction which is forcefully being launched in accordance with the grand plan of our party, the foundation of independent national economy is being strengthened more and more. This gives us a great faith and courage to our people and armed forces who will fight with the U.S. imperialist aggressors through to the end.

No matter how stupendous aggressive forces and nuclear weapons the U.S. imperialists may bring in to south Korea, and no matter how much they may run wild for war schemes, their aggressive ambitions can never be realized; and only an ultimate ruin is in store for them. U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppets must squarely look at these facts and act with discretion.

Although we by no means desire a war, we do not fear it. We will counter the enemies' revenge with revenge and an all-out war with an all-out war. This is a constant stand of our people and our armed forces.

Our people and officers and men of our People's Armed Forces are keenly watching the schemes of U.S. imperialism and the south Korean puppet clique for provoking a new war with high revolutionary awareness. We will never stand idle with their aggression and war schemes. If the U.S. imperialist aggressors attempt, despite of our patient endeavors and warnings, to find a way out from the crisis they are in by means of military provocations against our republic, they would never be able to avoid punishment hundredfold and thousandfold.

The struggle of our party and the people which is designed to drive out the U.S. imperialist aggressors from south Korea and unify the fatherland and which is designed to [bring about] permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula is enjoying an absolute support and encouragement from the peace loving peoples of the whole world. Our people and our armed forces will continue to raise high the banner of anti-imperialist and anti-U.S. struggle, will march forward more dauntlessly in fighting; they will eventually drive out U.S. imperialism from south Korea and consummate the historical cause of the unification of the fatherland.

Victory is always on the side of justice. No force in the world can block the future of our people and officers and men of the People's Armed Forces who, upholding the judicious leadership of the party and the leader, are vigorously launching, with wholehearted unity, into the accomplishment of the cause of justice.

The entire people and officers and men of the People's Armed Forces, with enhanced faith and redoubled courage, will accomplish fresh advancement in the socialist construction and in strengthening the combat power of the armed forces. Thus they will shatter the enemies' schemes for provoking a new war in their every step and forcefully accomplish ahead of schedule the independent peaceful unification of the fatherland and eventual consummation of the cause of *chuche*.

7989

Defense Official's Visit Signals Renewal of Military Alliance With USSR

41070085 Seoul PUKHAN in Korean

No 6, Jun 88 pp 200-201

[Article by Hong Sung-won, member of the Standing Research Committee of the North Korea Research Institute: "North Korean Conditions Update: a New Very Close Military Relationship Between the Soviet Union and North Korea"]

[Text] It is an old story that the Soviet Union and north Korea have a very close military relationship. However, of late, it is conspicuously noteworthy that a new phase of military togetherness has been strengthened and military assistance and military diplomatic events, including a large-scale joint military exercise, have been launched. Actual examples of these facts are as follows: a joint military exercise that took place on the eastern sea during the recent six months; and a visit to north Korea, on 19 April, by a large-scale military delegation headed by Petr Lushev, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR.

The recent visit of the military delegation of the USSR has become even more noteworthy because of the distinguishing characteristic that it was made at the time when foreign dispatches carried the news that navies of the Soviet Union and north Korea held a joint military exercise on the eastern sea during the past 6 months.

During its stay, the recent visiting delegation held separate talks with Kim Il-song and O Chin-u, minister of People's Armed Forces and had one official talk with a north Korean military delegation, too. Major events in the itinerary of the military delegation's visit to north Korea are as follows: on 19 April, arrival at Pyongyang airport with greeting by Choe Kwang, chief of the General Staff of the armed forces, and other high ranking military officers; holding an official talk, immediately on the same day, with a north Korean military delegation; and then placing wreaths at the Taesongsan revolutionary ancestors tomb and before the Liberation Monument.

In his welcome address, Choe Kwang, chief of the General Staff of the armed forces, said: that "I firmly believe that this visit will excellently help strengthen militant friendship and cooperation between the two countries' armed forces"; and that "we treasure the friendship and unity with the armed forces of the USSR and are rejoicing at all successes being scored in the Soviet Union," welcoming the delegation. In his return speech, Petr Lushev, head of the Soviet military delegation, suggested that the Soviet Union set up an active posture for military cooperation with north Korea and emphasized the matter of course nature of the military cooperation with north Korea.

In this way, facts clearly shown in the content of speeches made by representatives of both north Korea and the Soviet Union may be taken as a confirmation of the close cooperative relationship between the armed forces of the two sides and as a revelation of the fact that the Soviet Union's military influence over north Korea is being expanded. As for the very close military relationship developed so far between the Soviet Union and north Korea, the military cooperative relationship was strengthened on the basis of the existing treaty of military alliance after Kim Il-song's visit to the Soviet Union in May 1984; and, of late, both sides came to an agreement on the necessity of expanding the substantial military cooperation in order to improve the security of both regions in accordance with the Soviet Union's emphasis on the policy of placing more weight on Asian regions.

These facts may also be inferred from the facts that some most up-to-date offensive weapons, including MiG 23 aircraft and SA-3 Scud missiles, have been provided to north Korea, and that north Korea granted to the Soviet Union the right of the Soviet Union's military aircraft flying over the air space of north Korea and the right of utilizing naval bases, including Wonsan and Nampo. Furthermore, north Korea and the Soviet Union strengthened the very close military [relationship] between the two countries by means of carrying out exchange visits of high level military delegations every year and of confirming the unvarying friendship and joint struggle between the armed forces of both countries on the occasion of the anniversary of concluding the treaty of military alliance.

Meanwhile, north Korea and the Soviet Union had a joint naval mobile exercise on the eastern sea in October 1986 for the first time in history. And, again this year, they had a large scale joint naval exercise. Thus it is now apparent that their joint naval exercises have entered a stage in which they hold them regularly. The reasons for the sudden recent promotion of military cooperative relationship between north Korea and the Soviet Union may be cited as follows in terms of international interests of both countries: first, the Soviet Union was given big spurs from the northern region policy being launched by the PRC, as an interpretation [of the situation] suggests. The Soviet Union came to face a situation in which it cannot disregard the possibility that there was a secret treaty for the PRC's assistance in strengthening the traditional military cooperation, in view of the fact that the military exchange and cooperative relationship between the PRC and north Korea was greatly promoted on the occasion of the visit to north Korea by the PRC's military delegation in the middle part of April this year. The Soviet Union may have been faced with a situation in which it cannot help firmly promising military assistance to north Korea also as a means of suppressing north Korea's leaning toward the PRC.

Second, one may think that the large scale military exercise is held partly for the purpose of reducing the uneasiness on the part of north Korea which has been

caused by the decisions of communist countries, including the Soviet Union, to take part in the Seoul Olympic games. Third, one may think that the Soviet Union for one, as a result of its emphasis being placed on the Asian Pacific region, may have wanted to restore its loss of influence caused so far by the solidifying of relations between the United States, Japan, and the PRC. These facts show that the policy of placing emphasis on the Asian Pacific region, [the formation of] which started from the changes that began to be made in the late period of the Brezhnev regime and became concrete in the era of Gorbachev, has two objectives: one is to restore the Soviet Union's influence lost in this region; and the other is to effect the stabilization of regional situation, which is essential for the reform and revitalization of domestic economy, by means of gradually improving relations with those countries concerned, including especially Japan and the PRC.

Judging from such a chain of reasoning, it is a fact that the Soviet Union has made its relationship with north Korea closer, after all, for the policy-oriented purpose of restoring its influence lost in the Asian Pacific region. Namely, the Soviet Union is trying to stand against the Asian Pacific region influence sphere which was formed on the basis of the triangle cooperation system established among the United States, Japan, and the PRC, by means of making tight the relationship with its allies in this region as a first step. Thus the Soviet Union came to utilize north Korea as part of the display designed to show such an offensive posture in the east and to attempt to form a new strategic network that connects the Soviet Union's far east with north Korea and Vietnam. On the other hand, north Korea for one would have wanted to utilize fully the existing competition between the Soviet Union and the PRC for the influence over north Korea and thereby would have endeavored to utilize [the Soviet Union and the PRC] as strong guardians in implementing its policy of strengthening armed forces and its imminent Korean peninsula policies. North Korea might have fully utilized such an opportune logic as this on the occasion of the Soviet Union's delegation's visit to north Korea.

7989

Seoul Sees Supreme Commander's Order Tied to Team Spirit Exercises

*41070053 Seoul NAEWOE TONGSIN in Korean
No 582, 1 Apr 88 pp 1C-7C*

[Text] Recently north Korea, concerned about the Team Spirit'88 Korean-U.S. joint military exercise has, day by day, been taking a more virulent aggressive stance toward the south.

In north Korea, last 21 March, immediately after the entire regular army and entire militia structure was ordered to immediately assume combat-ready status on orders from the Supreme Commander of the Armed

Forces (Kim Il-song), all over north Korea, beginning with a massive public rally in Pyongyang, rallies were held in unison to attack Team Spirit'88.

Because of such inflammatory rallies, a tense atmosphere, like an enveloping black cloud, is forming over all of north Korea, as though they are on the eve of war. Aggravating the situation, north Korea propaganda organs, trying to heighten the sense of crisis, have been intensifying their propaganda offensive by saying such things as that south Korea and the U.S. "are openly engaging in hazardous war games in order to invade our republic" and that "this is creating an extremely dangerous situation for our nation."

Trying to spread this sense of crisis among the north Korean population, north Korea held a series of mass rallies, and also launched an orchestrated propaganda offensive by having party and state organs, social organizations and party cadres make statements of support for the order from Supreme Headquarters. At the same time, they tried to build tension even among foreign seamen on ships anchored in north Korean harbors by mobilizing them for propaganda rallies.

Despite the fact that the Team Spirit joint south Korean-U.S. military exercises are widely recognized at home and abroad as an annual military exercise, every year north Korea has been using these exercises as strategic propaganda against the south and trying to fool world public opinion with them. For example, there have been a number of orders issued in connection with Team Spirit. In 1983 north Koreans were ordered to urgently prepare for war. In 1984 and 1986 they were ordered to immediately assume combat ready status. And in 1985 they were ordered to strengthen their readiness for war mobilization.

This year as well, under the guise of a report from the "Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army," they have been similarly ordered to immediately assume combat ready status. This began their inflammatory propaganda offensive which is being extended to all of north Korea.

The contents of that report from the Supreme Headquarters show that, along with their groundless schemes against the Team Spirit exercises, they focused on showing that their order to immediately assume combat ready status was appropriate. Despite the fact that the Team Spirit exercises are defensive exercises for deterring war, north Korea declared "they are an unscrupulous rehearsal of an aggressive strategy for a first strike against our republic and are an extremely dangerous drill in nuclear war." North Korea insisted that "because of this, the Korean Peninsula has reached an extremely dangerous stage in which war can break out whenever they choose."

Furthermore, this report from the Supreme Headquarters explained that in order to cope with such a tense situation, "the command had been given for all units of the Korean People's Armed Forces, the army, the navy, the air force, and the People's Constabulary, along with all members of units of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Red Youth Guards, to be prepared for any war mobilization situation with a noble revolutionary tenacity." It emphasized that this was "a defensive measure in order to cope with the American imperialists and the south Korean fascist clique provocative schemes for a new war." This report incited and aroused a pro-war spirit and ill will toward south Korea and the U.S.

North Korea, against a backdrop of that order placing their troops on combat ready status, proposed that a north-south joint conference be convened. Despite this, north Korea is scheming to "reveal a south Korean maneuver to bring in more weapons under the smoke screen of guaranteeing security for the Seoul Olympics, and to expose the fabrication of the incident of the missing passenger plane in an effort to wage a campaign against the republic." Such scheming by north Korea clearly reveals its hypocrisy in hiding its true intent of trying to improve its international image and reduce criticism by the international community, having recently suffered severe losses from the barbaric incident of the bombing of the KAL plane, and from their not participating in the Seoul Olympics. Furthermore, in addition to the effects of their propaganda directed overseas, north Korea has also been feverishly maximizing, at home, the effect of their mobilizing to combat ready status.

On 23 March, 2 days after the Supreme Headquarters of the north Korean military issued that report, a massive propaganda rally, called the Pyongyang City mass rally, was held in Kim Il-song Plaza in Pyongyang. Participating in that rally were Vice President Pak Song-chol, Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Yong-nam, Responsible Party Secretary for Pyongyang City Kang Hui-won, high level cadres from the party and their government, various echelons of representatives from organizations, and more than 100,000 of the masses. They made speeches supporting the order from the supreme commander and held a demonstration.

Pyongyang City Responsible Party Secretary Hui-won, in his rabble-rousing speech at the rally, supported the mobilization, saying, "The command by the comrade supreme commander is a most revolutionary measure to cope with the aggressive war-provoking schemes of the American imperialists and south Korea and to protect our socialist motherland and the gains of our revolution." He fanatically incited antagonism toward the U.S. and south Korea with such inflammatory rhetoric as "We condemn Team Spirit'88 as an intolerable criminal act of disturbing the peace by rehearsing for war, and strongly denounce it in the name of the Korean people."

Kang Hui-won harangued the south with such hackneyed demagoguery as "The people of south Korea must not tolerate the American imperialists' aggressive nuclear war maneuvers." After Kang finished his speech, representatives of the military and the workers mounted the rostrum, one right after another, and made speeches inciting "revolutionary vigilance" and hatred of south Korea and the U.S. among those attending the rally.

After this Pyongyang City mass rally was held on 23 March, the Choson Social Democratic Party (26 March), the Chondoist Chonggu Party (25 March), the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (24 March) and various other agencies and organizations issued short statements of support. Important factories, enterprises, and cooperative farms, such as the Hongnam Fertilizer Consolidated Enterprise, each held mass rallies and military assemblies to foment the war mobilization atmosphere.

Similarly, the foreign seaman who had laid anchor in north Korean harbors were mobilized and propagandizing rallies were held one after another to denounce the Team Spirit'88 exercises. In one example, on 26 March, the seaman on a Bulgarian ship in Hongnam harbor had to hold a "solidarity rally" where they were incited to criticize the Team Spirit'88 exercises, and to express their hostility toward south Korea and the United States.

Such an agitprop offensive by north Korea against the Team Spirit'88 exercises gives the noticeable impression of being on a larger scale and more fiery than in ordinary years. More than anything else, the reason behind this phenomenon is that recently north Korea has begun to feel more isolated internationally and more insecure overseas.

Actually, although this year north Korea made some peace gestures toward the south, such as proposing a joint north-south conference, because of the international condemnation that resulted from the barbaric bombing of the KAL airliner, even such propaganda has fallen on deaf ears. With Fiji, Saint Vincent, and Saint Lucia severing diplomatic relations, north Korea has found that a number of nations have distanced themselves diplomatically. Accordingly, all this has served only to further intensify the feeling of diplomatic isolation. In addition, in carrying out the Third 7-Year Plan, north Korea has faced growing problems, from a lack of advanced capital and technology to a shortage of raw materials. Consequently, the overseas-oriented segment of their economy has been deteriorating daily. In completing important domestic economic construction projects, such as the "200-day battle" almost totally dependent on the mobilization of the labor force of the general population, north Korea has not been able to go beyond pre-modern methods of running an economy.

Under such conditions, it is only natural that life would grow more difficult for the inhabitants of north Korea and that the loss of drive among workers would worsen.

Accordingly, as an ingenious scheme to repress in advance any gathering of forces unhappy with and opposed to the existing order, north Korea used the Team Spirit'88 exercises as an excuse to issue an order for combat-ready status.

As it has done in most years, this year as well north Korea will take advantage of this order for combat-ready status and will continue in the days ahead to hold domestic propagandizing rallies to encourage and incite "revolutionary vigilance" among the north Korean population. In doing this, north Korea is scheming to maximize the mobilization of labor and the solidarity of the population. North Korea is focusing its efforts so that in this way they can accelerate the completion of economic projects through mobilizing the labor of the population and can expedite an atmosphere of support for the political order with Kim Il-song and his son at the apex.

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Organization, Officers of Korean People's Army
41070093 Seoul PUKHANUI KIGWAN MIT
TANCHAEBYOL INMYONGJIP in Korean
April 88 pp 93-99

[Text] Structure

Supreme Commander

Party Military Affairs Commission; National Defense Committee; Ministry of People's Armed Forces.

Ministry of People's Armed Forces

Party Committee of the People's Army; Military Armistice Commission; General Guards Bureau; General Staff Department; General Political Bureau; Political Security Bureau; Military Tribunal Bureau; Military Prosecution Bureau; General Rear Service Bureau; Military Police Bureau.

General Staff Department

Special Eighth Corps; Artillery Command; Mechanized Command; Naval Command; Air Command; Capital Defense Command; Guided Missile Command; Army Corps (8 corps); Operations Bureau; Military Training Bureau; Military Mobilization Bureau; Ordnance Bureau; Replacement Bureau; Inspection Bureau; Military Development Bureau; Reconnaissance Bureau; Engineering Bureau; Cadres Bureau; Classified Information Bureau; Communications Command Bureau; Chemical Bureau; Geological Bureau.

General Political Bureau

People's Army Forces Publishing House; 8 February Group; 8 February Movie Studio; People's Army Press; People's Armed Orchestra; Organization and Planning Department; Party Organization Department; Socialist

Working Youth League Guidance Department; Propaganda and Education Department; Special Operations Department; Cultural Liaison Department; Special Political Department; Inspection Department; Public Information Department; Statistics Department; Cadres Personnel Department.

General Rear Service Bureau

Organization and Planning Bureau; Provisions Management Bureau; Clothings Management Bureau; Fuel Management Bureau; Vehicle Management Bureau; Construction Bureau; Road Maintenance Management Bureau; Military Military Bureau; Veterinarian Bureau; Finance Bureau; Munition Production Bureau; Transport Bureau; Military Commerce Bureau; Building Management Bureau.

A. Supreme Command: Supreme Commander: Kim Il-song (marshal)

B. Ministry of People's Armed Forces: Minister: O Chin-u (vice marshal); Vice Ministers: Kim Kwang-chin (general); Kim Pong-chin (general); Yi Pyong-uk (colonel general); Chang Pong-chin (lieutenant general); Yun Chae-kwan (lieutenant general)

(1) State Security Bureau: Bureau Chief: Yi Ul-sol (general)

(2) General Political Bureau: Bureau Chief: O Chin-u (vice marshal); Vice Bureau Chiefs: Yun Chi-ho (lieutenant general); Yi Si-won (lieutenant general); O Kyong-hun (lieutenant general)

Propaganda Bureau Chief: Kim Ung-to (major general); Bureau Vice Chief: Yi Tae-ho (major general)

Party Political Committee Member: Pak Chong-ryol (senior colonel)

(3) Political Security Bureau: Bureau Chief: Han Yong-ok (lieutenant general)

(4) Military Tribunal Bureau: Bureau Chief: Yi Pyong-il (major general)

(5) Military Prosecution Bureau: Bureau Chief: Kim Pyong-nam (major general)

(6) General Rear Service Bureau: Bureau Chief: Kim Haeng-yon (lieutenant general)

(7) Police Bureau: Bureau Chief: O Tuk-sun (lieutenant general)

C. General Staff Department: Chief of the General Staff: Choe Kwang (general); Vice Chiefs of the General Staff: Hwang Chol-san (general); Chong Chang-yol (colonel

general); Chon Chin-su (lieutenant general); Choe Hui-son (lieutenant general); Yi Hung-sun (major general); Yi Tong-chun (major general); Pak Hyong-uk (lieutenant general)

Operations Bureau Chief: Wi Chang-chin (major general); Fifth Office Chief: Han Chang-kuk (senior colonel); Military Training Bureau Chief: Choe Tae-song (major general); Ordnance Bureau Chief: Chon Ui-hwan (major general); reconnaissance Bureau Chief: An Yong-ho (lieutenant general); Engineering Bureau Chief: Pak Kil-nam (major general); Education Bureau Chief: Kim Chol-su (major general); Communications Command Bureau Chief: Yi Chin-in (major general); Cadres Bureau Chief: Yi Rim (major general)

D. Headquarters of each service

(1) Naval Command; Commander: Kim Il-chol (admiral)

(2) Air Command; Commander: Cho Myong-rok (colonel general); Vice Commander: Yi Chol-hwan (major general); Vice Commander, Flight: An Yong-kuk (major general); Vice Commander, Political: Kim Hyon-su (major general)

Political Committee Members: Pak Yong-sop (major general); Kim Hyong-pong (major general)

First Fighter Plane Division Commander: Pak Yong-chun (major general)

Second Fighter Plane Division Commander: Kim Chae-mun (major general)

(3) Artillery Command: Commander: Choe Sang-uk (lieutenant general)

(4) Mechanized Command: Commander: Kim Chong-ok (colonel general)

(5) Guided Missile Command: Commander: Cho Min-song (lieutenant general)

(6) Metropolitan Defense Command: Commander: Yi Ul-sol (general); Vice Commander: Kim Nam-kyong (lieutenant general)

(7) Worker-Peasant Red Guards Command (under the jurisdiction of the Party Military Affairs Department): Commander:

E. Corps Under the Command

First Corps Commander: Kim Sang-ho (colonel general); Second Corps Commander: Chu To-il (general); Third Corps Commander: Chong Pyong-kap (colonel general); Fourth Corps Commander: Yo Chun-sik (general); Fifth

Corps Commander: Chon Chae-son (colonel general); Sixth Corps Commander: Kim Ri-chang (lieutenant general); Vice Corps Commander: Yi Kyong-sam

Seventh Corps Commander: Kim Yong-chun (colonel general)

Special Eighth Corps Commander: Han Chon-su (lieutenant general)

Ninth Division Commander: Sin Pong-un (senior colonel)

Twelfth Division Commander: Yi Chin-ho (major general)

F. Military Educational Institutions

Kim Il-song Military University: President: Choe In-tok (general); First Vice President: Kim Sun-il (lieutenant general); Vice President: [vacant]; Faculty Chief: Kim Su-hyon

Kim Il-song Political University: President: O Ki-su (lieutenant general); Vice President: Yi Nung-hun; Office Chief: Kwak Yong-chan; Courses Chief: Min Yong-chol; Vice Faculty Chief: Kim Yon-sok

Air Force College: Dean: Choe Su-hyon (major general)

Naval College: Dean: Yi Se-hwan (senior colonel)

Military Medical College: Dean: Yi Yun-sok (major general)

Kim Hyong-chik Military Medical College: Dean: Yi Sok (senior colonel)

Ministry of Public Security Political College: Dean: So Chun-pong

Kang Kon Military Academy: Superintendent: Chon Mun-uk (general); Education Bureau Chief: Kim Chol-su (senior colonel); Political Bureau Chief: Cho Yong-kun (colonel)

General Artillery Officers School: Superintendent: Kim Chae-yun (major general)

People's Security Forces Officers School: Principal: Kim Pyong-sun (major general)

Chuul Aviation Officers School: Superintendent: Pak Yong-chun (major general)

People's Army Art Institute: Director of Institute: Choe Chang-un

G. Others

(1) Anti-Imperialist Fighters Veterans Committee: Chairman: Chon Mun-uk (general); Vice Chairman: O Chae-won (colonel general)

(2) Jurisdiction or Positions Unknown: Colonel generals: Pak Chin-hyok; Cho Sun-paek; Yi O-song; Lieutenant generals: Hwang Chol-su; Yi Kuk-hwan; Yim Chol; Kim Song-kuk; Kim Song-hak; Kil Yong-su; Pak Song-kuk; Chong Ho-kyun; Song Ok-man; Kim Chi-pok; Kim Ha-kyu; Pak Chong-son; Choe Sang-ok; An Yun-chan; Major generals: Yi Chang-ho; Kwon Sang-ho; Pak Sung-chu; Sin Chang-hwan; Chong Kyong-sik; Han Hi-kum; Yi Kwang-ha; Ho Kwang; Kim Tae-hwa; Kim Che-ha; Yi Ki-hwan; Yi Ho-kun; Choe Yong-nam; Han Hi-ho; Yi Hak-mun; Kim Kap-sik; Yi In-paek; Yi Yong-su; Yi Chun-ha; Yom Hyong-kuk; Pak To-sam; Paek Myong-hak; Pak Nam-hyong; Chi Ki-son; An Yun-chan; Kim Yong-kon; Yi To-pin; Pak Yun-sok; Kim Tok-hyon; Pak Chae-kyong; Yi In-chun; Kim Pyong-sop; Mun Kwang-man; Pak Pyong-rim; So Yul-sok; An Pi-tuk; Chon Myong-chong; Chong Sang-u; Choe Ki-sok; Pak Kyong-son; Kim Tuk-hyon; Colonel: Yi Chang-su (division commander)

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Kim's Military Leadership, Tactics in 'Fatherland Liberation War' Praised

41100094 *Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN* in Korean
26 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by Han Sun-song: "A Great Victory of the Chuche-Oriented Military Thought"]

[Text] Thirty-five years have passed since the time when a salute of guns was fired signaling victory in the war.

Every year when the anniversary of victory in the war, 27 July, comes, we look back to those days of the Fatherland Liberation War which were the days of the most arduous and severe trials.

The historic victory of our People's Army and our people in the Fatherland Liberation War was a victory scored by the creative military thought that was founded by the great leader by means of embodying the immortal chuche thought on the field of battle.

On the basis of the chuche-oriented view that the decisive factor that affects the fate of a war is not a weapon or military equipment of any kind but the ideological and spiritual state of mind of the man who is dealing with it, the great leader politically and ideologically strengthened our revolutionary rank and file, making it firm as a rock.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song taught as follows:

"The decisive factor that affects the fate of a war is not a weapon of any sort or numerical superiority of armed forces but the state of spiritual and moral preparedness of soldiers and the people mobilized in the war."

The Fatherland Liberation War [we fought] in the past was a decisive battle between our people who vigorously rose up to defend the independence of the country and the U.S. imperialist beasts, ringleaders of world aggression.

U.S. imperialism, which has a 100-year history of aggression, was at that time "a great power," which had never been beaten in 114 aggressive wars it had fought, and it was proud of being "the strongest" power in the world.

Our republic was in its infancy, only 5 years had elapsed since it was liberated from the colonial fetters of Japanese imperialism and only 2 years had elapsed since it was founded.

• However, we won victory.

The chuche-oriented military thought founded by the great leader was a banner of invincibility that led our people and our People's Army to the victory.

From the first day of the war, the great leader paid deep attention to strengthening our party, the headquarters of revolution, and to continuously enhancing its role of leadership.

Through the three plenary sessions of the party Central Committee and other meetings it had under the difficult conditions of war, our party was able to fulfill its mission as an organizer and stimulator who organized, mobilized, and forcefully led the popular masses to a nationwide struggle designed to score victory.

Thus the role of the party organizations at various levels as an organizer and mobilizer was strengthened further and the vanguard role of the party members was further enhanced.

The stories about the heroism and dedication engraved by the party members and the people on unnamed hills, skies, and waters are displaying the realities of the shining victory of the chuche-oriented military thought of the great leader.

"The party members fought excellently. It was not the case that they had special weapons. To them, their determination to carry out duties assigned by the party and the leader was a weapon more excellent than anything else."

This is part of the memoir written by the chairman of a party cell in a unit of the Korean People's Army who defended, to the last, Hill 125 in the Fatherland Liberation War.

We were able to beat U.S. imperialism only because members of the party self-consciously pledged to render devoted service to the party and the leader, through to the end.

On the basis of his firm view that the popular masses are the master in war, and that the power that makes a war victorious resides in the popular masses, the great leader unceasingly enhanced the revolutionary determination of the popular masses and spurred them to heroic feats.

The great leader stirred men of our People's Army and our people making them fervent patriots and steadfast revolutionary fighters who would risk their lives to fight a sacred war designed to defend with blood the party, revolution, fatherland, and the people from the enemies' aggression.

A young Korea was able to defeat the strong U.S. imperialism thanks to the chuche-oriented military thought of the great leader which stressed that victory in a war must be accomplished by the self-reliance and creativeness of the popular masses.

The firm determination that they would never again become colonial slaves, and the iron will that they would never again lose the independence of their country and their human rights were kept in the hearts of men of the People's Army and the people.

Because of this determination, the following became realities: the story of heroism of the fighters of Hill 1211 who fought to win like the phoenix, amid falling splinters of rocks shattered by tens of thousands of artillery shells and bombs daily; the victory in the operation designed to liberate Taechon, an example of a modern battle of encirclement; and the phoenixes of Wolmi-do, a single battery company, who fought to defeat more than 50,000 U.S. imperialist aggressors.

The shining victory in the Fatherland Liberation War was a victory won by the chuche-oriented method of fighting that was established by the great leader. It was a brilliant victory of creative military art.

The entire process of the Fatherland Liberation War was a strategy in which the numerical and technological superiority of the U.S. imperialist aggressors was defeated by the creative strategy, tactics, and operational plans involving many changes, and appearing in unexpected places at unexpected moments. This was the strategy devised by the great leader.

The great leader, thoroughly embodying the chuche-oriented stand that a war must be waged using the Korean method, created combat methods and creative tactics which conform to the geological characteristics and realistic conditions of our country and to the armament and equipment of our armed forces.

The chuche-oriented tactics and operational plans, including all-out and immediate counterattacks against an enemy sudden offensive, continuous blows all along the front, encirclement and annihilation of enemy groups, the formation of a second front in the rear of the enemy by regular units, mountain battles and night operations, active front defense operations and offensives, the sharpshooters team movement, mobile artillery company activities, aircraft-search team movement, and tank-search team movement, knocked the hell out of the atrocious U.S. imperialist aggressors, who assumed bravado and bluster by resorting to their numerical and technological superiority. These tactics scored a decisive victory in the war.

Indeed, the chuche-oriented military thought and military art of the great leader made possible the creation of a new miracle in the worldwide history of wars. They put the haughty nose of U.S. imperialism out of joint, and were successful in displaying the mettle and glory of the heroic Korea to the whole world.

Our men of the People's Army and our people, who scored victory in the severe and rigorous 3-year war, came to attain the iron faith and will with which they can knock down enemies, no matter how strong they may be, as long as they can employ the great leader's chuche-oriented military thought, and as long as they can enjoy his excellent leadership.

The dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il, who is thoroughly enhancing the chuche-oriented military thought of the great leader, further developed and enriched the treasure house of the chuche-oriented military thought. He is judiciously leading the People's Army along the road of victory with his precise leadership.

The dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il, who set forth the slogan of conversion of the entire armed forces to the chuche ideology, made clear that the fundamental way to raise all men in the armed forces into revolutionary fighters of the chuche type is to teach them how to make their loyalty toward the party and the leader their first priority.

It is the intention of our party to make the entire People's Army and the people become revolutionary fighters who are endlessly loyal to the great leader. The dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il set forth the slogan "Let us fight for the great leader at the risk of our lives!" He then saw to it that the work of political and ideological indoctrination was intensified so that the slogan could become the firm faith and will of the men of the People's Army.

The dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il thoroughly embodied the chuche-oriented military thought in military construction and military activities, and energetically led the work designed to further strengthen the People's Army militarily and technologically. Thus today our People's Army has become a strong revolutionary armed might of 1-a-match-for-100.

Today, on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the great victory in the Fatherland Liberation War, our fatherland has become a dignified and self-reliant country which no enemy can recklessly antagonize.

The future of our fatherland, which is forcefully marching ahead in order to consummate the cause of chuche while upholding the great leader and following the guidance of the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il, is brilliant and resplendent, and our people and our People's Army are victorious and invincible at all times.

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